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1. Research Dossier.
Title: An examination of the relative benefits of a psychosocial cardiac 
rehabilitation programme for younger and older patients and for different 
types of Coronary Heart Disease.
Aim: The vast majority of evidence relating to the efficacy of cardiac 
rehabilitation is based on studies of white, middle-class males with 
myocardial infarction. There is a dearth of evidence relating to other sub­
groups of patients, such as those who have undergone coronary artery 
bypass surgery, older patients and women. This raises significant issues for 
clinical practice. Routine clinical practice entails providing a cardiac 
rehabilitation service for a range of individuals of different ages and with 
various forms of coronary heart disease. Bearing in mind the limited evidence 
available, how do we know if a specific programme is equally appropriate for
differing sub-groups of patients? This clinical question provides an 
opportunity to undertake empirical investigation.
The aim of the present study is to make use of the opportunities afforded by 
routine clinical practice as a basis for the investigation of issues that are both 
theoretically well motivated and relevant to everyday clinical practice. The 
specific questions are: (1) Can a standard cardiac rehabilitation programme 
show evidence of benefit for older as well as younger patients? (2) Can a 
standard rehabilitation programme show evidence of benefit for coronary 
artery bypass graft patients as well as myocardial infarction patients? (3) Is 
there any evidence of differences in outcome for men and women, taking into 
account the other variables described in (1) and (2)? And, finally, (4) Can 
standard cardiac rehabilitation show evidence of benefit for patients with 
varying degrees of psychological morbidity?
Data were collected over a twelve month period on physical and psychosocial 
baseline and outcome function, as part of routine clinical practice. These 
were then examined for evidence of change within patients, over time and 
between different sub-groups of patients. The data were analysed statistically 
using a variety of methods, including cluster analysis, regression analysis, 
chi-square, t-tests and non-parametric statistics. Implications for clinical 
practice are discussed.
2. Academic Dossier - two critical reviews.
2(a) Title: From Placebo to Credebo: the missing link in the healing 
process.
Aim: The placebo effect has long been something of a mystery. The 
response of researchers has broadly been of two kinds; either to dismiss it as 
an artefact; or to view it as an important, but unknown, component in 
treatment. The aim of this paper is to examine the relevance of the placebo 
effect to clinical practice. Existing theories of the placebo effect in medical 
and psychological research are first described and evaluated and then 
integrated with the notion of the ‘therapeutic alliance'. It is suggested that a 
fuller understanding of the placebo effect informs our understanding of the 
therapeutic alliance.
2(b) Title: Therapeutic Strategies and Outcomes: Perspectives from 
Different Cultures.
Two forms of psychological therapy, one Japanese the other Euro/American, 
are described and compared. The paper aims to examine the extent to which 
there are universal or culturally specific principles underpinning psychological 
therapy. Consideration is given to the implications for clinical practice of the 
application of any specific form of psychotherapy on members of a culture 
other than that within which the therapy has developed.
3. The Professional Dossier.
Title: Health Psychology and the Primary Care Strategy: A Discussion 
Document
The primary care strategy for Cornwall aims to develop an appropriate 
balance between primary and secondary care. This will involve extending into 
the primary care setting a range of services previously provided at the 
secondary care level. The Health Authority and Primary Care Practitioners 
are concerned to ensure that such services are as good or better than those 
currently provided. The aim of this paper is to draw upon the principles 
underpinning Health Psychology and apply these to the specific needs of 
service development within a local clinical context.
IV
An examination of the relative benefits of a psychosocial cardiac 
rehabilitation programme for younger and older patients and for 
different types of Coronary Heart Disease.
J Mitchell Noon
Introduction.
Psychosocial cardiac rehabilitation is predicated on the fact of a 
relationship between human behaviour and Coronary Heart Disease 
(CHD). It is now widely accepted that, in addition to the biological factors 
associated with heart disease, the development of CHD is also strongly 
influenced by such behavioural risk factors as diet, activity and smoking. It 
can also be influenced by psychological factors such as depression and 
anxiety. The evidence for these associations will be reviewed below and 
the implications of relevant research will be considered in relation to 
psychosocial approaches to cardiac rehabilitation.
Behavioural and Psychological Aspects of CHD
Since the 1950’s, when the first attempts were made to provide 
rehabilitation to patients with CHD (Levine and Lown, 1952), there has 
been a considerable literature examining the link between CHD and 
behavioural and psychological factors.
Over the years, the focus of interest has been on three broad areas: (i) 
Type-A/Type-B Behaviour and CHD, (ii) Social Factors (social support 
and isolation) and CHD, (iii) Mood and CHD. In more recent years.
interest has moved away from Type-A/B behaviour and onto questions of 
mood: particularly anxiety and depression. Type-A research continues, 
but as will be described below, the early promise of this research has not 
been fully supported by the evidence. The question of social isolation 
remains of interest and relevance but, as will also be described below, is 
largely seen as a secondary product of mood.
The initial focus of research has been on psychosocial factors as 
precursors, or risk factors, to the onset of CHD. However, there has also 
been an emerging interest in the status of psychosocial factors as 
prognostic indicators associated with recovery from CHD, which has led to 
the examination of treatment options that might be directed towards 
reducing the influence of negative psychosocial variables following CHD.
Type-A/Type-B Behaviour
Type-A behaviour was originally characterised in terms of 
competitiveness, time-urgency, and hostility (e.g. Freidman and 
Rosenman, 1974; Rosenman, et al 1975), in contrast to Type-B 
behaviour, which is the absence of these characteristics. People with 
Type-A behaviour were described as angry and distrustful, over-forceful, 
driven by a sense of urgency over almost all aspects of their lives, 
impatient and irritable (eg Mendes de Leon et al 1991 ). Rosenman, et al 
(1975) reported that men displaying Type-A behaviour were five times 
more likely to suffer recurrent Ml than men with Type-B characteristics, 
even if biological factors such as cholesterol, blood-pressure and lifestyle
were equated. And Mendes de Leon, et al, (1991) found that specific 
counselling directed towards the reduction of Type-A behaviour, in 
addition to standard rehabilitation, could reduce maladaptive behaviour 
and decrease cardiac morbidity by 44 percent. Subsequent research, 
however, has failed to replicate the original findings (summarised in 
McGee et al, 1994) and there has been a shift of emphasis away from 
Type-A as a general behavioural style towards specific elements of Type- 
A behaviour. The consensus now is that hostility/aggression is the more 
prominent psychological characteristic associated with risk for reinfarction 
(McGee, op. cit.). More recent research has reported a relationship, both 
in men and women, between hostility and increased risk of cardiac 
morbidity (e.g. Helmers et al, 1993).
Social Support/Isolation
There is evidence of an association between social isolation and 
increased risk of morbidity and mortality following CHD. Frasure-Smith 
and Prince (1985) found that in a sample of 453 male Ml patients, those 
who were unmarried and who did not receive any intervention to help 
cope with stress were approximately 80 percent more likely to die that 
those who were married. In the experimental group that received an 
intervention aimed at decreasing stress, there was no difference between 
married and unmarried men. Appels (1990) found a similar pattern in a 
group of patients living alone. Six-month mortality was nearly 100 percent 
greater than amongst a group of patients with equivalent CHD who lived 
with others.
The interpretation of these findings is uncertain, however, since social 
isolation may be secondary to mood problems, such as depression, which 
leads to social withdrawal and isolation, or it may be associated with 
differences in lifestyle factors, such as relatively poor self-care, in terms of 
poor diet, or an increased incidence of smoking and excessive alcohol 
consumption as a means of coping with anxiety or cardiac-related fears. It 
is also possible that those with least support are less likely to be 
compliant with cardiological treatment (Williams and Chesney, 1993), so 
that any differences in prognosis reflect self-neglect rather than any 
primary relationship between CHD and support/isolation. Lack of social 
support or isolation, then, may well be an artefact of other psychological 
difficulties.
Depression and Anxiety
In more recent times, the major focus of research into psychosocial 
aspects of CHD has been on psychological morbidity, particularly in terms 
of depression and anxiety. This has been prompted by the common 
clinical observation that depression and anxiety are a frequent 
accompaniment of CHD. Following a heart attack, for example, changes 
in mood are in many ways a natural response and may be viewed as part 
of a normal adjustment reaction, reflecting the apparent loss of health and 
function signified by the attack and worries about the future. However, as 
adjustment occurs and recovery begins, mood also should begin to lift. If 
this does not occur and the formerly natural responses of depression and
anxiety become extended in time and progress to a chronic state, then 
recovery is likely to be compromised.
It is estimated that between 15% and 30% of patients will have a clinically 
significant degree of anxiety or depression following a cardiac event 
(Carney et al 1991; Schliefer et al 1989). Schliefer et al (1989) estimated 
that 18 percent of a sample of 283 Ml patients showed formal symptoms 
of major depression and 27 percent had a less severe form of mood 
disorder, and Stern et al (1976) have demonstrated that 70% of patients 
who were depressed at six weeks remained depressed at one year follow 
up. Depression has also been related to an increased risk of mortality 
from cardiac arrest and is associated with occurrence of arrhythmia 
(Frasure-Smith, 1991). These authors state that: “Major depression in 
patients hospitalised following an Ml is an independent risk factor for 
mortality at 6 months. Its impact is at least equivalent to that of left 
ventricular dysfunction (Killip class >1) and history of previous Ml”, and 
Frasure-Smith et al (1995) report that this vulnerability extends to non- 
clinical levels of diminished mood. Griego (1993) found that somatic 
symptoms, e.g. fatigue, headaches, insomnia, weakness, shortness of 
breath, bodily aches and pains and palpitations were also more common 
among those suffering from depression.
Anxiety too is common amongst patients with CHD. Stern et al (1976) 
found that 67% of patients who were anxious at three months remained 
anxious at one year follow up. Anxiety may be accompanied by
adrenergic hyperactivity which produces tachycardia and hypertension 
(Lown et a! 1980) and these are associated with an increased risk of 
myocardial ischemia. Gullette et al (1997) examined the relationship 
between myocardial ischemia and specific emotional states: ‘negative’ 
emotions of anxiety, sadness, anger and ‘positive’ emotions of happiness 
and control. They performed 48 hour ambulatory monitoring on 58 
patients with known myocardial ischemia. They compared resting 
baseline ischemia with ambulatory levels over the 48 hour period and 
correlated this with patients’ concurrent diary ratings of mood states 
during the ambulatory period. 44 percent of the patients had a history of 
Ml and 38 percent of CABG, with the remainder showing a history of other 
cardiovascular disorder. They found a positive and significant correlation 
between higher levels of negative emotion recorded in the diary and 
higher levels and duration of ischemia. This effect held after adjustments 
were made for levels of activity, so that the effect was not an artefact of 
activity levels. There was also a correspondingly lower rate of ischemia in 
states of positive emotion, although the effect was smaller than that found 
for the negative emotions. These differential effects of positive and 
negative emotions allowed the authors to conclude that the levels of 
ischemia were not simply a function of arousal, since this would have 
been equivalent in positive and negative emotional states. It was also 
noted that the states of emotion involved in triggering ischemia were not 
particularly high (rated between 2 and 3 on a 5-point intensity scale), from 
which the authors conclude that it is not just severe emotional distress that 
is likely to trigger adverse physical symptoms. These findings are
consistent with those of Frasure-Smith et al (1995) mentioned above. 
Finally, Gullette et al examined the question of cause and effect. They 
found that in only 2 percent of cases did ischemia occur after physical 
symptoms of chest pain, so that for the vast majority of cases the ischemia 
was silent. They argue that this supports the view that the ischemic events 
were caused by the mental stress, rather than vice-versa. However, the 
authors did not discuss the possibility that the differential rates of silent 
ischemia may have been a consequence of more serious baseline 
physical pathology rather than emotion, and also that higher rates of 
negative emotion may be a result of greater pathology, rather than vice 
versa. Their results, therefore, are suggestive, but not definitive.
Anxiety and depression can also lead to unnecessary restrictions in 
activity levels, and work effort, poor family relationships, psychosexual 
disorder and invalidism (Lewin, 1995). One of the most common reactions 
following Ml is to fear and deliberately avoid activity (Croog, 1977). 
Fatigue and other symptoms such as pains around the chest region are 
related by the patient to the heart and this can lead to a reduction in social 
and physical activity and increased preoccupation with the symptoms. 
This reduced activity then leads to deconditioning of the myocardium and 
muscle wasting and joint stiffness that results in greater fatigue and 
feelings of illness causing, in turn more anxiety. It will be apparent that this 
is a vicious circle and provides the basis for an increased likelihood of 
somatisation, leading to the development of fear and increased chances 
of psychological and cardiac morbidity. It is not, therefore, surprising if
quality of life is also affected. It has been reported that 20-60% of patients 
will experience long term reduction in quality of life as the result of the 
psychological factors highlighted above (Lewin, 1995).
Putting the theory into practice: Psychosocial Cardiac Rehabilitation
Bearing in mind the above findings, it is understandable that clinicians 
have been motivated to attempt to influence the relevant psychosocial 
variables that have been identified as risk factors for morbidity or mortality 
following Ml. It follows that comprehensive treatment of CHD should also 
encompass the behavioural and psychological factors underlying its 
development and prognosis. There is limited benefit in treating the 
physical aspects of CHD if the patient continues to engage in high risk 
behaviours or is disabled by depression and anxiety, thus increasing the 
risks of subsequent morbidity and mortality.
Such considerations have led to the development of psychosocial cardiac 
rehabilitation programmes that aim to encompass both the physical and 
the psychological characteristics of CHD and provide methods of 
enhancing recovery. In recent years there has been a considerable 
amount of research aimed at evaluating the efficacy of such programmes. 
However, before reviewing the evidence, it is important to be clear about 
the definition of cardiac rehabilitation. This has two aspects. The first is a 
question of the definition of the aims of cardiac rehabilitation , and this is 
relatively straightforward. The second is a definition of the means by 
which those aims can be realised - i.e. the relevant components of
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cardiac rehabilitation , and this is more contentious. It will be argued that 
the lack of appreciation of the differences in types of cardiac rehabilitation 
has led to confusion in the literature, as will be described below.
Looking first at the aims of cardiac rehabilitation , these encompass 
preventing the progression of cardiac disease, preventing progression of 
psychological disorder, promoting recovery of pre-morbid function and 
enabling adaptation to the changes in an individual's life following CHD. 
This entails a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach to treatment, as 
reflected in widely quoted definition of cardiac rehabilitation as:
"... the sum of interventions required to ensure the best possible 
physical, psychological and social conditions so that patients with 
chronic or post-acute cardiac disease may, by their own efforts, 
preserve or resume their proper place in society.” (European 
Heart Journal, 1992)
However, as noted above, the means by which these aims may be 
achieved is less clear: what are the precise ingredients of the “sum of 
interventions” in the above quote? It is apparent from the literature that 
there are different varieties of cardiac rehabilitation and it is evident that 
different approaches achieve different outcomes. At least four varieties of 
cardiac rehabilitation can be discerned in the literature that will be 
reviewed below. Because there are some contradictions in the reported 
findings from research on the efficacy of cardiac rehabilitation, it will be
helpful to identify its different varieties before reviewing the literature. 
These will be referred to as:
1. Standard Rehabilitation
2. Comprehensive Rehabilitation, Type-1
3. Comprehensive Rehabilitation, Type-2
4. Psychological Rehabilitation
Standard cardiac rehabilitation consists of exercise-only rehabilitation. 
This is the standard against which the addition of psychosocial elements 
to the rehabilitation process are often compared. Comprehensive 
Rehabilitation consists of exercise plus psychosocial components to the 
intervention. The psychosocial components, in turn, appear to take two 
forms in the literature. For ease of reference, the first of these will be 
labelled ‘comprehensive rehabilitation type-1’. This consists of the 
modification of behaviour known to increase the risk of further morbidity or 
mortality, alongside exercise. In a number of studies described below, this 
type of comprehensive rehabilitation is often carried out by non­
psychologists: usually physiotherapists and/or nurses (Cupples & 
McKnight, 1994; Frasure-Smith, et al, 1997a; Carrlson et al 1997; Taylor 
et al 1997; Campbell et al, 1998; Jolly et al, 1999). There is, though, a 
second type of comprehensive rehabilitation that will be referred to as 
‘comprehensive rehabilitation type-2’ (Oldenberg, et al, 1995; Blumenthal 
et al, 1997). In this case, the psychosocial ingredient is usually described
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as ‘stress-management’, and is often implemented by psychologists, 
alongside other healthcare professionals.
The differences between type-1 and type-2 rehabilitation are partly real 
and partly semantic. There do not appear to be any explicit guidelines on 
the use of these terms and the terms ‘risk-factor modification’ and ‘stress- 
management’ seem to be used somewhat indiscriminately, often to refer 
to what appear to be identical processes. This is not surprising, since 
there is some overlap between the aims of both. However, there are also 
important differences between the two, and the failure to specify these 
may account for some of the variability in findings between studies.
In order to make the differences explicit, risk-factor modification, in this 
context, may be defined as the management of behaviours that are 
associated with an increased risk of coronary disease. The behavioural 
risk factors include smoking, lack of exercise leading to reduced cardio­
vascular health, poor diet, and hypertension that may be exacerbated by 
stress. The aim of risk-factor modification is to identify circumstances 
where there is increased risk and provide the individual with the means to 
change his or her behaviour in ways that reduce the risk. For instance, if 
the high risk is associated with smoking, then the individual may be 
provided with behavioural methods of reducing smoking. If the risk is 
increased by worry, or external work, social or family stresses, then this 
can be addressed with information which enables the individual to identify 
and challenge erroneous cardiac fears, alongside the opportunity to
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engage in supervised exercise, which in itself can restore confidence. If 
the increased risk is due to physical tension, then the individual may be 
taught methods of relaxation. These are all, basically, a form of health 
promotion. The ‘stress' in this context may be viewed as a variety of 
normal response to serious ill-health. Any particular psychological 
problems, though, are secondary to the illness, rather than primary.
What is referred to as stress-management, in the context of cardiac 
rehabilitation , has some overlapping aims, and as mentioned above, is 
often used interchangeably with the term ‘risk-factor modification'. There 
is, though an important difference between the nature of the problems for 
which stress-management is indicated and those that are appropriate for 
risk-factor modification. Stress-management, as defined here, refers to a 
psychological intervention aimed at clinically significant levels of 
emotional disorder. Emotional disorder may also lead to increased risk 
behaviours: for instance, overeating as a symptom of depression, or 
anxiety that may induce heightened blood-pressure. These, in turn, may 
then bring about increased risks of re-infarction or angina. However, the 
stress is a consequence of serious psychological morbidity such as 
clinical depression, clinical anxiety and other long-term personality 
characteristics, such as hostility and anger. These may be primary 
problems, that existed before the illness, or secondary problems, following 
the illness, that have assumed a magnitude to constitute a formal 
diagnosis of psychological disorder and which are not amenable to the 
types of health promotion techniques described above. As mentioned
12
earlier, the kinds of psychological problems for which stress-management, 
as defined here, is necessary constitute only between 15 and 30 percent 
of cases amongst the CHD population.
The difference between the two types of intervention, then, reside in the 
degree of psychological dysfunction in the recipients of the intervention. 
Those requiring stress-management suffer disabling stress due to 
psychological conditions such as anxiety, depression or long-term 
maladaptive personality characteristics. By contrast, the stress identified 
in risk-factor modification approaches takes a more general form. It is not 
pathological, but a reflection of general difficulties in adapting to the 
effects of serious illness, or problems of changing risky behaviour. Indeed, 
it is helpful to view the aims of risk-factor modification and stress- 
management as representing a spectrum of severity from what may be 
termed ‘normal’ stress to ‘excessive’ or pathological stress. The former is 
the target of risk-factor modification, and the latter of stress-management.
Finally, there is one important example of a fourth variety of cardiac 
rehabilitation, which will be referred to as ‘psychological rehabilitation’ 
(Jones and West, 1995; Trzcieniecka-Green and Steptoe, 1996). In this 
case, the rehabilitation consists solely of psychological techniques, 
without exercise-based rehabilitation. These different approaches are 
summarised in Table 1, and it will be helpful to bear these differences in 
mind when considering the evidence to be reviewed below.
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Table 1. Four types of cardiac rehabilitation
‘Standard’
Rehabilitation
‘Comprehensive’
Rehabilitation
Type-1
‘Comprehensive’
Rehabilitation
Type-2
‘Psychological’
Rehabilitation
= exercise only = exercise + 
psychosocial 
interventions aimed 
at risk factor 
modification - often, 
but not always, 
nurse-led
= exercise + 
psychosocial 
interventions aimed 
at stress- 
management - 
often, but not 
always,
psychologist-led
= psychological
interventions only,
without exercise:
(psychological
therapies,
counselling,
relaxation-training,
stress-management)
-psychologist-led
The following review is concerned with the three different types of 
psychosocial intervention and evidence of their efficacy.
The starting point is a paper by Oldridge, et al (1988). They undertook a 
meta-analysis of ten randomised clinical trials, dating from the early 
1970’s. The trials comprised 4347 patients post-MI. 2202 of these 
received rehabilitation, and the remaining 2145 were controls receiving 
standard post-discharge cardiac care. The rehabilitation in question 
consisted of exercise and risk-factor modification, although the precise 
ingredients of each rehabilitation package varied between programmes. 
There is no information about the composition of the teams or who 
undertook the risk-factor modification and it is acknowledged that nothing 
is known about patient variability, time of entry into the trials, length of 
intervention, or components of intervention. Nevertheless, Oldridge et al 
argue that by examining only within group effects rather than between 
group effects, the consequences of the variability between trials is 
minimised.
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Bearing these limitations in mind, they found a 24 percent reduction in all­
cause death and a 25 percent reduction for cardiovascular mortality in 
patients receiving rehabilitation, compared with those receiving standard 
treatment without rehabilitation. Oldridge et al argue, though, that 
conclusions about the benefits of rehabilitation must further be tempered 
by the lack of adequate control for potential Hawthorne and placebo 
effects due to increased attention, support and surveillance received by 
the intervention and control patients. Nevertheless, the evidence 
described by Oldridge has stimulated a great deal of interest and a 
number of subsequent studies.
A more recent meta-analysis was undertaken by Linden, et al (1996).
They examined 23 randomised controlled trials, comprising 3180 patients, 
2024 of whom received some form of psychosocial treatment, compared 
with the remaining 1156 controls. Eighteen of the 23 studies included in 
the analysis comprised patients with Ml and the remainder comprised 
some combination of Ml, CABG, or other coronary artery disease. The 
authors were interested in evaluating the extent to which the specific 
addition of psychosocial treatments to standard rehabilitation, meaning, in 
this case, exercise-only rehabilitation, conferred any advantage. There is 
no detail, though, about the nature and composition of the psychosocial 
treatments. Nevertheless, they found evidence of a significant effect, with 
a 41 percent reduction in all-cause mortality and a 46 percent reduction in 
cardiac morbidity at two year follow-up for those who had received the 
psychosocial treatments in addition to standard exercise rehabilitation.
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There was also evidence of improved quality of life and reduced anxiety 
and depression in the psychosocial population. Their conclusion was that: 
“The addition of psychosocial treatments to standard cardiac rehabilitation 
regimens reduces mortality and morbidity, psychological distress and 
some biological risk factors." (p745).
However, these claims have been criticised in terms of the statistical 
reliability of the meta-analytic techniques used. West (1997) suggests that 
the data presented by Linden et al includes incomplete studies which lack 
rigour and that the conclusions are vitiated accordingly. However,
Redfern (1997) points out that despite these reservations. Linden et al's 
analysis produces a comparable risk estimate for mortality to that reported 
by West in Jones and West (1995 - see below for a full discussion of the 
latter). Consequently, despite any methodological reservations 
concerning their analysis, the findings reported by Linden et al seem 
consistent with other analyses.
Subsequent to the Linden et al review, Oldridge (1998) has reviewed 
twelve recent reports of cardiac rehabilitation in the literature, only one of 
which was included in the Linden et al meta-analysis (Turner, et al, 1995). 
Some of these suggest benefits from cardiac rehabilitation and some find 
no evidence of benefit.
Amongst those claiming benefit, Blumenthal et al (1997), examined the 
prevention of stress in patients with myocardial ischemia and the extent to
16
which adverse cardiac events might be reduced following stress- 
management training. The intervention consisted of exercise versus 
stress-management, with a control group of patients who were unable to 
attend either programme. There was found to be a significant advantage 
for the stress-management group compared with the exercise group and 
for both, compared with the usual care controls.
Trzcieniecka-Green and Steptoe (1996) evaluated quality of life outcome 
for patients post-MI or post-CABG following stress-management. The 
quality of life measures included ratings of emotional well-being, social 
activities, chest-pain and general functioning in 50 patients receiving 
group stress-management, compared with a waiting-1 ist/usual care control 
group. The authors reported significant improvement for the intervention 
group over the control group, both for Ml and CABG patients, on all 
measures at 6 months. They subsequently assigned the waiting-list 
controls to stress-management following the study, but found relatively 
little improvement except in measures of anxiety and depression.
In contrast to these generally positive results, however, negative findings 
are reported by a number of investigators. Oldenberg et al (1995), in a 
study of rehabilitation applied to CABG patients, measured improvements 
in risk-factors (diet, exercise, smoking) and general improvements in 
quality of life following rehabilitation. The rehabilitation consisted of a six 
week psychosocial programme, including goal-setting, stress- 
management, reinforcement of adaptive change, and the provision of
17
social support. Each patient identified his or her own goals and the 
programme was tailored to individual needs. The investigators found little 
benefit for the intervention group compared with the usual care controls, 
both of whom showed some improvements in quality of life. There was, 
though, a slight advantage for the intervention group in exercise capacity.
Several studies of nurse-led intervention report limited or negative benefit. 
Carlsson et al (1997) compared usual care following Ml with a nurse-led 
exercise programme following discharge from hospital. Patients were 
randomly allocated to one or the other treatment and evaluated in terms of 
life-style changes (diet, smoking and exercise). There was found to be an 
advantage in beneficial dietary change for the nurse-led group, but no 
significant differences on other measures. A similar lack of effect was 
reported by Taylor et al (1997), in a comparison of a home-based nurse- 
led risk-modification programme (i.e. health education) and usual care. 
They found no advantage for the intervention group over the controls at 
12 months on measures of life-style change and psychological 
improvement.
Cupples and McKnight (1994) undertook a health education intervention 
with patients with angina, with the aim of reducing cardiovascular risk 
factors. Patients were given written and verbal health advice and 
information regarding diet, smoking and exercise at four monthly intervals 
to a follow-up point at two years. At this stage intervention patients were 
compared with usual care controls and assessed on objective measures
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of cardiovascular function. The result was that while there were some 
quality of life gains for the intervention group, in terms of diet and exercise 
and consequently fewer restrictions in normal function, the objective 
measures of cholesterol concentration, blood-pressure and smoking were 
equivalent in both groups. Cupples and McKnight (1999) reported a 5 
year follow-up of the same patients and found that most of the benefits for 
the intervention group had disappeared, although there remained a 
slightly higher level of exercise and better use of prophylactic medication. 
Nevertheless, the gains from the initial intervention were relatively slight.
Campbell, et al (1998) reported a similar nurse-led health education 
intervention amongst a random sample of 1343 patients in General 
Practice with a history of heart disease. There were 673 intervention 
patients and 670 usual care controls. At one year there were increases in 
functional status, reduction in pain and general health improvements over 
the baseline scores, but no improvements in Anxiety or Depression as 
measured by questionnaire. However, it is apparent from their data that 
the average baseline levels of anxiety and depression were below the 
clinical level of potential significance. The authors note that only 14 
percent of patients were clinically anxious and 6 percent clinically 
depressed at baseline, although there is no discussion of any sub-group 
effects. It also remains to be seen, bearing in mind the findings of Cupples 
and McKnight (1999) described above, whether the gains for the 
intervention group that have been reported at one year will persist in the 
longer term.
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Jolly, et al (1999) reported a large scale study of post-MI and angina 
patients in primary care. The intervention was a nurse-coordinated health- 
promotion programme in which specialist nurses liaised with practice 
nurses to ensure adequate follow-up of patients in the community. 
Objective measures of cardiovascular function were taken at baseline and 
one year follow-up and intervention patients were compared with usual 
care controls. At one year there was found to be no difference between 
the intervention and control groups on any objective measure. The 
authors argue that the lack of apparent effect was possibly due to the 
complexities of coordinating other staff and the variability amongst those 
staff in resources available for optimal care. They also point out that the 
health-promotion model used may have been inappropriate, being based 
on system which emphasises the importance of motivating change, 
whereas for this particular population motivation is generally high already, 
and so some of the techniques may well have been redundant.
A question raised by the above studies concerns the gualitv of the 
behaviour-change interventions that have been used. Stott, et al (1994) 
have highlighted some of the limitations inherent in many of the health 
promotion techniques used in primary care. They argue that while the 
standard health promotion approaches may offer viable opportunities for 
changing health behaviours, there is sometimes a neglect of the patients’ 
“inner readiness to change”. In other words, behavioural change requires 
both method and volition; and the latter cannot be taken for granted.
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There is no guarantee that health-care staff in general will have the ability 
to encourage change and facilitate its maintenance in others.
The problem of whether the professionals involved have appropriate 
psychosocial skills to succeed in their aims is highlighted in one of the 
more influential studies of nurse-led intervention in the recent literature. 
Frasure-Smith, et al (1997a) evaluated the effects of a home-based 
nursing intervention on lyear cardiac mortality amongst men and women 
following Ml. The intervention consisted of a home visit in which 
psychosocial difficulties were identified and, to quote the authors, “dealt 
with”. This was followed by a second visit within one month where 
intervention in the form of “emotional support, reassurance, education, 
practical advice, and referral to family doctors, cardiologists, or other 
health resources” were provided as required. None of the nurses 
undertaking these tasks were given special training in psychosocial 
methods, but were assumed to have the requisite skills on the basis of 
their experience in cardiology. The outcome was that the intervention had 
no impact on mortality rates at one year. It was also reported that “The 
programme's impact on depression and anxiety among survivors was 
small.” (p473).
However, there are a number of limitations in this study. The intervention 
in question was a nurse-led, home-based, non-specialist programme. 
Lewin, et al (1997a) raise the question of the quality of the intervention, 
which failed, after an average of 20 patient contacts to relieve
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psychological distress. They point out that there is a well-established 
literature that demonstrates the efficacy of properly presented 
psychological interventions in relieving psychological distress. To expect 
health staff untrained in such methods to succeed is, perhaps, naive. It 
might be that the study demonstrates only that untrained staff delivering 
an atypical form of psychosocial intervention are likely to fail in their 
endeavour. Frasure-Smith, et al (1997b) acknowledge these criticism and 
state that to extend their specific results "... to all approaches to cardiac 
rehabilitation ... would be a terrible disservice to post-myocardial infarction 
patients.” (pi 401). It appears, then, that there is an issue of training and 
competence that must also be considered in evaluating the outcome of 
such interventions.
Lewin et al’s critique of Frasure-Smith et al’s study implies that 
psychosocial interventions should be carried out by professionals 
competent in validated psychosocial methods. However, there is evidence 
to suggest that competence in psychosocial methods is no guarantee of 
successful outcome. One study stands out in questioning the evidence of 
efficacy for psychosocial interventions. Jones and West (1995) undertook 
a large scale, multi-centre, randomised controlled evaluation of what they 
termed ‘psychological rehabilitation' following Ml. The interventions in 
question were designed by psychologists and carried out by either 
psychologists or nurses trained in the relevant methods. The aim of the 
study was to provide further empirical evidence relevant to the claims of 
benefit made by many small scale studies which have combined
22
‘standard’ (exercise-based) rehabilitation with some form of psychological 
intervention. They distinguish between combined approaches or 
‘comprehensive rehabilitation', and ‘psychological rehabilitation'; the latter 
term meaning purely psychological approaches to rehabilitation which 
lack any of the additional components of comprehensive rehabilitation.
The decision to exclude comprehensive rehabilitation was made in order 
"... to evaluate rehabilitation by psychological therapy and counselling 
independent of possible contamination by exercise training or risk factor 
modification.” (p1517). In order to address this issue, the authors 
investigated 2328 patients with Ml from six District General Hospitals.
Patients were randomly assigned to intervention and control groups. The 
intervention group was attended by patients and, for the first two sessions, 
spouses. Participants received 14 hours of information-giving, group 
discussion, relaxation, stress management and individual counselling.
The control group received standard care from their General Practitioners 
and Cardiological Services, but without specific rehabilitation.
Baseline measures of all participants were taken and comprised number 
of angina episodes in past week, frequency of Glyceryl Trinitrate use in 
past week, a verbal rating scale for disability, the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression (HAD) scores. State Anxiety, and a structured interview 
covering attitudes to the Ml and expectations of future life. Results at
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baseline were compared with results at six month follow-up. Both groups 
were also compared for medical status at twelve months.
The finding was that psychological therapy and counselling did not show 
any advantages over the control group treatment in any of the 
psychological or physical measures. Jones and West considered a 
number of possible explanations for the apparent lack of efficacy of the 
psychological intervention. They point out that there was no evidence of 
any sub-group effect whereby those patients with, say, higher levels of 
psychological dysfunction, may have responded relatively more to the 
intervention than the rest of the group with relatively less scope for 
psychological improvement. There was no indication of such sub­
grouping, or any relative variability as a function of baseline condition.
The authors also discount the possibility of a Hawthorne effect whereby 
local practitioners providing ‘standard care’ may have been aware of good 
practice in cardiac rehabilitation and given essentially comparable 
treatment to the controls as was received by the intervention group.
Similar conclusions apply to the question of whether follow-up was too 
soon, whether the change measures lacked sensitivity, whether the study 
groups were atypical due to their willingness to participate, compared with 
the 25 percent of patients invited to attend but who declined. Their 
conclusion was that “Rehabilitation programmes based on psychological 
therapy, counselling, relaxation training, and stress management seem to
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offer little objective benefit to patients who have experienced myocardial 
infarction compared with previous reports of smaller trials”. (p1517)
It is important, though, to be clear exactly what questions were being 
addressed. Jones and West were not studying comprehensive 
rehabilitation. They were, instead, examining one ingredient of 
comprehensive rehabilitation in isolation from the others. This creates 
some difficulties. The idea that there is a psychological element in cardiac 
rehabilitation that can be separated from the other components is 
debatable. As Noon (1997) points out “ ... the psychological element of 
rehabilitation is a thread that runs through the whole rehabilitation 
process, including the physical aspects of rehabilitation. To extract and 
isolate it changes its potency and efficacy. A physical analogy would be to 
isolate hydrogen and ‘prove’ that it had no thirst quenching properties - 
though the fact remains that it does if combined in the correct proportions 
with oxygen. In the same way the combination of psychological, physical, 
and social components in rehabilitation has properties that none of the 
components should be expected to have in isolation.” (p979).
There is also a problem with the components of the psychological 
intervention. Pither and Williams (1997) have criticised the details, 
pointing out, for example, that it is inappropriate to use a stress-reduction 
model to deal with health-related anxieties and that ‘counselling’ is not 
usually a component of comprehensive rehabilitation. In addition, for the 
‘treatment-as-usual’ control group, “Treatment as usual from their general
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practitioners could well have consisted of personally relevant advice, 
information, and anxiety alleviation, and may have been very effective 
treatment.” (p979). Indeed, in response to the comments above, Jones 
and West (1997) concede that their study "... does not prove that 
psychological rehabilitation is unsuccessful, nor can the conclusion be 
drawn that a psychological component to a comprehensive programme 
would not be beneficial.” (p979).
On the basis of the evidence examined so far, it is apparent that there are 
discrepancies in the results of cardiac rehabilitation. However, it will be 
apparent that the types of rehabilitation vary, as described earlier (Table 
1 ). There were also some differences amongst the patient groups studied. 
Oldridge et al's (1988) meta-analysis was of Ml patients only, whereas 
Oldenberg (1995) focused on CABG patients. Indeed this difference in 
type of CHD is offered by Oldenberg et al as an explanation of the 
apparent discrepancies between their findings and other data derived 
from Ml patients. They suggest that CABG patients may differ in 
rehabilitation needs from Ml patients, on whom the majority of evidence to 
date is based. However, Linden et al’s (1996) meta-analysis did include 
some CABG patients and there was no reference to any differences in 
responsiveness from this group, and so the possibility also exists that the 
ingredients of the intervention provided by Oldenberg et al may also 
account for the differences in outcome observed.
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The studies reported by Frasure-Smith et a! (1997a), Carlsson et al
(1997), Taylor et al (1997), Cupples and McKnight (1994), Campbell et al
(1998) and Jolly et al (1999) were all carried out by professionals who, 
arguably, may not have been fully equipped to undertake the 
psychosocial tasks required, or who may have been using techniques that 
were of limited applicability to the patient population in question.
Nevertheless, even when apparently sophisticated psychological 
practitioners undertake the task of rehabilitation, the evidence does not 
appear to support the view that cardiac rehabilitation is effective (Jones 
and West, 1995). Here too, though, there is a question of the 
appropriateness of the intervention, as already described, Jones and 
West (1997) conceded that their results were of limited applicability.
In summary, the literature is replete with contradictions. As things stand, 
the evidence suggests that sometimes cardiac rehabilitation appears to 
help and sometimes it does not. It appears to help some patients and not 
others. It appears to be effective when applied by some professionals, but 
not others. One way of looking at the apparent discrepancies is in terms of 
the distinctions made earlier between different types of cardiac 
rehabilitation (Table 1). Conclusions about efficacy should, therefore, be 
reserved for the specific type of intervention in question and not extended 
to all forms of rehabilitation, cardiac rehabilitation interventions need to 
become more specific about their aims and methods and the outcomes
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that might reasonably be expected from the specific approaches taken, 
and definitive conclusions await clearer definitions.
Cardiac Rehabilitation and Older Patients
One question of particular importance is whether cardiac rehabilitation is 
suitable for older patients as well as those who are younger. It is reported 
that in the United States, heart disease is responsible for 44% of all 
deaths for those over the age of 65 years (Cay, 1995). In the United 
Kingdom, Angina seems to remain at a stable level of about 15% to 17% 
after the age of 65 years (Mittelmark, et al, 1993). However, other forms of 
heart disease do show age-related trends. The prevalence of Ml is 11 % in 
the age group between 65 years and 69 years, but increases to 18% in 
those aged 80 years to 84 years, and the over 65's account for 80% of 
cases of chronic heart failure (Mair, et al, 1996).
A recent report of cardiac rehabilitation in the United Kingdom identifies 
that fact that the development of cardiac rehabilitation has been focused 
on younger populations and most often white males to the neglect of older 
people, women and ethnic minorities (NHS Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination, 1998). It is reported that the uptake of cardiac 
rehabilitation is less frequent amongst elderly and female patients than 
amongst younger and male patients. The report concludes that “Services 
should meet the needs of all groups - including women, the elderly, ethnic 
minorities and people with all types of heart disease” (pi ). Potential 
reasons for these discrepancies are discussed in the report, including the
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possibility that these sub-groups may be less likely to be invited onto 
cardiac rehabilitation , and that older people in particular may have fears 
about the potential risks of cardiac rehabilitation . In addition, it is 
suggested that because of the current trends for cardiac rehabilitation 
programmes to comprise mainly younger males, these other sub-groups 
may be reluctant to participate for fear of feeling out of place.
The apparent reluctance recorded in the literature may also reflect 
attitudes of relatives and healthcare staff who subscribe to 
misconceptions about the appropriateness of cardiac rehabilitation , 
particularly for older patients. Indeed there is a literature which expressed 
precisely such caution with respect to older people. For example, Morro 
(1989) writes; “Until very recently in the history of cardiac rehabilitation, 
older patients (65+ years) were not considered appropriate for vigorous 
exercise training following cardiac events. This attitude toward older 
patients was based upon the belief that older patients could not improve 
their cardiac status sufficiently to warrant the expense of treatment, and 
the fear that older patients could not be exercised safely” (p59). Indeed, in 
one meta-analysis, O’Conner, et al (1989) reported that 20 out of 22 
studies examined excluded patients aged over 65 years from their 
analysis on the basis that they may be unrepresentative of the potential 
benefits of rehabilitation (cited by Marchionni, et al, p. 176).
In contrast to these views, the current recommendations are for the 
inclusion of a wider range of the population with heart disease as well as
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a wider range of types of CHD. However, even if there is increasing 
acceptance of the relevance of cardiac rehabilitation for older people, the 
evidence of its benefit remains sketchy. Oldridge (1998) points out that in 
recent guidelines for cardiac rehabilitation in the United States, the 
evidence-base for the recommendations, relating to cardiac rehabilitation 
for older people, were derived from one non-randomised control trial and 
seven observational studies. Oldridge located an additional 12 studies 
that had been published since the guidelines, but found that only one of 
these provided age-specific data (Marchionni, et al, 1994).
Marchionni, et al (op.cit) examined the response to standard (exercise- 
based) rehabilitation amongst 16 patients aged under 65 years compared 
with 16 patients over 65 years in age. These were also compared with a 
non-random control group comprising “Those who refused or could not 
participate in the programme..." (p i75). All patients had had a recent Ml. 
The programme consisted of 24 sessions of ‘endurance training’ and 
participants were assessed on physical capacity at baseline and 8-week 
outcome. They report that there were no differences in compliance as a 
function of age. Physical capacity was statistically equivalent between all 
four groups at baseline and there was significant improvement in younger 
and older patients in the rehabilitation group. The younger rehabilitation 
group increased physical capacity 55 percent over baseline at 8 weeks 
and the older group 65 percent. The younger controls also improved 
spontaneously to a significant degree over baseline, during the time 
period in question, but the older controls did not. There was no difference
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relating to age in episodes of adverse events during exercise. No further 
information is available in terms of other characteristics of patients, such 
as psychosocial status and the effects, if any, of rehabilitation on this, and 
there are no data beyond 8 weeks.
Since the Oldridge review, Milani and Lavie (1998) have reported a study 
of psychosocial factors in 268 consecutive admissions to cardiac 
rehabilitation who were aged > 65 years. These patients were measured 
at baseline on depressive symptoms and quality of life (mental health, 
energy/fatigue, general health, bodily pain, functional status, and well­
being). Of the 268 patients, 24 percent were post-MI and 44 percent were 
post-CABG; the remainder being post-angioplasty. 18 percent of the total 
sample were defined as depressed on the symptom checklist used, and 
these were further distinguished into ‘moderate’ and ‘severe’ depression, 
in approximately equal proportions. It was found that the depressed group 
as a whole were significantly impaired, compared with the non-depressed 
patients, on measures of exercise capacity (a treadmill test). They also 
had greater symptoms of anxiety, and reduced quality of life on all 
measures at baseline.
Following a 12 week exercise-based rehabilitation programme, all patients 
were found to show benefit in measures of fitness, psychological status 
and well-being. This included the depressed patients, who showed 
significant improvement on measures of exercise capacity, psychological 
status and well-being. However, it is clear from the data presented that
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the depressed group continued to show psychological symptoms on all 
measures at a higher level at outcome than the baseline measures for the 
non-depressed group. Unfortunately the authors do not report any 
analysis of these between group differences at outcome, although they do 
report that a large proportion of these patients “were no longer 
depressed”. This, presumably, means that they did not score above the 
cut-off point they had formerly identified as the criterion for depression. 
However, the persisting higher psychological symptom scores suggest 
that the authors' conclusions are somewhat ambiguous. The patients may 
not have scored above a certain criterion level, but this does not mean 
they no longer reported symptoms of psychological distress. Nor is there 
any further discussion of relative changes between the group the authors 
identified as ‘severe’ and ‘moderate’ depression. This distinction is not 
referred to in the overall outcome measures.
The conclusion to be drawn from Milani and Lavie, then, is that exercise- 
based rehabilitation confers benefits to patients whether or not they are 
depressed, but that the depressed patients appear to benefit less than 
those who are not depressed. Unfortunately, this conclusion is not the one 
reported by the authors, who simply refer to the benefits obtained by the 
depressed group, and the questions raised by the persisting between- 
group differences are not addressed by them. For instance, what is the 
clinical significance of persisting psychological symptoms, even if below a 
given cut-off point? Do patients with varying degrees of psychological 
morbidity require different kinds of cardiac rehabilitation? Nor do Milani
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and Lavie present any separate analysis of the different types of CHD (Ml, 
CABG, Angioplasty). Are the results consistent across these groups, or is 
there variability depending on the type of CHD?
Myocardial Infarction (Ml) and Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG)
As will be apparent from the above studies, much of the evidence for the 
efficacy or otherwise of cardiac rehabilitation is derived from populations 
with Ml. The evidence relating to psychosocial intervention for CABG is 
limited and, as already mentioned Oldenberg (1995) has suggested that 
CABG patients may require different forms of rehabilitation than Ml 
patients. This sense of caution is also reflected in the recent SHPIC report 
(Waugh, 1998) which concluded that further research is necessary to 
clarify the relative likely benefits of rehabilitation for CABG patients. 
However, the limited evidence that does exist indicates the potential for 
benefit.
Magni, et al (1987) report a prospective study of psychosocial outcome 
one year after cardiovascular surgery, including CABG. They found that 
25 percent of a population of 99 patients - 69 men and 30 women - 
continued to experience significant psychological morbidity one year after 
surgery. This consisted mainly of symptoms of depression and anxiety. 
Two important findings were that this was independent of physical 
improvement, so that physical prognosis is not predictive of psychological 
prognosis, and that preoperative organic variables were not correlated 
with psychological morbidity. The first of these findings is unexpected in
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view of the evidence that regular physical exercise can improve mood (eg 
Palleschi et al, 1998; Craft et al, 1998). However, the patients described 
by Magni et al were not, in fact, receiving any exercise intervention: the 
physical indices were simply a standard assessment of prognosis with 
'treatment as usual' following heart surgery. It remains possible that if 
those patients had been provided with formal exercise their mood may 
have improved accordingly.
Hill, et al (1992) review five studies of psychosocial interventions following 
CABG. They point out that, in contrast to the literature on Ml, the focus on 
CABG interventions tends to be on immediate post-surgery recovery and 
the extent to which psychological factors might impeded recovery. Of the 
studies reviewed, four provide evidence of a reduction in psychological 
distress following psychosocial intervention, either before or after surgery. 
Distress, in this context, is defined as self-reported anxiety. The 
interventions were essentially information-giving and preparation for 
surgery and its after-effects (Aiken and Henrichs 1971; Anderson, 1987; 
Beckie, 1989) and ‘emotional inoculation' (Pimm and Feist, 1984) for the 
predicted adverse effects of surgery. In all cases, reduced psychological 
morbidity was recorded in those patients receiving the psychosocial 
interventions compared with controls. Only in one study was this 
apparently beneficial effect not found. Schindler et al (1989) found no 
decrease in psychological distress amongst patients provided with pre- 
and post-surgery psychotherapy. However, there was a reported 
decrease in post-operative complications and time spent in hospital after
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surgery. It is not clear, though, that psychotherapy would be the 
psychological treatment of choice for such patients, bearing in mind the 
reservations expressed earlier in relation to psychological approaches to 
recovery from Ml (see comments above on Jones and West, 1995 and 
Frasure-Smith et al, 1997a).
There are a number of studies of the effects of psychosocial intervention 
on Angina patients, many of whom would be potential candidates for 
CABG. Lewin (1997b) reviews several such studies and shows that there 
have been variable outcomes to psychological interventions with these 
patients. The study by Amarosa-Tupler (1989) found no benefits to a brief 
(2-week) psychosocial intervention delivered via audiotapes. Bundy et al 
(1994) provided a relatively sophisticated psychosocial intervention based 
on Lazarus' stress-management protocol, and found no reduction in 
frequency of angina, although duration of the episodes decreased. And 
Payne et al (1994) reported short-term reductions in angina which 
disappeared at 6 month follow-up in patients attending a three week 
group psychosocial intervention. As Lewin points out, however, in none of 
these studies was there any exercise component. In addition, in Bundy et 
al's experimental group there was a substantial drop out rate and the 
intervention itself aimed for reduced activity, which contrasts with the aims 
of most cardiac rehabilitation programmes.
One of the more dramatic examples of beneficial intervention is reported 
by Ornish et al (1990). They provided a comprehensive, multi-factorial
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intervention comprising exercise, dietary modification, smoking cessation 
and group support sessions led by a clinical psychologist. Following the 
programme a 90 percent reduction was reported in the frequency of 
angina and there was an objectively defined regression of coronary 
artherosclerosis in 82 percent of patients. Ornish et al (1998) reported a 5 
year follow-up of these patients and found that 20 out of the 28 patients in 
the experimental group maintained their lifestyle changes and showed 
continuing reductions in coronary artherosclerosis. This contrasted with 
the control group in which there was an increase in artherosclerosis after 
5 years.
Lewin et al (1995) also found dramatic results following a multi-faceted 
psychosocial intervention consisting of cognitive-behavioural interventions 
alongside a home-based exercise programme. There were 80 patients, 28 
of whom were awaiting CABG with the remainder having angina 
symptoms but being unsuitable for surgery. These patients were assigned 
to an ‘angina-management’ programme or waiting-list control, and then 
the controls were crossed over into the treatment condition. Lewin et al 
report substantial decreases in symptomatology following intervention, to 
the extent that 50 percent of those patients who had been awaiting 
surgery were, by the mutual agreement of the cardiologists and the 
patients able to be removed from the surgery waiting-list.
The evidence, then, is that angina patients before surgery may benefit 
from psychosocial intervention in order to manage their symptoms, but
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that this is more likely to provide benefit if the psychosocial intervention is 
part of a multi-component treatment including exercise. Following surgery, 
the evidence is less clear. There are certainly grounds to suppose that 
CABG patients may benefit from rehabilitation, although there is clearly a 
need for further evidence.
The aim of the present study is to examine the relative outcomes, on a 
range of physical and psychosocial measures, for older compared with 
younger people receiving group psychosocial cardiac rehabilitation 
following Ml and Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG). This permits an 
analysis both of age and also of type of heart disease.
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Method. 
Subjects
Subjects were 94 patients referred, following Myocardial Infarction (Ml), 
from the local General Hospital in-patient Cardiology department or, 
following cardiac surgery (Coronary Artery Bypass Graft -  CABG), from 
their General Practitioners. The subjects used in this analysis were a sub­
set of the total population of referrals over an approximately two year 
period, for whom 12 month follow-up data were available. There were 46 
who had experienced a first-time Ml within the 8 weeks prior to 
rehabilitation and 48 who had received CABG up to 3 months before 
rehabilitation. Other diagnoses were excluded from the analysis, as were 
multiple diagnoses (Ml and CABG) and cases where there had been 
multiple episodes of the same diagnosis (multiple CABG, more than one 
Ml). There were 79 males and 15 females. The age range was 32 to 85 
years, with a mean age of 64 years and a median of 65 years. Further 
details of the relationship between age and cardiac disease is presented 
in the analyses below.
The Rehabilitation Programme
The cardiac rehabilitation team consist of a full time G grade Nurse an 
Assistant Psychologist working under the supervision of qualified clinical 
psychologist, a half-time Physiotherapist and a Secretary. Other 
disciplines participate in the programme on a sessional basis (dietician, 
pharmacist). An inpatient rehabilitation nurse also operates from the 
coronary care unit and has close links with the outpatient service. Patients
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from all over the county are eligible to attend. The programme lasts for six 
weeks, two days per week and two hours per day.
Referral to the service: myocardial infarction
The majority of referrals to the service following myocardial infarction 
come from the inpatient cardiac rehabilitation nurse. The inpatient nurse 
works for 18 hours a week and visits all patients with diagnosed 
myocardial infarction. The post is rotational being filled for a six month 
period by nurses from the coronary care unit. The inpatient nurse visits 
patients as soon as they are well enough, to offer advice about Coronary 
Heart Disease, the factors which contribute to the progression of 
Coronary Heart Disease and also informs them about the outpatient 
service. The inpatient nurse uses the criteria for entry onto the 
programme (see Table 2, below) to guide her selection of patients and 
referral forms are signed by a member of the in-patient medical team. 
Referrals can also come direct from the patients' General Practitioner.
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Table 2. Showing referral criteria for cardiac rehabilitation
Selection Criteria
All patients should have a diagnosis of recent (within 2 to 8weeks) Acute 
Myocardial Infarction, or following Coronary Artery Bypass Graft surgery (2-3 
months). The responsibility for the medical diagnosis rests with the patient's 
medical consultant.
Exclusion Criteria: conditions delaying / preventing a patient's entry into
the programme:
a) Medical Exclusion Criteria
Unstable angina that would be induced by exercise.
Symptomatic heart failure that would prohibit exercise.
Symptomatic and uncontrolled atrial or ventricular arrhythmia (including 
2nd/3rd degree AV block).
Uncontrolled tachycardia (>1 OObpm).
Second or Third degree heart block.
Recent embolism.
Uncontrolled diabetes.
Acute systemic illness or fever.
Acute pericarditis or myocarditis.
Thrombophlebitis.
Severe physical disability that would prohibit exercise.
b) Psychological Exclusion Criteria
• Psychological problems including:
=> Psychotic symptoms.
=> Evidence of dementia.
=> Current severe Anxiety or Depression which is independent of the 
cardiac condition.
=> Prior history of clinically significant psychological disorder.
If there are any indications of the above psychological problems, the 
patient should be referred on to the Health Psychology Service.
Referral to the service: post-surgery
Patients are referred either directly from the hospital where they have 
surgery or by their General Practitioners. Increasingly patients are 
referring themselves following surgery.
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Materials. 
Walk Test
Physical function is assessed at baseline, 6 weeks and 6 months on the 
basis of the number of 5 metre laps completed in 6 minutes. The number 
of laps achieved by the patient is recorded by the physiotherapist as part 
of the general physical assessment and provides the basis for the 
individual's exercise plan throughout the programme. Because follow-up 
at 12 months was administered by postal questionnaire, there are no walk 
test results for 12 months.
Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HAD)
Anxiety and Depression are the main psychological symptoms of distress 
reported following CHD; and their clinical significance has been 
documented above. The Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale is a well 
known screening instrument for symptoms of anxiety and depression that 
was developed for use amongst non-psychiatric general hospital out­
patient populations (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). There has been some 
recent debate about the reliability of the scale for patients with cancer, 
and the possibility that it detects a number of false positive cases (Hall, 
AHern & Fallowfield, 1999; cf Zigmond and Snaith 1983, Moorey, et al 
1991 ). However, despite these potential reservations, it recommended for 
use in the context of screening psychological distress amongst patients 
with heart disease. The psychometric status is well documented 
(Weinman, et al, 1995) and considered to be sound. Internal consistency 
is 0.93 for anxiety and 0.90 for depression (Cronbach’s Alpha).
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Concurrent validity too is high, in relation to independent psychiatric 
measures of anxiety and depression (anxiety r=0.54, depression r=0.79).
The Impact of Events Scale (lES)
In addition to anxiety and depression, experience of working with patients, 
following Ml in particular, suggests that some patients find the experience 
particularly traumatic and talk in terms of the ‘shocking’ nature of their 
illness. Others, in contrast, appear relatively unaffected psychologically 
and present a ‘matter-of-fact’ account of their ordeal. There appears to be 
a spectrum of reactions and much individual variability, but it is evident 
that for some the experience of Ml has been severely traumatic, both 
physically and psychologically.
The Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz, et al, 1979) was developed for the 
assessment of symptoms of trauma on patients referred to a stress clinic. 
It provides a measure of two major consequences of trauma on thought 
and behaviour. One is Intrusion, which refers to the occurrence of 
unwanted thoughts and images, troubled dreams, strong emotions, and 
repetitive behaviour. The other is Avoidance, which refers to a general 
inhibition of thought and behaviour motivated by a desire not to be 
reminded of the traumatic event. Horowitz et al report a test-retest 
reliability of 0.87 for the entire scale, and demonstrate that the scale is 
sensitive to change in symptoms over time.
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The I ES is widely used in the assessment of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD). This, in turn, has usually been associated with severe 
trauma, such as combat stress or the effects of accidents and natural 
disasters. However, the scope of application of PTSD has also been 
extended to the effects of a number of traumatic medical experiences 
(O’Brien, 1998). In recent years, symptoms of PTSD have been found 
amongst a variety of medical populations, including women following 
childbirth (Wijma, et al, 1997), patients with facial pain (Aghabeigi et al 
1996 -  in O’Brien, 1998) and CHD populations (Kutz, et al 1994; Doerfler, 
et al 1994; vanDriel and denVelde 1995). O’Brien (1998) suggests that 
the IBS is highly correlated with formal diagnostic instruments in the 
assessment of PTSD.
Numerical Rating Scales
Numerical Rating Scales (MRS) and their variants (Visual Analogue 
Scales and Verbal Rating Scales) are widely used in clinical practice. 
They are simple to administer, and patients report that they are easy to 
understand. Jensen, et al (1986) compared six pain intensity 
measurements and found that the NRS is a highly sensitive measure, 
which is easy to apply and easily understandable across the age-range.
In the present study NRS is used for a number of variables. These include 
three measures that are subsumed under the heading of ‘quality of life’. 
These include: General Quality of Life (QOL), Confidence in Making a 
Recovery (Conf) and Understanding of Heart Condition (Und).
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The scale used is the standard NRS-101, ranging between 0 and 100. 
Data were scored by a member of the rehabilitation team to the nearest 
estimated 5 percent. An example of the questions is provided in Table 2a 
below.
Count Scales
Two count scales were also used to record number of days, during the 
previous two weeks, that patients had experienced chest-pain (Frequency 
of Chest Pain - FCP) and impairment of function due to the heart condition 
(Number of Days Impaired by Heart Condition - NOD). The scores ranged 
between 0 and 14. An example of the questions is also provided in Table 
2a below.
Table 2a, showing examples of the Numerical Rating Scale 
questions and Count-scale questions
Example 1 : Numerical Rating Scale: General QOL
Try to think back to the last 2 weeks. How do you rate your quality of life (the 
satisfaction you get from everyday activities and relationships) during this 
time?
Please put a cross on the line below to show how you have felt, on average, 
during the last 2 weeks.
Very poor quality Very high quality
0 10 20 30 40 SO 60 70 80 90 100
Example 2: Count Scale: Number of Days (NOD)
During the last two weeks, on how many days has your heart condition, or 
your anxiety or concem about it, prevented or significantly impaired your 
ability to do what you had planned to do?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9___ 10 11___ 12___ 13___ 14
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General considerations
One of the main problems in using the above measures is the possibility 
of 'ceiling' and 'floor' effects amongst those patients who are relatively 
less distressed or disabled. For instance, with the psychological 
measures, one may reasonably expect elevated scores amongst those 
patients experiencing psychological difficulties. However, the low scores 
that are likely amongst the remainder will provide little scope for change.
In other words, if a patient starts with a low score and continues with low 
scores during follow-up, the result will be a lack of significant change.
This, in conjunction with the potential 'ceiling' effects amongst some of the 
count and NRS measures may lead to the the attenuation of any statistical 
effects and the conclusion that the intervention has had little or no 
measurable effect. However, this conclusion would be misleading in view 
of the relative lack of scope for change. On the other hand, in cases 
where there is a clinically significant level of symptoms the effects, if any, 
of treatment should be apparent. These issues will be considered further 
in the analysis, and despite any limitations, the measures in general will 
have utility in terms of providing an epidemiological view of the group as a 
whole and illustrating the range of psychological and other symptoms 
within the sample.
With respect to the NRS and Count scales, it is accepted that the 
resulting data relies on patients' subjective recall and there is no objective 
evidence to confirm the information provided. There is a possibility, 
therefore, that distortions may occur in these measures depending on
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other factors such as memory or mood state. For instance, diminished 
mood could either lead to a magnification of perceived symptoms, or there 
could equally be a reduction in perceived symptoms because of difficulties 
in concentration and recall associated with the diminished mood. One of 
the aims of the present study is to examine whether or not these scales 
are, in fact, useful and this will be discussed in the analysis.
Assessment:
The patient's first contact with the outpatient programme is in the 
individual assessment which lasts for one hour. Fifteen minutes are spent 
in physical assessment with the physiotherapist and the remaining forty- 
five minutes is spent with the nurse and assistant psychologist who 
undertake a combination of medical and psychosocial assessment. 
Partners are also invited to assessment and their attendance is regarded 
as invaluable. Psychometric tools are also used to aid assessment in 
order to establish baseline measures of mood, quality of life and 
behaviour, alongside physical measures of activity.
Table 3: Assessment measures used and time administered
Assessment
Measure
Baseline
End of 
programme
6 month 
follow-up
12 Month 
follow-up
Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale 
(HAD)
y y y y
Revised Impact of 
Events Scale (lES)
y y y y
Walk Test* y y y H
Number of days 
limited by condition y y y
y
Frequency of chest 
pain (numerical rating 
scale)
y y y y
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General Quality of 
Life (numerical rating 
scale)
y y y y
Confidence in making 
a recovery (numerical 
rating scale)
y y y y
Understanding about 
condition (numerical 
rating scale)
y y y y
The 12 month follow-up was by questionnaires sent by post. There was no opportunity to 
perform a 12 month Walk Test.
With respect to baseline physical function, all patients conformed to Class 
I or II criteria of the New York Heart Association (below). The categories 
are as follows:
Class I: patients with no limitations of activities; they suffer no symptoms 
from ordinary activities.
Class II: patients with slight, mild limitation of activity; they are comfortable 
with rest or with mild exertion.
Class III: patients with marked limitation of activity; they are comfortable 
only at rest.
Class IV: patients who should be at complete rest, confined to bed or 
chair; any physical activity brings on discomfort and symptoms occur at 
rest.
The group: New groups begin every two weeks. The groups are closed 
and have a maximum of ten patients and their partners. The programme 
lasts six weeks, 2 days per week, 2 hours per day. The programme 
examines patients’ beliefs, motivation and the environmental factors that 
may be contributing to the maintenance of unwanted behaviours, such as
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risk factors, and difficulties in adjusting and coping. Partners are invited to 
every session where they meet other partners and have the opportunity to 
gain mutual support. They also participate in the programme, both in 
discussion and in the exercise component.
The programme aims to allow participants to examine the basis of any 
fears, anxieties or difficulties which may be impeding their ability to 
comply with the process of rehabilitation and in doing so to reduce their 
risk-factors and increase their health. Much of the programme entails 
enabling patients to set personally relevant goals and devise realistic 
strategies to achieve them. The relationship between anxiety or fear and 
symptoms of heart disease is examined and patients are encouraged to 
manage their anxiety and angina appropriately. Counselling about the 
disease, it's prognosis and management is also offered. There is, though, 
no formal psychological therapy for any psychological difficulties that may 
be found.
A graduated exercise programme is an integral part of the rehabilitation 
process. The aim of the exercise component of the programme is for 
patients and their partners to increase understanding about their 
condition; for patients to increase activity and improve fitness and learn a 
safe way to exercise that is also enjoyable for them; to gain the 
confidence to continue with activities of daily living; to have an increased 
ability to manage their own disease and a better adaptation to their 
disease; to reduce activity-based anxiety, low morale and the tendency
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towards illness behaviour; to improve quality of life and the long-term 
maintenance of behaviour change.
In terms of the distinctions made earlier (Table 1), this programme is 
defined as ‘Comprehensive Rehabilitation - Type-1’. Although patients are 
screened for psychological symptoms at assessment, there is not yet the 
facility for individual psychological intervention within the programme for 
those found to have high levels of psychological morbidity. The decision 
was taken, therefore, wherever possible to include all medically suitable 
patients within the programme, and if psychological problems persist 
following rehabilitation, to refer on to local mental health services or to the 
health psychology service. High levels of psychological morbidity at 
screening were not a basis for exclusion from the programme as long as 
the individual concerned was willing and able to attend.
Experimental Questions.
The aim of the present study is to make use of the opportunities afforded 
by routine clinical practice as a basis for the investigation of issues that 
are both theoretically well motivated and relevant to everyday clinical 
practice. The specific questions are:
1. Is there any association between age and responsiveness to cardiac 
rehabilitation, on any of the measures described below and at any stage 
from baseline to the outcome points?
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2. Is there any association between illness (MI/CABG) and responsiveness 
to cardiac rehabilitation, on any of the measures described below and at 
any stage from baseline to the outcome points?
The analyses of these questions will subsume the further issue of any 
relationship between age and illness-type.
However, in answering the above questions, consideration must also be 
given to a further variable that can be predicted to exert a potential 
influence on responsiveness to cardiac rehabilitation . This variable will 
be termed ‘psychological morbidity' and will be defined below. As 
described in the introduction earlier, there is a substantial body of 
evidence to suggests the potential importance of this variable on 
prognosis following CHD. Consequently, for each of the above questions, 
a further analysis will also be performed to take into account the 
possibility of differential responding as a function of psychological 
morbidity.
Data were collected over a twelve month period on physical and 
psychosocial baseline and outcome function, as part of routine clinical 
practice. These will be examined for evidence of change within patients 
over time, and between different sub-groups of patients. The data are 
analysed statistically using a variety of methods described below. 
Implications for clinical practice will be discussed.
Accordingly, the sequence of analysis will be as follows:
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a) The group will be classified into two age groups - younger and older - on 
the basis of a cluster analysis which will be described below. Between- 
group and Within-group comparisons will be made of ‘Younger’ and 
‘Older’ sub-groups of patients on all outcome measures at all points of 
measurement.
b) The above analyses will then be undertaken in relation to Illness Category 
(CABG/MI)
c) An analysis will be made of all outcome measures at all points of 
measurement for objectively defined ‘high’ and ‘low’ psychological 
morbidity sub-groups, and subsumed within this, there will be an analysis 
of any relation between age and illness-type and psychological morbidity. 
The implications of all findings will then be discussed in relation to the 
basic questions identified above.
Statistical Methods.
The data will be evaluated using a split-plot repeated measures Analysis 
of Variance. In this case, the between subjects measures are Age, Illness 
and, later in the analysis. Psychological Morbidity. The within subject 
measure is the effect of Treatment: that is to say the effect of any change 
from baseline through the outcome points of 6 weeks, 6 months and 12 
months. In these analyses, within subject variability is reflected as residual 
error, but between subject variability is not. The analysis, therefore, 
requires the inclusion of a Subject main effect within which is nested the 
between subjects term (eg Subject [Age]), and this is treated as a random 
effect. The result is three main effects and any specified interaction.
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Analysis of Variance assumes normality of distribution and equal 
variances. However, departures from these criteria are permissible (eg 
Lindman, 1974). The distribution of the responses is shown in Appendix 1. 
In order to maximise the assumption of normality, the data were 
normalised using a Iog10 transformation. A table showing mean 
untransformed raw scores with standard deviations is provided in 
Appendix 2. Separate analyses of equality of variance, following the Iog10 
transformation, are reported in Appendix 3, where it can be seen that in all 
but one case (Understanding) the variances are statistically equal at 
baseline.
The results of the analysis are shown in two parts. The first part is the 
Analysis of Variance table for the whole model. This provides a check on 
whether there is at least one regression factor in the model, and this is 
shown as a significant F ratio. The second part is the Tests with respect 
to (wrt) Random Effects' table, which shows the specific tests for each 
factor and provides F ratios and significance levels for these. Assuming 
the model to be significant, the discussion will focus on these latter 
results.
Where indicated a posteriori iesis will also be undertaken in order to 
examine differences between means. In these cases an Analysis of 
Contrasts will be used, corrected using the Bonferroni adjustment, which 
will be described as appropriate. The analysis of contrasts provides t-tests
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for each column of the contrast using least squares means of the effect. In 
some cases, where sub-groups are examined, this also produces an 
adjusted F ratio for each sub-group, taking into account the planned 
comparisons.
Sub-analyses of the distribution of Age in relation to Illness are performed 
using the chi-square statistic on the raw data. Clustering analysis was 
also used and is described at the appropriate point in the text. All data 
analysis was undertaken using the JMP software package (SAS Institute, 
1995).
Defining the Age Groups
The usual cut-off point for younger versus older patients is 65 years. 
However, there is some variability in the literature with ‘older’ patients 
being defined variously as 65 years or older (e.g. Lavie, et al, 1993),
“older than 70” (McMechan and Adgey, 1998) and “over 75 years of age” 
(Cortes and Goetz, 1994). Bearing in mind this variability, therefore, and 
in order to avoid arbitrary assumptions, the cut-off point for older and 
younger patients was defined for this specific sample on the basis of a 
cluster analysis using the technique of k-means clustering with n=2 
clusters. This produced two groups: a younger age group (n=34) and an 
older group (n=60). Details of the cluster analysis are shown in Table 4 \
 ^ The JMP method permits cluster analysis with just one variable (SAS institute - personal 
communication).
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Table 4 Showing results of the cluster analysis on Age
Cluster
Summary
Max Distance Prior Distance
Younger 
Age Group 
(n=34)
2.23 2.36
Older Age
Group
(n=60)
1.58 2.11
Cluster Means: Cluster s.d.'s
Younger 
age group
53.47 5.86
Older age 
group
69.83 5.27
The first question is whether there is any difference in distribution of 
illness category (Ml versus CABG) according to Age. Chi-squared tests 
were used for this purpose (Table 5).
Table 5, showing the distribution of patients.
Younger
Age
Group
Older
Age
Group
Totals Significance(Lik- 
elihood Ratio)
CABG 14 34 48 x '=2.084, 
p=0.1489, n.s.Ml 20 26 46
The analyses revealed that there was no significant difference in Illness 
distribution within the Younger or Older age groups.
The next task is to determine what effects, if any, there are in relation first 
to Age and the cardiac rehabilitation outcome measures, and then Illness 
category and outcome. In all the following analyses all main effects and
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interactions will be discussed in relation to Age, but where Treatment and 
Subjects results are essentially duplicated in the analyses of Illness 
category, only the main effect of Illness and the interaction of Illness and 
Treatment will be discussed, although all the results will be visible in the 
summary tables.
Results
(a) PHYSICAL FUNCTION
The first analyses examine the relationship between Age, and then Illness 
category, and physical function.
Looking first at Age, the correlations of Age, as a continuous variable, and 
Walk Test results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6, showing a Pearson Product-Moment 
Correlation coefficients for Walk Test x Age
Variable by Variable Correlation p value
WT  (Ass) Age -0.3831 0.0003
W T  (6w) Age -0.5252 0.0000
W T  (6m) Age -0.4649 0.0002
It can be seen that there is a negative correlation between Age and 
Distance Walked, so that the older the patient, the less the distance. This 
applies at all stages.
The next analysis examines between group and within subjects effects 
with patients classified into Younger or Older Age groups, as defined by
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the Cluster Analysis described earlier and using Analysis of Variance. 
The Anova is shown in Figures 1 a-c and in Table 7.
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Table 7: Anova Walk Test x Age:
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 94 4.6869392 0.049861 3.6191
Error 113 1.5568283 0.013777 Prob>F
C Total 207 6.2437675 <.0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
AGE 0.56392 0.56392 1 18.3183 <0001
TREATMENT 0.86614 0.43307 2 31.4337 <0001
TREATMENT*AGE 0.0042 0.0021 2 0.1524 0.8588
SUBJECT[AGE] 3.04833 0.03425 89 2.4860 <0001
Figures 1 a-c and the latter part of Table 7 shows the effects of Age, 
Treatment and Subject and the interaction of Age and Treatment. It can 
be seen that the three main effects are highly significant, but that there is 
no interaction. It is concluded, therefore, that Age does influence distance 
walked and, as is apparent from Figure la, the younger age group as a 
whole walk further. However, all patients significantly increased the 
distance walked above baseline following Treatment. Inspection of the 
raw data (Appendix 2) reveals that for the younger group this amounts to
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a 40 percent increase over baseline, and for the older group, a 35.4 
percent increase, both at six months. The relative percentage change for 
both groups suggests that each derives benefit to a comparable degree 
from the treatment. Finally, it is notable that there is a main effect of 
Subjects (patients), which shows that there is considerable variability 
between individuals. Thus, while generalisations can be made on the 
basis of Age, there is also considerable variation between individuals 
which influences outcome.
(b) Physical Function and Illness-Type
In the next analyses physical function is examined in relation to Illness 
category. The relative performance of Ml and CABG patients is shown in 
Figure 2a and the interaction in Figure 2b. The Anova is summarised in 
Table 8.
Figure 2a
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Table 8: Anova Walk x Illness Category
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 94 4.6938231 0.049934 3.6405
Error 113 1.5499444 0.013716 Prob>F
C Total 207 6.2437675 <0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
ILLNESS 0.00695 0.00695 1 0.2038 0.6526
TREATMENT 0.9334 0.4667 2 34.0252 <.0001
TREATMENT*ILLNESS 0.01108 0.00554 2 0.4040 0.6686
SUBJECT[ILLNESS] 3.5312 0.03968 89 2.8926 <0001
As mentioned earlier, where the effects of Treatment and Subject are 
essentially duplicated they will not be commented upon a second time. It 
can be seen that there are no significant differences between CABG and 
Ml patients on the Walk Test, and no interaction of Illness category and 
Treatment. It is concluded, therefore, that Illness category does not 
influence responsiveness to cardiac rehabilitation in terms of the Walk 
Test, and that both groups benefit comparably.
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(b) CARDIAC MORBIDITY
The next analyses examine the relationships first between Age and then 
Illness category and two measures of cardiac morbidity: Frequency of 
Chest Pain (FCP) in the last 14 days and Number Of Days in the last 14 
in which the heart condition interfered with normal function (NOD).
Correlation of Age and FCP are shown below.
Table 9, showing a Pearson Product-Moment Correlation 
coefficients for Freq Chest Pain x Age
Variable by Variable Correlation p value
FCP(Ass) Age 0.0103 0.9334
FCP(6w) Age 0.0325 0.7876
FCP(6m) Age -0.0493 0.6659
FCP(12m) Age 0.0663 0.5664
It can be seen that there are no significant correlations between Age and 
Frequency of chest pain.
Figures 3 a-c and Table 10 summarise the Analysis of Variance.
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Table 10: showing Anova FCP x Age:
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 42 6.6634286 0.158653 2.0295
Error 28 2.1888376 0.078173 Prob>F
C Total 70 8.8522662 0.0257
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
AGE 0.22242 0.22242 1 1.5395 0.2209
TREATMENT 0.27613 0.09204 3 1.1774 0.3360
AGE*TREATMENT 0.26333 0.08778 3 1.1229 0.3566
SUBJECT[AGE] 5.98925 0.17112 35 2.1890 0.0179
There is a main effect of Subjects. There is no significant effect of Age or 
Treatment or any interaction of Age with Treatment. It is concluded, 
therefore, that there is no association between Age and FCP and no 
evidence of any change over time corresponding to Treatment.
In the next analysis. Age is examined in relation to Number of Days 
Impaired. The correlations are shown in Table 11.
Table 11, showing a Pearson Product-Moment
Correlation coefficients for Number of Days x
Age
Variable by Variable Correlation Signif
No days (Ass) Age -0.0637 0.5871
No days (6w) Age 0.0680 0.5540
No days (6m) Age -0.0417 0.7047
No days (12m) Age 0.0029 0.9799
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Table 11 shows that there are no significant correlations between Age 
and NOD. Figures 4a-c and Table 12 show the Anova.
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Figure 4c
TREATMENT*AGE: Profile Plot
Younger ^GE Older
Table 12: showing Anova Age x NOD
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 77 11.704835 0.152011 1.8039
Error 69 5.814586 0.084269 Prob>F
C Total 146 17.519421 0.0067
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
AGE 0.03166 0.03166 1 0.2428 0.6232
TREATMENT 1.03606 0.34535 3 4.0982 0.0098
AGE*TREATMENT 0.26556 0.08852 3 1.0504 0.3759
SUBJECT[AGE] 10.5876 0.15125 70 1.7949 0.0080
In the Analysis of Variance, there is no effect of Age and no interaction of 
Age with Treatment. There are, though, significant effects of Treatment 
and Subjects. Inspection of Figure 4b shows a trend towards a reduction 
in symptoms, relative to baseline, at 6 weeks and 6 months which then 
appears to rise again at 12 months. This raises the question of whether 
the significant improvement overall is, in fact, maintained at 12 months. In 
order to examine this an a posteriori analysis of contrasts was performed, 
using the Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. The analysis of 
contrasts provides t-tests for each column of the contrast using least 
squares means of the effect. With an analysis of Contrasts, if no
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Bonferroni correction were to be applied there would be a chance of 
0.1426 (14.26%) of finding one or more significant differences by chance 
alone in 3 comparisons. The alpha for each test therefore needs to be 
lowered to 0.016952428 to bring the alpha level overall back to 0.05. 
Thus a significance level of just over 1 % is required in the following 
analysis of contrasts. The results are shown in Table 13 below.
Table 13: Analysis of Contrasts: NOD and Age
Contrast
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve 
months):
1 + + +
2 +
3 +
4 +
Estimate 0.2137 0.2578 0.1307
Std Error 0.0765 0.0834 0.0806
t Ratio 2.793 3.0916 1.6212
Prob>|t| 0.0068 0.0029 0.1095
SS 0.6574 0.8054 0.2215
Sum of Squares 1.0360593192
Numerator DF 3
F Ratio 4.098205014
Prob > F 0.0097730442
It can be seen that the changes between baseline and 6 weeks and 
baseline and 6 months remain significantly different, but that the change 
between baseline and 12 months is not. This confirms the apparent trend 
in figure 4b, above. It is concluded that although the effects of Treatment 
were to confer overall improvement, this was not sustained as a 
significant difference at 12 month follow-up.
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Cardiac Morbidity and Illness-Type: CABG and Ml
In the next analyses the same questions asked of age will also be 
addressed to illness type. The data are summarised in Figures 5 a and b 
and Table 14.
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Table 14: showing Anova Illness x FCP
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 42 6.5921083 0.156955 1.9444
Error 28 2.2601579 0.080720 Prob>F
C Total 70 8.8522662 0.0333
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
ILLNESS 0.16153 0.16153 1 1.1356 0.2918
TREATMENT 0.20481 0.06827 3 0.8458 0.4805
ILLNESS*TREATMENT 0.19201 0.064 3 0.7929 0.5081
SUBJECT[ILLNESS] 5.98331 0.17095 35 2.1178 0.0221
It can be seen that there is no effect of Illness and no interaction. 
In the next analysis, Illness category is examined in relation to Number of 
Days affected. The results are summarised in Figures 6 a and b and 
Table 15.
Figure 6a
ILLNESS: Profile Plot
CABG ILLNESS ^  '
67
Figure 6b
TREATMENT*!LLNESS: Profile Plot 
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=slx weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months)
0 .9  -
0 .5  -
0 .3  -
0.1 -
CABG
ILLNESS
Table 15: showing Anova NOD x Illness
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 77 11.569843 0.150258 1.7426
Error 69 5.949578 0.086226 Prob>F
C Total 146 17.519421 0.0099
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source 8 8  MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
ILLNESS 0.00882 0.00882 1 0.0695 0.7926
TREATMENT 1.13513 0.37838 3 4.3882 0.0069
ILLNESS*TREATMENT 0.13057 0.04352 3 0.5048 0.6803
SUBJECT[I LLNESS] 10.2313 0.14616 70 1.6951 0.0147
There is no effect of Illness nor any interaction. It is concluded that Illness 
category is not a factor in rates of cardiac morbidity, or responsiveness to 
treatment.
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(c) QUALITY OF LIFE MEASURES
In the next analysis, the quality of life measures are examined in relation 
first to age and then to illness category to determine any differences within 
or between the groups.
Table 16 shows the correlations of Age and General Quality of Life 
(QOL).
Table 16, showing a Pearson Product-Moment
Correlation coefficients for Quality of Life x Age
Variable by Variable Correlation Signif
QOL (Ass) Age -0.1123 0.3308
QOL (6w) Age -0.0345 0.7630
QOL (6m) Age -0.0822 0.4571
QOL (12m) Age -0.0595 0.6049
It can be seen that there are no significant correlations.
Figures 7 a-c and Table 17 show the Analysis of Variance
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Table 17: showing Anova QOL x Age
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Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares
Model 99 7.497062
Error 214 3.832029
C Total 313 11.329091
Tests wrt Random Effects
Mean Square 
0.075728 
0.017907
F Ratio 
4.2290 
Prob>F 
<0001
Source 88 M8 Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
AGE 0.07734 0.07734 1 1.1800 0.2801
TREATMENT 1.13531 0.37844 3 21.1339 <.0001
TREATMENT*AGE 0.0586 0.01953 3 1.0908 0.3539
SUBJECT[AGE] 6.49882 0.07064 92 3.9449 <0001
There are significant main effects of Treatment and Subjects, but not of 
Age and there is no interaction of Age by Treatment. It is, therefore, 
concluded that Age does not affect levels of Quality of Life reported by 
patients. Quality of Life does, though, increase significantly from baseline 
following treatment. There is also a notable variability amongst Subjects in 
levels of QOL reported.
Looking now at Confidence, Table 18 shows the correlations.
Table 18, showing Pearson Product-Moment 
Correlation coefficients for Confidence x Age
Variable by Variable Correlation Signif
Confidenc0(Ass) Age -0.1419 0.2215
Confidence (6w) Age -0.0659 0.5613
Confidence (6m) Age -0.1118 0.3203
Confidence (12m) Age -0.0574 0.6179
There is evidently no significant correlation of Age and Confidence at any 
stage of treatment.
Figures 8 a-c and Table 19 show the Analysis of Variance.
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Figure 8c
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Table 19: showing Anova Confidence x Age
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 99 5.7165667 0.057743 3.5203
Error 209 3.4282120 0.016403 Prob>F
C Total 308 9.1447787 <0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
AGE 0.13596 0.13596 1 2.4574 0.1202
TREATMENT 0.03039 0.01013 3 0.6176 0.6043
AGE*TREATMENT 0.06932 0.02311 3 1.4086 0.2413
SUBJECT[AGE] 5.4324 0.05905 92 3.5998 <0001
There is a main effect of Subjects, but no other significant effects. It may 
be concluded, therefore, that Age does not exert an influence on levels of 
Confidence reported, and that the levels of confidence do not change as a 
result of treatment. It should also be noted that mean levels of confidence 
were high from the outset (mean level at baseline = 83.5% - Appendix 2) 
and so the scope for improvement is limited. The implications of this 
observation will be discussed more fully below.
Looking now at Understanding, Table 20 shows the correlations.
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Table 20, showing Pearson Product-Moment 
Correlation coefficients for Understanding x 
Age
Variable by Variable Correlation Signif
Understand (Ass) Age -0.3142 0.0054***
Understand (6w) Age -0.1659 0.1440
Understand (6m) Age -0.1537 0.1706
Understand (12m) Age -0.2910 0.0093***
Table 20 shows significant negative correlations between Age and 
Understanding at baseline and 12 months, suggesting that the older the 
patients, the less their understanding at these points. This trend towards 
an age difference will be examined further in the next analysis.
Figures 9 a-c and Table 21 show the Analysis of Variance
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Table 21 : showing Anova Understanding x Age
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean 8quare F Ratio
Model 99 3.8930972 0.039324 4.4586
Error 216 1.9051077 0.008820 Prob>F
C Total 315 5.7982050 <.0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source 88 M8 Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
AGE 0.08022 0.08022 1 2.1570 0.1452
TREATMENT 0.16396 0.05465 3 6.1965 0.0005
AGE*TREATMENT 0.09987 0.03329 3 3.7745 0.0114
SUBJECT[AGE] 3.65243 0.0397 92 4.5012 <.0001
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The analysis of variance reveals significant main effects of Treatment and 
Subjects. There is no effect of Age but there is an interaction between 
Age and Treatment. It is concluded that for both groups the level of 
Understanding increases throughout Treatment and although Age is not a 
factor in the development of Understanding, there is, nevertheless, an 
interaction between Age and Treatment, so that changes in levels of 
understanding between treatments occur differentially for younger and 
older patients. It is apparent from the correlations, above, that the older 
group showed evidence of a negative correlation with understanding at 
baseline and 12 months. In order to understand this association more 
fully, an a postenon analysis is now undertaken using contrasts, as 
described earlier. In this case, the question is whether there is any 
evidence of differences between means at different phases of treatment. 
Table 22 shows the analysis of contrasts. In this case, for four 
comparisons, the Bonferroni adjustment is 0.012741455 to provide an 
equivalent alpha level of 5%.
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Table 22. Analysis of Contrasts: Understanding and Age
Contrast
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months) 
X Age (Younger versus Older)
+ = comparison; * = not Included in comparison
1 2  3 4
+
+
+
Younger
Older +
Younger * +
Older * +
Younger * *
Older +
Younger * * *
Older +
Estimate 0.0973 0.0124 0.0191 0.0045
Std Error 0.0223 0.0221 0.0215 0.0221
t Ratio 4.3618 0.5621 0.8868 0.205
Prob>|t| 2e-5 0.5746 0.3762 0.8378
SS 0.1678 0.0028 0.0069 0.0004
Sum of Squares 0.1777800578
Numerator DF 4
F Ratio 5.039149755
Prob > F 0.0006679832
This analysis suggests that the main influence of Age on Understanding 
was at baseline, where there remains a significant difference between 
least square means for Age groups in relation to Treatment; and this is 
also apparent in Figure 9c above. It is concluded, therefore, that while 
Age is not a significant main effect, there is evidence of an age difference 
in understanding at the start of treatment. However, this does not persist 
beyond baseline. The negative correlation between Age and 
Understanding at 12 months is probably attributable to Subject variability.
Quality of Life and illness Category
The next analysis examines any effects of illness category on the quality 
of life measures. The results are shown in Figures 10a and b and Table 
23.
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Table 23: showing Anova QOL x Illness
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 99 7.512919 0.075888 4.2556
Error 214 3.816172 0.017833 Prob>F
C Total 313 11.329091 <.0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
ILLNESS 0.13826 0.13826 1 2.1508 0.1457
TREATMENT 1.10571 0.36857 3 20.6684 <.0001
TREA TM EN T LLNESS 0.07446 0.02482 3 1.3918 0.2463
SUBJECT[ILLNESS] 6.42838 0.06987 92 3.9183 <.0001
There is no effect of Illness and no interaction effect. It is apparent from 
the earlier analysis of Treatment that Quality of Life improved from
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baseline to the outcome points and that this improvement was maintained 
at 12 month follow-up. Illness category did not influence this pattern.
Figures 11a and b and Table 24 show the analysis of Confidence and 
Illness
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Table 24: showing Anova Confidence x Illness
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 99 5.6970896 0.057546 3.4885
Error 209 3.4476891 0.016496 Prob>F
C Total 308 9.1447787 <.0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
ILLNESS 0.11294 0.11294 1 2.0521 0.1552
TREATMENT 0.02363 0.00788 3 0.4775 0.6983
TREATMENT*ILLNESS 0.04984 0.01661 3 1.0071 0.3906
SUBJECT[ILLNESS] 5.47929 0.05956 92 3.6104 <0001
There is no effect of Illness or interaction between Illness and Treatment. 
Finally, the analysis of Understanding in relation to Illness category is 
shown below in Figures 12a and b and Table 25.
Figure 12a
ILLNESS: Profile Plot
CABG ILLNESS
80
Figure 12b
TREATMENT*ILLNESS: Profile Plot 
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months)
# =
CABG iLLi^EsS
Table 25: showing Anova Understanding x Illness
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 99 3.8409883 0.038798 4.2818
Error 216 1.9572167 0.009061 Prob>F
C Total 315 5.7982050 <0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
ILLNESS 0.09472 0.09472 1 2.5972 0.1103
TREATMENT 0.17372 0.05791 3 6.3905 0.0004
TREATM ENT LLNESS 0.04776 0.01592 3 1.7571 0.1564
SUBJECT[I LLNESS] 3.63347 0.03949 92 4.3586 <0001
There is no effect of Illness on Understanding, nor any interaction. The 
other effects are as found previously in relation to Age. It is concluded that 
for all the Quality of Life measures Illness category is not a significant 
factor.
(d) PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASURES
The next analyses examine the relationship between age, and then illness 
category, and the psychological measures of Anxiety, Depression,
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Intrusion and Avoidance. Table 26 shows correlations of Age with all 
psychological measures.
Table 26, showing Pearson Product-Moment
Correlation coefficients for Psychological
Measures x Age
Variable by Variable Correlation Signif
Anx (Ass) Age -0.1361 0.2141
Anx (6w) Age -0.0195 0.8614
Anx (6m) Age -0.0904 0.4137
Anx (12m) Age -0.0239 0.8355
Dep (Ass) Age 0.0967 0.3787
Dep (6w) Age 0.0518 0.6417
Dep (6m) Age 0.0815 0.4614
Dep (12m) Age 0.1350 0.2417
Avoid (Ass) Age 0.1163 0.2921
Avoid (6w) Age 0.0112 0.9225
Avoid (6m) Age -0.0584 0.5956
Avoid (12m) Age 0.0688 0.5547
Intru (Ass) Age -0.0682 0.5402
Intru (6w) Age -0.1264 0.2701
Intru (6m) Age -0.1960 0.0705
Intru (12m) Age -0.0157 0.8928
It can be seen that there are no significant correlations between Age and 
any measure of psychological morbidity. 
Each measure is now analysed in turn for differences within Age Groups 
and between subjects. The analyses for Age and Anxiety are shown in 
Figures 13 a-c and Table 27.
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Table 27 Anova of Anxiety x Age:
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 97 24.974851 0.257473 6.1680
Error 199 8.306944 0.041743 Prob>F
C Total 296 33.281796 <0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
AGE 0.20021 0.20021 1 0.8846 0.3493
TREATMENT 0.4056 0.1352 3 3.2389 0.0232
TREATMENT*AGE 0.1485 0.0495 3 1.1858 0.3163
SUBJECT[AGE] 24.1952 0.26884 90 6.4402 <.0001
There is a significant main effect of Treatment, so that Anxiety levels 
change as a result of Treatment. As is evident in Figure 13b, above, the 
Anxiety scores decline from baseline at 6 weeks and 6 months, but 
appear to rise again towards 12 months, suggesting that the initial 
improvements are not maintained in the longer term. This possibility is 
further examined by an a posteriori analysis using Contrasts, adjusted for 
inequality, as described above. The results are shown below in Table 28.
Table 28: Analysis of Contrasts: Anxiety and Age
Contrasts
Treatments (1=basellne, 2=six weeks, 3=slx months, 4= twelve 
months):
1 + + +
2 +
3 +
4 +
Estimate 0.0842 0.0968 0.0456
Std Error 0.0349 0.0342 0.0355
t Ratio 2.4141 2.8317 1.2833
Prob>|t| 0.0167 0.0051 0.2009
SS 0.2433 0.3347 0.0687
Sum of Squares 
Numerator DF
0.4056044458
3
F Ratio 3.2388679171
Prob > F 0.0232196226
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This shows that there is no significant difference between baseline and 12 
months. In addition, the difference between Baseline and six weeks is just 
at the borderline for significance, taking account of the Bonferroni 
adjustment. Nevertheless, there remains a significant difference between 
baseline and six months.
Looking now at Age and Depression, the analyses are shown in Figures 
14a-c and Table 29.
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Table 29: showing Anova Depression x Age
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 93 24.416260 0.262540 5.0550
Error 181 9.400609 0.051937 Prob>F
C Total 274 33.816869 <0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
AGE 0.03912 0.03912 1 0.1612 0.6890
TREATMENT 0.4304 0.14347 3 2.7623 0.0435
TREATMENT*AGE 0.01715 0.00572 3 0.1101 0.9541
SUBJECT[AGE] 23.7766 0.27647 86 5.3232 <0001
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The analysis of Depression and Age shows no effect of Age on levels of 
Depression at any stage. There is a just significant main effect of 
Treatment and a highly significant main effect of Subjects. Inspection of 
Figure 14b suggests a differential effect of Treatment depending on the 
outcome point, with particular difference between baseline and 6 months, 
but perhaps a reversion to baseline levels at 12 months. Using the same 
rationale as described above, the Analysis of Contrasts is shown below in 
Table 30.
Table 30: Analysis of Contrasts: Depression and Age
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve 
months):
1 + + +
2 +
3 +
4 +
Estimate 0.039 0.1025 0.0054
std Error 0.0409 0.0397 0.041
t Ratio 0.9527 2.5796 0.131
Prob>|t| 0.342 0.0107 0.8959
SS 0.0471 0.3456 0.0009
Sum of Squares 
Numerator DF
0.4303977983
3
F Ratio 2.7623032205
Prob > F 0.043496722
This suggests that the significant difference lies between baseline and six 
months, but not the other outcome points.
Looking now at Avoidance and Age, Figures 15a-c and Table 31 show the 
analyses.
87
Figure 15a
AGE: Profile Plot
<D
I
I 
I
(DO
Figure 15b
Younger Older
TREATMENT: Profile Plot 
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months)
a>c
S
§
I
(DO
1 -
0 -
1 2 3
TREATMENT
Figure 15c
TREATMENT*AGE: Profile Plot
g
S
I 
I
CDO
Younger AGE Older
88
Table 31 : Anova Avoidance x Age
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 90 27.063815 0.300709 3.3757
Error 133 11.847731 0.089081 Prob>F
C Total 223 38.911546 <0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
AGE 0.97426 0.97426 1 3.6674 0.0585
TREATMENT 0.19974 0.06658 3 0.7474 0.5257
TREATMENT*AGE 0.08644 0.02881 3 0.3235 0.8084
SUBJECTS[AGE] 26.1673 0.31527 83 3.5391 <.0001
There is no effect of Treatment. The levels stay approximately the same 
throughout. The main effect of Age just fails to reach significance at the 5 
percent level and so it is concluded that there is no effect of Age on 
Avoidance, and no interaction between Age and Treatment. Once again, 
there is a main effect of Subjects.
The analyses of Intrusion and Age are shown below in Figures 16a-c and 
Table 32.
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Table 32: Anova Intrusion x Age
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 85 24.360984 0.286600 2.8975
Error 125 12.364124 0.098913 Prob>F
C Total 210 36.725108 <.0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
AGE 0.09006 0.09006 1 0.3652 0.5470
TREATMENT 0.09932 0.03311 3 0.3347 0.8003
TREATMENT*AGE 0.18443 0.06148 3 0.6215 0.6024
SUBJECTS[AGE] 23.7403 0.30436 78 3.0771 <0001
The only main effect is of Subjects. Neither Age nor Treatment elicit any 
effect.
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Illness Category and Psychological Morbidity
The next analyses examine whether there is any influence of Illness 
category on psychological morbidity and any interaction between Illness 
Category and Treatment. Looking first at Anxiety, the results are 
illustrated in Figures 17a-c and Table 33.
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Table 33: showing Anova of Anxiety x Illness
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 97 24.989966 0.257629 6.1830
Error 199 8.291830 0.041667 Prob>F
C Total 296 33.281796 <.0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
ILLNESS 0.10189 0.10189 1 0.4610 0.4988
TREATMENT 0.40701 0.13567 3 3.2560 0.0227
TREATMENT*ILLNESS 0.16362 0.05454 3 1.3089 0.2727
SUBJECT[I LLNESS] 24.1447 0.26827 90 6.4385 <.0001
There is no effect of Illness nor interaction of Illness with Treatment.
Looking now at Depression and Illness, Figures 18a and b and Table 34 
summarise the analysis
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Table 34: showing Anova of Depression and Illness Category
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 93 24.405431 0.262424 5.0469
Error 181 9.411438 0.051997 Prob>F
C Total 274 33.816869 <0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
ILLNESS 0.02604 0.02604 1 0.1094 0.7415
TREATMENT 0.43073 0.14358 3 2.7613 0.0436
TREA TM EN T LLNESS 0.00632 0.00211 3 0.0405 0.9891
SUBJECT[ILLNESS] 23.8133 0.2769 86 5.3253 <0001
There is no effect of Illness or interaction of Illness with Treatment.
The next analysis examines the relationship between Intrusion and 
Illness.
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Table 35: showing Anova of Intrusion and Illness Category
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 85 24.470062 0.287883 2.9364
Error 125 12.255046 0.098040 Prob>F
C Total 210 36.725108 <0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
ILLNESS 0.54392 0.54392 1 2.2537 0.1365
TREATMENT 0.08005 0.02668 3 0.2722 0.8454
ILLNESS*TREATMENT 0.29351 0.09784 3 0.9979 0.3962
SUBJECTS[ILLNESS] 23.0409 0.2954 78 3.0130 <.0001
There is no effect of Illness and no interaction.
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Finally, looking at Avoidance and Illness: 
Figure 20a
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Table 36: showing Anova of Avoidance and Illness Category
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 99 14427.536 145.733 5.5447
Error 223 5861.201 26.283 Prob>F
C Total 322 20288.737 <.0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
ILLNESS 1.53208 1.53208 1 5.8494 0.0175
TREATMENT 0.14948 0.04983 3 0.5708 0.6352
ILLNESS*TREATMENT 0.32464 0.10821 3 1.2397 0.2979
SUBJECTS[ILLNESS] 25.5471 0.3078 83 3.5261 <.0001
This shows the first instance of any significant difference between 
patients' psychological status as a function of Illness category. As is 
apparent from the above table and Figure 20a, the Ml patients showed 
significantly higher levels of Avoidance than the CABG patients. The 
implications of this finding will be discussed below.
Summary of findings relating to (i) Age and (ii) lllness-category
(i) Age and Cardiac Rehabilitation
All analyses show a significant main effect of Subjects, so that there is 
significant variability amongst individuals on all measures. Nevertheless, 
Age as a grouping factor exerts an influence on physical capacity, with 
younger patients showing higher levels of physical function at baseline 
and throughout follow-up and a negative correlation between Age and 
distance walked. However, this does not limit the potential for 
improvement amongst the older patients who improve in relative terms to 
a degree comparable to the younger age group. It may be concluded that 
Age is not a barrier to beneficial response to the physical exercise
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components of cardiac rehabilitation and there is no evidence that the 
mixture of ages in the present programme has any negative effects for 
older or younger patients.
Measures of Cardiac Morbidity show no effects of Age, but Number of 
Days affected by chest pain does show a treatment effect, with a decline 
from baseline to all outcome points, and this applies independently of 
Age. Although it was not apparent from the analyses, the measures of 
Cardiac morbidity did contain a large number of zero scores, which led to 
a skew in the distribution. This limits the generality of the findings, since 
for some patients a 'floor' effect obtained and the scope for change was 
accordingly limited. The measures of Cardiac Morbidity, therefore, require 
further consideration. It is not clear how objective they are or whether they 
are independent of other measures, such as mood. This will be discussed 
more fully below.
For the Quality of Life measures, there is only one relevant Age factor, 
and this is in the interaction between Understanding and Age. This took 
the form of significant negative correlations at baseline and 12 months. 
However, there was no main effect of Age in the Analysis of Variance. A 
posfe/7017 analysis of Treatment located the principal difference between 
age-group means at baseline. Beyond this point, for both groups the level 
of Understanding increased, although the interaction suggested that 
levels of understanding between treatments occurred differentially for 
younger and older patients.
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Finally, the psychological measures of Anxiety, Depression, Intrusion and 
Avoidance appear to be independent of Age. There seems to be a 
general effect of Treatment for anxiety and depression whereby both 
improve (the symptoms decrease), and this persists up to six months, but 
then recedes thereafter. This raises some general questions about the 
effects of cardiac rehabilitation on mood. These will be considered more 
fully in the next analyses which will concentrate on sub-groups of patients 
with higher and lower levels of psychological symptoms.
(ii) lllness-category and Cardiac Rehabilitation
In general there was very little evidence of any differential effects between 
Ml and CABG patients. Both groups performed equally well in the Walk 
Test, and both groups showed significant gains in physical capacity 
throughout the programme and at 6 month follow-up. The same 
equivalence obtained for the other measures, with only one exception. 
This was the measure of Avoidance, and on this the difference between 
groups was significant with Ml patients showing evidence of greater 
impairment. The implications of this finding will be discussed in more 
detail in the final discussion. However, the main conclusions to be drawn 
from the results so far are that CABG patients appear to respond to 
cardiac rehabilitation to an extent comparable to Ml patients, and there is 
no evidence in the present data of any contra-indications to the 
participation of CABG patients.
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Cardiac Rehabilitation and Psychological Morbidity
More generally, for the sample as a whole, irrespective of Age or Illness 
category, a notable feature of a number of all the above measures is the 
large degree of variability within the sample, so that within any of the sub­
groups there are individuals who show a range of response to the 
measures. This is particularly evident within the psychological measures. 
The mean values on these are also relatively low (Appendix 2) and below 
any level associated with clinical significance. In some of the measures 
there were instances of ‘ceiling’ and ‘floor’ effects, so that the scope for 
change in either direction was limited. At the same time, and by contrast, 
there were some individuals who scored substantially higher than average 
and at levels indicative of potential clinical disorder.
Visual inspection of the raw data suggests that, in particular, there is a 
sub-group of individuals with relatively high cardiac and psychological 
morbidity and correspondingly low Quality of Life and physical indices of 
function. As described in the introduction, there is evidence in the 
literature of variation between CHD patients in levels of psychological 
morbidity and this is now recognised as an independent risk-factor for 
relapse. Just as one would predict differences in outcome as a function of 
illness severity, so is it possible that some of the above findings may be 
confounded by differences within the sample in baseline levels of 
Psychological Morbidity. In the next analyses, therefore, Psychological 
Morbidity is investigated as a separate distinguishing characteristic within 
the present sample.
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High versus Low Psychological Morbidity: Statistical Methods.
In order to examine differences between subjects and any sub-group 
effects, a clustering analysis was performed on the data using the 
technique of k-means clustering with n=2 clusters, as described earlier. 
The variables chosen were the psychological dimensions of anxiety, 
depression, intrusion and avoidance at baseline.
The cluster analysis produced two clusters, summarised in Table 37. This 
produced 13 patients in cluster 1 and 67 in cluster 2. Missing data at 
baseline precluded the remaining 14 patients, and they are therefore 
excluded from the following analysis.
Table 37 Showing results of the cluster analysis on Psychological
Cluster Summary Max Distance Prior Distance
1. High
Psychological
Morbidity
(n=13)
3.94 4.09
2. Low
Psychological
Morbidity
(n=67)
3.30 3.67
Cluster
Means
(s.d.’s):
Baseline
Anxiety
Baseline
Depress­
ion
Baseline
Avoidance
Baseline
Intrusion
High Psych 
Morbidity
11.77 (3.34) 8.46 (4.05) 18.54 (9.40) 15.08 (6.68)
Low Psych 
Morbidity
4.43 (2.86) 2.37 (2.04) 4.33 (5.49) 3.27 (3.71)
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The distinguishing characteristic of cluster 1 compared with cluster 2 is 
the relatively high levels of psychological symptoms of Anxiety, 
Depression, Intrusion and Avoidance. Accordingly, cluster 1 is labelled 
‘High Psychological Morbidity’ (HiP) and cluster 2 ‘Low Psychological 
Morbidity’ (LoP).
It is important to note that the mathematical analysis procedure has, in 
fact, produced categories with scores that are consistent with clinically 
meaningful decision criteria. Thus the mean scores for each psychological 
measure are at a level that is clinically significant. The anxiety mean score 
of 11 for HiP and the Depression mean score of 8 are both specified cut­
off points within the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & 
Snaith, 1983). The avoidance and intrusion mean scores of over 15 are at 
the level used by researchers as clinically significant cut off scores 
(Robbins & Hunt, 1993).
In terms of prevalence too, the clustering creates clinically meaningful 
distinctions. The HiP group comprise just over 16 percent of the sample. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, this is consistent with a number of 
previous studies that identify between 15 and 30 percent of the population 
of patients with coronary heart disease as suffering clinically significant 
psychological distress. The data were then subjected to the same 
analyses as performed in relation to Age and Illness category above. As a 
preliminary, the distribution of patients is shown in Table 38 and analysed 
for significant differences using chi-squared.
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Table 38 Showing chi-squared analysis of distribution of 
psychological morbidity
High
Psych.
Morbidity
Low
Psych.
Morbidity
Totals Significance 
(Likelihood Ratio)
CABG 6 37 43 x'=0.359, 
p=0.5489, n.s.Ml 7 30 37
Younger 5 24 29 x'=0.033, 
p=0.8566, n.s.Older 8 43 51
It can be seen that there are no statistically significant differences in the 
distribution of Age, or Illness across the High/Low Psychological Morbidity 
categories.
(a) PHYSICAL FUNCTION
The analysis of results for physical function in terms of number of 5 metre 
laps completed in 6 minutes are summarised below in Figures 12a and b 
and Table 39. Figures 21a and b show the main effect of Psychological 
Morbidity (Psychmorb) and the interaction of Psychmorb with Treatment, 
respectively. As previously the effects of Subjects and Treatment overlap 
with the previous analyses and will only be discussed here where 
relevant. The main focus will be on the between group effect and any 
interaction.
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Figure 21a
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Figure 21b
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB: Profile Plot 
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months)
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Table 39: Anova Psychmorb x Walk-test
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 85 3.8897851 0.045762 7.3651
Error 79 0.4908602 0.006213 Prob>F
C Total 164 4.3806452 <0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
PSYCHMORB 0.00001 0.00001 1 0.0004 0.9836
TREATMENT 0.32294 0.16147 2 25.9873 <0001
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB 0.01465 0.00733 2 1.1789 0.3130
SUBJECT[PSYCHMORB] 2.90379 0.0363 80 5.8418 <0001
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There is no main effect of Psychmorb, not any interaction. It may be 
concluded, therefore, that high versus low psychological morbidity was 
not associated with any disadvantage in the recovery and development of 
physical function, as measured by the Walk Test.
(b) CARDIAC MORBIDITY
The analysis of the cardiac morbidity measure of Frequency of Chest Pain 
(FCP) is summarised in Figures 22a and b and Table 40.
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Figure 22b
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB: Profile Plot 
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months)
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Table 40: showing Anova of FCP and Psychmorb
Source DF
Model 38
Error 25
C Total 63
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Squares 
5.6912587 
1.7344011 
7.4256599
Tests wrt Random Effects
Mean Square 
0.149770 
0.069376
F Ratio 
2.1588 
Prob>F 
0.0230
Source 88 M8 Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
PSYCHMORB 0.20896 0.20896 1 1.5417 0.2217
TREATMENT 0.33849 0.11283 3 1.6263 0.2085
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB 0.10759 0.03586 3 0.5169 0.6744
SUBJECT[PSYCHMORB] 4.88232 0.15749 31 2.2702 0.0194
Although there is a trend towards higher levels for the HiP group on this 
measure, this analysis shows no statistically significant effect of 
Psychological Morbidity nor any interaction. It is concluded that both 
groups performed equally on this measure.
The next analysis is of Number Of Days in the last 14 in which the heart 
condition interfered with normal function (NOD). Results are shown in 
Figures 23a and b and Table 41.
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Figure 23a
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Figure 23b
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB: Profile Plot 
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months)
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Table 41 : showing Anova of NOD and Psychmorb
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 65 10.300659 0.158472 1.8619
Error 61 5.191864 0.085113 Prob>F
C Total 126 15.492523 0.0076
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
PSYCHMORB 1.80777 1.80777 1 13.5692 0.0005
TREATMENT 1.38413 0.46138 3 5.4208 0.0023
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB 0.02938 0.00979 3 0.1151 0.9510
SUBJECT[PSYCHMORB] 7.63305 0.1316 58 1.5462 0.0473
There is a significant difference between groups, but no interaction. It may 
be concluded that high psychological morbidity is associated with higher 
levels of cardiac morbidity on this measure throughout treatment, although 
both groups showed a decline in frequency as a result of treatment.
(c) QUALITY OF LIFE MEASURES
Mean quality of life measures of General Quality of Life (QOL),
Confidence in Making a Recovery (Conf) and Understanding of Heart 
Condition (Und) are summarised in the following analyses. Looking first at 
General Quality of Life, the analysis is shown in Figures 24a and b and 
Table 42.
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Figure 24a
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Figure 24b
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB: Profile Plot 
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months)
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Table 42: Anova of QOL x Psychmorb
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 85 6.1324541 0.072147 5.0557
Error 188 2.6828075 0.014270 Prob>F
C Total 273 8.8152616 <0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
PSYCHMORB 1.68542 1.68542 1 37.3807 <.0001
TREATMENT 0.59707 0.19902 3 13.9468 <0001
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB 0.03036 0.01012 3 0.7091 0.5477
SUBJECT[PSYCHMORB] 4.13044 0.05295 78 3.7108 <0001
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It is apparent that the main effect of Psychmorb is significant, and there is 
no interaction. It is concluded that there is a significant difference between 
patients' general Quality of Life which is a function of Psychological 
Morbidity. It is apparent from Figure 24b above that the high Psychmorb 
patients show consistently lower levels of QOL. However, in relative 
terms, both groups benefit from treatment with an increase in quality of life 
throughout the programme, which indicates that despite the presence of 
psychological morbidity, patients remain responsive to the positive effects 
of treatment and improve significantly relative to their baseline scores.
The next analysis, of Confidence and Psychological Morbidity, is shown in 
Figures 25 a and b and Table 43.
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Figure 25b
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB: Profile Plot 
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months)
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Table 43: Anova Confidence x Psychmorb
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Squares 
4.8264149 
3.2200546 
8.0464694
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source DF
Model 85
Error 183
C Total 268
Mean Square 
0.056781 
0.017596
F Ratio 
3.2270 
Prob>F 
<.0001
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
PSYCHMORB 1.53148 1.53148 1 41.0180 <.0001
TREATMENT 0.06193 0.02064 3 1.1732 0.3213
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB 0.03899 0.013 3 0.7387 0.5302
SUBJECT[PSYCHMORB] 3.12648 0.04008 78 2.2780 <.0001
This shows a main effect of Psychological Morbidity, and there is no 
interaction effect. These results taken in conjunction with Figure 25a 
above, suggest that patients with high levels of psychological morbidity 
are less confident in their ability to recover from their heart condition than 
those with lower levels, and that this discrepancy persists throughout 
treatment. In fact, for both groups, there was hardly any change between 
outcome points on this measure: essentially, where they started is where 
they ended up.
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Finally, the analysis of Understanding and Psychological Morbidity is 
shown in Figures 26a and b and Table 44.
Figure 26a
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Figure 26b
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB: Profile Plot 
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Table 44; showing Anova of Understanding and Psychmorb
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 85 3.1180563 0.036683 4.3330
Error 189 1.6000511 0.008466 Prob>F
C Total 274 4.7181074 <.0001
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
PSYCHMORB 0.24621 0.24621 1 7.6111 0.0072
TREATMENT 0.02058 0.00686 3 0.8103 0.4896
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB 0.04607 0.01536 3 1.8141 0.1460
SUBJECT[PSYCHMORB] 2.63182 0.03374 78 3.9856 <.0001
Here it can be seen that there is a main effect of Psychological Morbidity, 
and there is no interaction effect. It is concluded, therefore, that patients 
with high levels of psychological morbidity show evidence of less 
understanding throughout treatment than those with low levels, and this 
does not change during treatment.
Taken together, these findings confirm the predictable association 
between high levels of psychological morbidity and diminished quality of 
life. Furthermore, they show that even after six weeks of cardiac 
rehabilitation, the disadvantage to the HiP group remains.
(d) PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASURES
Psychological measures are analysed in order to examine whether the 
differences between clusters at baseline are maintained at the other 
measurement points and, in particular, any interaction effects between 
Psychological Morbidity and Treatment. Results for the psychological 
measures of Anxiety, Depression, Intrusion and Avoidance are 
summarised below.
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The first analysis examines Anxiety in relation to Psychological 
Morbidity. Figures 27a and b and Table 45 summarise the results.
Figure 27a
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TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB: Profile Plot 
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months)
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Table 45:showing Anova of Anxiety x Psychmorb
Source DF
Model 83
Error 180
C Total 263
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Squares 
23.356301 
7.291417 
30.647717
Tests wrt Random Effects
Mean Square 
0.281401 
0.040508
F Ratio 
6.9468 
Prob>F 
<0001
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
PSYCHMORB 7.68724 7.68724 1 34.8494 <0001
TREATMENT 0.31931 0.10644 3 2.6276 0.0518
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB 0.03662 0.01221 3 0.3013 0.8244
SUBJECT[PSYCHMORB] 16.216 0.21337 76 5.2673 <0001
There is a main effect of Psychmorb, but no interaction. However, the 
Treatment effect, in this case, is just above the 5% level of significance, 
suggesting a trend towards a beneficial response to Treatment.
The next analysis is of Depression and Psychological Morbidity. The 
results are shown in Figures 28a and b and Table 47.
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Figure 28b
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB; Profile Plot 
Treatments {1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months)
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Table 47: Anova of Depression x Psychmorb
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Squares 
21.934621 
7.653309 
29.587930
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source DF
Model 79
Error 159
C Total 238
Mean Square 
0.277653 
0.048134
F Ratio 
5.7683 
Prob>F 
<.0001
Source 8 8 M8 Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
PSYCHMORB 7.49284 7.49284 1 35.5661 <0001
TREATMENT 0.63274 0.21091 3 4.3818 0.0054
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB 0.2151 0.0717 3 1.4896 0.2194
SUBJECT[PSYCHMORB] 14.2895 0.19847 72 4.1232 <0001
There is a main effect of Psychmorb, but no interaction. There is also 
confirmation of the earlier significant effect of Treatment, suggesting that 
both groups change during the process of cardiac rehabilitation.
Inspection of Figure 28b suggests that the most notable changes 
occurred for the High Psychmorb group. In order to examine this further, 
separate analysis of contrasts for each group were performed. The results 
are shown in Tables 48a and 48b.
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Table 48a: showing Analysis of Contrasts for Depression for High 
Psychological Morbidity group
Contrast
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months)
1 + + +
2 + - -
3 - + -
4 - - +
Estimate 0.1012 0.2527 0.0076
Std Error 0.0884 0.0884 0.0884
t Ratio 1.1448 2.8578 0.0856
Prob>|t| 0.254 0.0048 0.9319
SS 0.0631 0.3931 0.0004
Sum of Squares 
Numerator DF
0.4948344735
3
F Ratio 3.4267827366
Prob > F 0.0186278708
Table 48b: showing Analysis of Contrasts for Depression for the Low 
Psychological Morbidity group
Contrast
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=slx months, 4= twelve months)
1 + + +
2 + - -
3 - + -
4 - - +
Estimate 0.04 0.0581 -0.015
Std Error 0.047 0.0451 0.0469
t Ratio 0.8505 1.2869 -0.325
Prob>|t| 0.3963 0.2 0.7456
SS 0.0348 0.0797 0.0051
Sum of Squares 
Numerator DF 
F Ratio 
Prob > F
0.151529071
3
1.0493553547
0.3724456632
Here it can be seen that the changes that occurred over time were located 
amongst the High Psychological Morbidity group. The adjusted F ratio in 
this case is just below the Bonferroni adjusted level of significance, but the 
t-tests suggest that the main difference was between baseline and 6 
months.
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Next, Figures 29a and b and Table 49 show the analysis of Avoidance 
and Psychmorb.
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Table 49: Anova of Avoidance x Psychmorb
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Squares 
24.503041 
10.527845 
35.030885
Tests wrt Random Effects
Source DF
Model 78
Error 119
C Total 197
Mean Square 
0.314142 
0.088469
F Ratio 
3.5509 
Prob>F 
<0001
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
PSYCHMORB 7.90772 7.90772 1 28.5147 <0001
TREATMENT 0.3317 0.11057 3 1.2498 0.2949
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB 0.07108 0.02369 3 0.2678 0.8485
SUBJECTS[PSYCHMORB] 17.4797 0.24619 71 2.7828 <0001
It can be seen that there is a main effect of Psychmorb, but no effect of 
Treatment and no interaction of Psychmorb with Treatment, so that the 
main effect of Psychmorb remains consistent throughout treatment.
Finally, Figures 30a and b and Table 50 show the analysis of Intrusion 
and Psychmorb.
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Figure 30b
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB: Profile Plot 
Treatments (1=baseline, 2=six weeks, 3=six months, 4= twelve months)
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Table 50: Anova of Intrusion x Psychmorb
Source DF
Model 75
Error 114
C Total 189
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Squares 
22.580608 
11.743258 
34.323866
Tests wrt Random Effects
Mean Square 
0.301075 
0.103011
F Ratio 
2.9227 
Prob>F 
<0001
Source SS MS Num DF Num F Ratio Prob>F
PSYCHMORB 8.36231 8.36231 1 37.1201 <.0001
TREATMENT 0.10923 0.03641 3 0.3535 0.7867
TREATMENT*PSYCHMORB 0.07788 0.02596 3 0.2520 0.8598
SUBJECTS[PSYCHMORB] 14.5551 0.21405 68 2.0779 0.0003
Here again, there is no effect of Treatment and no interaction, but a highly 
significant main effect between groups, so that it is concluded that the 
discrepancies persist throughout treatment.
Summary of findings relating to High and Low Psychological 
Morbidity
In summary, there are no between group differences in Walk Test and 
Frequency of Chest Pain. On all other measures there are clear and 
significant between group effects, with the High Psychmorb group
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showing greatest disadvantage. Treatment effects are found for Walk 
Test, Number of Days, Quality of Life and Depression. There is also an 
outcome for Anxiety which is just above the 5% significance level for 
Treatment effect. There are no interactions on any measure.
General Discussion
All conclusions drawn from these results should be prefaced with an 
acknowledgement of the limitations in the present data. First of all, this is 
not a randomised controlled trial of cardiac rehabilitation: there is no 
control group receiving ‘standard’ cardiac care with which the present 
results may be compared for relative efficacy. Nor are the participants in 
the programme randomly assigned to the treatment. Those who 
participated elected to do so and we do not have detailed information 
about those who declined. In addition, the number of participants is small 
compared with major trials of cardiac rehabilitation, and so the possibility 
of statistical artefact cannot be dismissed. Finally, there was considerable 
variance in some of the measures, and there is clearly a balance to be 
sought between the generalisations that can reasonably be made from 
these data and the fact of individual variability within the sample.
However, despite these limitations, there are a number of considerations 
which give grounds to the view that the present data may, nonetheless, 
remain of clinical relevance and interest. Although this is not a RCT, the 
programme is consistent with clinical guidelines on best practice. There 
are very clear medical inclusion and exclusion criteria, so that those who
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participate are medically comparable in terms of the nature and severity of 
disease. In addition, the ingredients of the programme are specified within 
the parameters already discussed in the introduction to this analysis, 
where it was stated explicitly that the present programme conforms to the 
definition of Cardiac Rehabilitation Type-1. Thus the present study 
provides an opportunity to examine the efficacy of a well-founded 
rehabilitation programme and to examine trends within the population in 
question in which each sub-group acts as its own control for changes over 
time. The programme is also standardised between sub-groups, so that 
Ml patients receive the same treatment as CABG and younger the same 
as older. Any differences found, therefore, are attributable to factors other 
than treatment per se.
Bearing these considerations in mind, what conclusions may be drawn 
from the present findings? First of all, there is the fact that in all the 
analyses outcome was variable: on some measures there was evidence 
of change over time, and on others there was no change. Physical 
function generally improved to a significant degree, as did Number of 
Days, global QOL, Understanding, Anxiety and Depression, and this was 
independent of the sub-group variables of age or illness-type. However, 
other measures showed relatively less evidence of change: Frequency of 
Chest Pain, Confidence, Intrusion and Avoidance remained largely 
unchanged from baseline to the various outcome points. There is, though, 
an important consideration in interpreting these findings. As mentioned 
earlier, there was a large degree of variability in the data on many of the
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measures, and there were a number of measures in which ‘floor’ and 
‘ceiling’ effects were apparent, so that the scope for change was often 
restricted. This will be examined in more detail in the following sections.
Age and responsiveness to cardiac rehabilitation
Looking first at Age as a variable that may potentially affect outcome, the 
experimental question of interest was whether there was any evidence 
that older patients may respond differently than younger patients to 
cardiac rehabilitation, so that standardised cardiac rehabilitation Type-1 
may be more or less appropriate depending on age. The broad finding 
appears to be that older patients benefited from the cardiac rehabilitation 
provided in a way that was comparable with younger patients, and there 
was no evidence of any disadvantage as a result of age. Even where 
significant age-differences emerged, such as in the Walk Test results, the 
proportional benefits (relative change between baseline and outcome 
points) were equivalent for older and younger patients.
As described in the introduction, there is a dearth of studies of cardiac 
rehabilitation amongst older age groups. The study by Marchionni et al 
(1994) found substantial improvement 8 weeks after the start of an 
exercise-based rehabilitation programme amongst patients over 75 years 
of age, compared with a non-randomised control group of patients who 
had declined cardiac rehabilitation. The present results are consistent 
with Marchionni, et al’s and, in addition, show persisting improvement at 6 
months in patients with a mean age of approximately 70 years. They are
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also consistent with guidelines that claim older patients may be exercised 
safely and with benefit in cardiac rehabilitation programmes (e.g. Cortes & 
Goetz, 1994).
With respect to Psychological Morbidity, it was argued in the introduction 
that there was relatively little evidence regarding psychosocial outcome 
amongst older patients following cardiac rehabilitation. The study by 
Milani and Lavie (1998) provided some evidence of benefit for older 
patients receiving cardiac rehabilitation, but the data were vitiated by a 
lack of analysis of the differential responding of so-called ‘depressed’ and 
‘non-depressed’ groups. As with Milani and Lavie, the present study 
demonstrated that psychological morbidity was not an obstacle to physical 
improvement following cardiac rehabilitation.
Looking now at Cardiac Morbidity and Quality of Life, in the present study 
there were no age-related differences in measures of Cardiac Morbidity. 
With respect to measures of Quality of Life, there was just one finding: a 
negative correlation between Age and Understanding and an interaction 
in the Analysis of Variance. The implication of this finding is that while 
there is no strong evidence of differences between age groups in 
Understanding, it may be wise to proceed with caution and allow for the 
possibility that perceptual and cognitive differences associated with 
ageing may influence speed and extent of Understanding, at least at the 
initial stages. However, it is also worth noting that levels of Understanding 
were very high at outset for both groups (86 percent for younger patients
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and 73 percent for older patients). Following this, mean Understanding for 
the older patients rose to just under 80 percent at 12 months, and by just 
2 points for the younger patients. Bearing this in mind, even if the levels of 
initial understanding reflected some aspect of perceptual or cognitive 
impairment associated with ageing, it was not sufficient to prevent 
subsequent improvement. Furthermore, there is no suggestion in the data 
that any problems with Understanding had a correspondingly negative 
effect on other aspects of Quality of Life as measured by the other 
categories of General QOL and Confidence. There were no main effects 
of Age on either of these other measures. General QOL does appear to 
improve, as a result of Treatment, for all patients irrespective of age, and 
the level of Confidence was statistically equivalent between age groups.
Most importantly, the physical benefit to the older patients is clearly 
apparent and, on the whole, the conclusion to be drawn from the present 
study is that standardised cardiac rehabilitation Type-1 is appropriate for 
patients of all ages, although there may be other sub-group effects that 
influence outcome, such as psychological morbidity (see below).
Illness-category and responsiveness to cardiac rehabilitation
With respect to Illness Category, there seem to be no contra-indications 
for the inclusion of CABG patients amongst the population of those 
receiving cardiac rehabilitation . As stated in the introduction, the majority 
of studies of cardiac rehabilitation have concentrated on Ml patients. The 
form and content of cardiac rehabilitation is largely based on the needs of
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this particular category of patients, and there is a relative dearth of 
evidence relating to the specific needs of CABG patients.
The present data suggest that Ml and CABG patients responded to an 
equivalent degree to the present cardiac rehabilitation programme, and 
where improvements in function occurred, they occurred equally for both 
groups. There were, though, some indications of psychological 
differences between the illness categories, although the findings are only 
tentative. Nevertheless, where statistically significant difference was 
found, in the Avoidance measure, it was the Ml group who reported the 
higher levels of symptoms. It is also apparent from the between-group 
graphs in the analyses that there was a non-significant trend towards 
higher levels of Anxiety and Intrusion for the Ml patients, although 
Depression levels were essentially equivalent. This broad trend is 
consistent with the clinical observation that, in general, CABG patients 
appear to be less distressed than Ml patients. This may well be due to the 
fact that CABG patients often report the belief that their heart condition 
has been ‘cured’ as a result of their surgery, and what they require from 
cardiac rehabilitation is help with resuming or improving on their prior 
function. By contrast. Ml patients often report fears about further heart 
problems which may make them more cautious about the prospects for 
physical activity and the psychosocial prognosis.
It would be interesting to undertake a more detailed study of the 
psychological or attitudinal characteristics of different groups of patients
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with various forms of heart disease and this may, in turn, have 
implications for the form and content of cardiac rehabilitation for different 
populations of patients with heart disease. The question of whether CABG 
patients would benefit from cardiac rehabilitation tailored more specifically 
to their needs remains to be investigated. There is a suggestion in the 
present data that for the majority of CABG patients there is relatively little 
psychological morbidity and a focus on exercise and the restoration or 
improvement of pre-morbid physical function may be sufficient.
High versus Low Psychological Morbidity and responsiveness to 
Cardiac Rehabilitation.
The main source of statistically significant difference within the present 
sample related not to illness category or age, but to psychological 
morbidity, and the differences found were clear and persisting. It thus 
appears that the present sample consisted on the one hand of a majority 
of patients with low psychological morbidity (the LoP group) and, on the 
other, a minority of patients with clinically significant psychological 
morbidity (the HiP group).
It is worth reiterating that the clustering analysis, which produced the two 
distinct groups in terms of psychological morbidity, appears to have 
validity since, as mentioned earlier, the cut-off points that were derived 
mathematically correspond to cut-off points used in clinical decision 
making. This suggests that the groupings are unlikely to be arbitrary. This 
view is further reinforced by the finding that the prevalence rate for
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psychological morbidity corresponds to that reported in the literature. In 
this respect the current sample is representative of the general population 
of patients with heart disease.
Differences between the groups were apparent on most measures. The 
LoP group had generally high quality of life measures and low cardiac 
morbidity, and there was limited scope for improvement on these due to 
‘ceiling’ and ‘floor’ effects. The HiP group, by contrast, had low levels of 
quality of life and high levels of cardiac morbidity. Despite this, however, 
both groups were equivalent in physical function and showed the benefit 
of Treatment.
In relation to physical function the HiP group were statistically equivalent 
to the LoP group, and both improved relative to their baseline function (37 
percent for the LoP group and just under 33 percent for the HiP group). 
These findings stand in contrast to other reports in the literature. For 
instance, Sullivan, et al (1997) in their one year prospective study of the 
relationship between functional status and psychological morbidity found 
that physical function was impeded, at one year, in proportion to the 
degree of psychological morbidity. Their measure of physical function was 
a questionnaire in which patients were asked to judge retrospectively the 
extent to which they had experienced difficulties in a number of physical 
tasks, such as climbing the stairs or walking a given distance. There were, 
though, no objective measures of actual physical ability alongside these 
retrospective accounts.
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The present study provides a more objective basis for evaluating physical 
function. The Walk Test used in the present analysis, is a clear and 
objective measure of one aspect of physical function and the results, in 
that respect, speak for themselves: ie there is no issue of interpretation 
that might confound the present results. It is possible, therefore, that the 
results reported by Sullivan et al may have been an artefact of the 
retrospective measures used. Unfortunately, the lack of 12 month walk- 
test data in the present study prevents any categorical statement about 
this, since it may still be the case that those who reverted to higher levels 
of psychological morbidity at 12 months also became physically less able 
at this stage. Nevertheless, the Walk Test results suggest that 
Psychological Morbidity perse is not a contra-indication for improved 
physical capacity. This is useful information for those cardiac 
rehabilitation programmes that are entirely exercise-based, since there 
are no grounds, on the present evidence, to exclude patients with some 
degree of psychological distress from such programmes.
Despite the benefits of increased physical function at 6 months, the HiP 
group reported greater levels of cardiac morbidity in terms of Number of 
Days impaired than the LoP group. They also remained psychologically 
more impaired than the LoP group throughout, despite a relative decline 
in Depression scores. Bearing in mind that illness severity for all patients 
was equivalent at the start of rehabilitation, this raises the question of the 
relationship between the cardiac morbidity symptoms and the
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psychological symptoms. Did the HiP group actually experience greater 
cardiac morbidity, or did they simply report more somatic concern as a 
consequence of their greater psychological vulnerability? And what is the 
causal relationship, if any, between these symptoms?
The Frequency of Chest Pain result casts some light on these questions. 
Earlier, in the introduction to this thesis, it was mentioned that the Count 
Scales may be of limited utility because they depended on recall and also 
because they may simply be an artefact of mood, so that patients who 
were depressed or anxious would be more likely to report a higher 
incidence of symptoms of cardiac morbidity. The finding of no significant 
effect of FCP between groups indicates that FCP was, in this case, 
independent of psychological morbidity, where clear between group 
effects were found. In addition, if recall were a confounding factor, then 
one would predict equivalent recall problems for both FCP and Number of 
Days: however, the evidence does not support this. It is concluded, 
therefore, that the present evidence supports the view that FCP and, by 
extension, NOD are valid and independent measures, although the 
present results would require replication before making any strong claims 
about this.
The results of the Anxiety and Depression measures are particularly 
interesting. The Anxiety Treatment effect overall was just above the 5% 
level of significance, suggesting a trend towards responsiveness to 
treatment. However, this result also illustrates the problem of having a
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'floor' effect. The LoP patients had very low levels of Anxiety at baseline, 
and to change from a clinically insignificant level to an even more 
insignificant level is of clinically dubious interest. In addition, inspection of 
the raw data in Appendix 2 shows that the apparent trend for the HiP 
group did not, in fact, bring mean Anxiety levels below the level of clinical 
significance at any stage: all mean scores remained above the 'cut-off 
score of 8.
With the Depression measure, however, the clinical and statistical 
implications are more interesting. In this case, it was the High Psychmorb 
patients who benefited more, and who showed particular benefit between 
baseline and 6 months. Not only was this change statistically significant, 
but the HAD Depression levels also fell below the threshold associated 
with clinical significance (see Appendix 2: the mean Depression levels at 
6 weeks and 6 months are below the clinical 'cut-off point of 8). This is 
encouraging, although the failure to find the same effect at 12 months 
vitiates the finding somewhat. Nevertheless, the benefit in mood, if taken 
in conjunction with the Walk Test results is consistent with the general 
finding of an improvement in mood associated with improvement in 
physical function, even amongst those with clinically significant levels of 
mood disorder (eg Palleschi et al, 1998; Craft and Landers, 1998). 
Because there was no 12 month measure of physical function, it cannot 
be determined whether the decline in mood between 6 months and 12 
months also corresponded to a decline in physical function. This
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highlights the importance of including a 12 month walk-test in future 
evaluation research.
It is also interesting to note the presence of clear symptoms of Avoidance 
and Intrusion in the HiP group, which are usually associated with PTSD, 
and this is independent of the sub-group factors (age, illness-type). 
Symptoms of PTSD amongst Ml patients have been reported by Kutz, et 
al (1994) and vanDriel and denVelde (1995). Doerfler, et al (1994) also 
report such symptoms amongst CABG patients. The rates vary between 
these studies, with 16 percent reported by Kutz et al in a sample of 100 
patients, 1 out of 18 patients reported by vanDriel and denVelde, and 8 
percent of 50 patients reported by Doerfler et al. Although no formal 
diagnosis of PTSD was attempted in the present study, the Impact of 
Events Scale correlates highly with clinical diagnosis of PTSD (O’Brien, 
1998) and the present results are consistent with the above reports. The 
indications are, therefore, that a small but clinically significant number of 
patients in the present study have been seriously traumatised by their 
experience of heart disease.
This finding also has implications for the varieties of psychological 
intervention offered to patients with CHD. The optimal treatment of Post- 
Traumatic Stress remains to be established, but the literature shows that 
a number of possibilities exist and, in many cases, are tailored to the 
specific needs of the sub-group involved. O’Brien (1998) lists a variety of 
approaches, including “psychotherapeutic, pharmacological, cognitive-
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behavioural, psychosocial, integrated”. It remains to be investigated 
whether the population of patients with cardiac disease require a cardiac- 
specific intervention for this aspect of their experience. Nevertheless, the 
addition of measures of Post-Traumatic Stress may expand our 
understanding of the meaning of the experience of CHD and enable better 
psychological treatments for those suffering these disabling symptoms.
Taking all the results together, the present findings suggest that a Type-1 
programme does not meet all the needs of all participants and, 
specifically, is less effective overall for those with high levels of 
psychological morbidity at baseline. Further research might focus on 
whether such patients can be prepared for rehabilitation by receiving 
some form of psychological intervention as a preliminary. Alternatively, 
they may be amenable to psychological intervention following standard 
rehabilitation in order to complement the rehabilitation and extend 
recovery. The relative outcome for a group provided with specific 
psychological intervention in addition to cardiac rehabilitation, and a 
group receiving rehabilitation alone would provide a basis for addressing 
these issues.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the present study has addressed the questions posed in 
the introduction, and found some answers of relevance to clinical practice. 
One of the problems identified in the introduction, was that evidence 
relating to the psychosocial outcome of cardiac rehabilitation programmes
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is variable: in some instances there is evidence of benefit, but in others 
there is little or none. The present results suggest that a Type-1 cardiac 
rehabilitation programme has the capacity to meet the needs of a wide 
range of patients of different ages and with different forms of CHD. For the 
large majority of patients with low levels of psychological morbidity (86 
percent of the present sample) there was, at baseline, a combination of 
poor physical function, with scope for improvement, but a low incidence of 
cardiac morbidity and relatively high quality of life indices, from the start. 
This raises an important issue for cardiac rehabilitation programmes. If 
psychological and cardiac morbidity are low to begin with and quality of 
life is high, then (a) there is limited scope for improvement on these 
measures (the ‘floor’ and ‘ceiling’ effects) and (b) the content of 
rehabilitation is unlikely to require sophisticated psychological 
interventions.
By the same token, in those cases where higher levels of psychological 
morbidity were apparent, the present intervention (Type-1 rehabilitation) 
made relatively little impact on psychological state. However, it should be 
noted that Type-1 rehabilitation is not designed to provide a high level of 
psychological intervention: the aim is health-education, not psychological 
therapy. It should not, therefore, be considered surprising if specific 
psychological pathology remained unrelieved following this form of 
cardiac rehabilitation . Realistically, a Type-1 programme would not be 
predicted to confer benefit to symptoms for which specific psychological
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treatment is indicated: this would require Type-2 rehabilitation, as already 
described.
Nevertheless, the advantage of a Type-1 programme is that, in principle, it 
has the capacity to provide benefit to the broadest range of patients. The 
present study supports this view and shows evidence of beneficial 
outcomes for the majority of patients, irrespective of sub-group 
differences. In planning cardiac rehabilitation programmes, account 
should be taken of the variable needs within the patient population and 
the form of cardiac rehabilitation offered should be capable of reflecting 
this variability.
At the same time, the present study has revealed a number of limits. In 
addition to the limit on the extent to which specifically psychological needs 
can be met by Type-1 cardiac rehabilitation, further questions about the 
particular needs of patients following CABG remain to be investigated. 
There is clear scope for further research in all of these areas, and routine 
clinical practice provides an opportunity to identify the issues and carry 
out relevant empirical investigations. The results of such studies serve a 
dual purpose of contributing to the evaluation of patient care, so that 
future programmes can be best planned and implemented, and providing 
a foundation for future, clinically well-motivated, research investigations.
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Appendix 1. Showing distribution of untransformed Raw Scores
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Appendix 3: Showing tests that Variances are equal. Unequal Variances 
will have a significant p value. Non-significant values indicate equality of 
Variances.
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49 0.3310575 0.2755007
Test F Ratio 
0 ’Brien[.5]1.3694
DF Num 
1
DF Den 
70
MeanAbsDifto Median 
0.3278561 
0.2730297
Prob>F
0.2459
Level
1
2
loglOintrusion at assessment By Agex2
Tests that the Variances are Equal 
Count Std Dev MeanAbsDifto Mean
23 0.3973573 0.3250512
38 0.4488811 0.3859268
Test F Ratio 
O'Brien[.5]0.7627
DF Num 
1
DF Den 
59
MeanAbsDifto Median 
0.3268433 
0.3830517
Prob>F
0.3860
Level
1
2
loglOavoidance at assessment By Agex2
Count
22
39
Tests that the Variances are Equal
Std Dev 
0.3484518 
0.4269763
Test F Ratio 
0'Brien[.5]1.3765
MeanAbsDifto Mean 
0.2762343 
0.3421773
DF Num 
1
DF Den 
59
MeanAbsDifto Median 
0.2731298 
0.3420468
Prob>F
0.2454
loglOconfidence at assessment By Agex2
Tests that the Variances are Equal 
Level Count Std Dev MeanAbsDif to Mean
1 24 0.0839542 0.0485360
2 51 0.1905653 0.1156950
MeanAbsDifto Median 
0.0431935 
0.0988854
Test F Ratio 
0'Brien[.5]1.3082
DF Num 
1
DF Den
73
Prob>F
0.2565
Level
1
2
Count
24
51
loglOQOL at assessment By Agex2
Tests that the Variances are Equal
Std Dev MeanAbsDifto Mean
0.2163381 0.1571614
0.2220376 0.1644662
Test F Ratio 
0 ’Brien[.5]0.0085
DF Num 
1
DF Den 
73
MeanAbsDifto Median 
0.1540563 
0.1630491
Prob>F
0.9269
Level
1
2
logi Ounderstanding at assessment By Agex2 
Tests that the Variances are Equal
Count
26
51
Std Dev 
0.0514664 
0.1830102
MeanAbsDifto Mean 
0.0448082 
0.1377369
MeanAbsDifto Median 
0.0448082 
0.1234209
Test
0'Brien[.5]
F Ratio 
5.2406
DF Num 
1
DF Den 
75
Welch An ova testing Means Equal, allowing Std's Not Equal
F Ratio DF Num DF Den Prob>F
13.1413 1 63.653 0.0006
t-T est 
3.6251
Prob>F
0.0249*
Level
1
2
loglOFCP at assessment By Agex2
Tests that the Variances are Equal 
Count Std Dev MeanAbsDifto Mean
7 0.3181543 0.2579233
15 0.3944994 0.3368302
MeanAbsDifto Median 
0.2804568 
0.3419053
Test F Ratio 
O'Brien[.5]0.7355
DF Num 
1
DF Den 
20
Prob>F
0.4013
Level
1
2
Count
15
36
loglONOD at assessment By Agex2 
Tests that the Variances are Equal
Std Dev 
0.2847387 
0.3205234
MeanAbsDifto Mean 
0.2386381 
0.2558870
MeanAbsDifto Median 
0.2233499 
0.2535533
Test
0'Brien[.5]
F Ratio 
0.3887
DF Num 
1
DF Den 
49
Prob>F
0.5359
VI
Placebo to Credebo: The Missing Link in the Healing Process
J Mitchell Noon
Placebo (“I shall please”) is defined as:
"... any therapeutic procedure (or that component of any therapeutic 
procedure) which is given deliberately to have an effect, or unknowingly has 
an effect on a patient, symptom, syndrome, or disease, but is objectively 
without specific activity for the condition being treated.” (Shapiro, 1961 )
The above definition is widely cited in the literature and expresses a common 
understanding of the nature of the placebo effect. It will be argued below that 
this definition is ambiguous and that the ambiguity reflects alternative and 
incompatible views of the placebo effect. Nevertheless and despite this, it 
provides a good starting point for discussion.
Traditionally, placebos have been used in drug studies to control for the
effects of expectancy in treatment. They are also used in psychological
therapy research as a means of controlling for so-called ‘non-specific’ factors
in therapy. In the following discussion, the role of placebos in pharmacological
and psychological research will be reviewed. The aim will be to examine the
nature of placebos and some of the explanations that have been proposed for
their effects. It will be argued that placebos are a missing link in theories of
the healing process. Their status in the theory of healing has changed over
the years from a nuisance, through a mystery, to an important ingredient in
the process of treatment. As the mechanisms of placebo become increasingly
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articulated, so it is apparent that the wider understanding and application of 
the principles of placebo has the potential to enhance healthcare generally.
One of the most remarkable characteristics of placebos is how potent they 
appear to be. Oh (1994) suggests that placebos work best with pain 
conditions, disorders of the autonomic nervous system, and processes under 
neurohumoral control. Ross and Olsen (1981) list evidence of efficacy in: "... 
the treatment of radiation sickness, dental pain, headaches, coughing, 
asthmas, postoperative pain, multiple sclerosis, the common cold, diabetes, 
ulcers, arthritis, sea sickness, parkinsonism, and much more.” (p409). Indeed, 
such ubiquitous effects have prompted O’Donnell (1995) to make the rather 
ironical comment that placebo is: "the most effective medication known to 
science, subjected to more clinical trials than any other medicament yet (it) 
nearly always does better than anticipated. The range of susceptible 
conditions appears to be limitless.”
Ross and Olsen (1981 ) distinguish five trends in the literature on the 
pharmacological placebo effect. The first is direction of effect: placebos tend 
to work in the same therapeutic direction as the active treatment with which 
they are being compared. Thus a placebo, compared with a drug that lowers 
blood-pressure, will also have a pressure-lowering effect. Conversely, if the 
active treatment produces an increase in blood pressure, then the placebo 
will have the same direction of effect.
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Secondly, there is equivalence of strength. If a placebo is compared with a 
strong analgesic, such as morphine, then the placebo will replicate the strong 
analgesia. If compared with a mild analgesic such as aspirin, then the 
magnitude of analgesia will be comparable with than provided by the aspirin.
Thirdly, placebo side-effects are similar to the side-effects of the active drugs 
under analysis. Any active drug is likely to have known side effects (e.g. 
stomach discomfort, nausea, headaches, effects on appetite, or on sexual 
performance and so forth). Placebos have been found to produce broadly 
similar effects.
Fourthly, the time-course of the placebo mimics the time course of the effects 
of the active drug. If the effects of the active drug last for a number of minutes 
or hours, the placebo will tend to follow the same pattern.
Finally, the ‘therapeutic window’ of placebos seems to be the same as the 
active drug under comparison. Any active drug requires a specific dosage to 
provide the optimal concentration of the drug in the blood system. There is a 
level under which the drug is ineffective and above which it is redundant. The 
therapeutic window is somewhere in between these extremes and differs from 
drug to drug. Placebos appear to follow the same pattern as the active drug in 
question.
The extent of placebo effect can be estimated in two ways. One is in relation 
to the percentage of patients who will be responsive to placebo treatment.
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The other is in terms of the degree of relief of symptoms. Regarding the first, 
much of the early work on placebos was undertaken in the context of pain- 
relief. Thus the commonly quoted rate of the placebo effect is generally said 
to be around 35%, meaning that about 35% of patients will respond to 
placebo treatment. This is derived from Beecher’s (1955) seminal study which 
investigated the placebo response in a variety of pain inducing medical 
conditions. Of the 1082 patients studied, between 15% and 58%, with a mean 
of 35.2% had their symptoms “satisfactorily relieved” by placebo.
In terms of the degree of relief, Evans (1974) reviewed a number of studies 
comparing placebo with active pain-relief and found an average of 36% of 
patients claimed up to 50% relief from pain following placebo administration.
The average relief was approximately 50% to 60% of the degree reported 
from strong analgesia, such as morphine.
Around 30%-40%, therefore, is the generally quoted rate for the proportion of 
patients likely to respond to placebo treatment, and in these patients there is 
generally found to be something of the order of 50%-60% symptom relief. 
However, there are a number of caveats. First of all, the percentages must be 
treated with caution since the scales used to measure placebo effects are not 
always well conceived. For example, in measuring pain relief from active and 
placebo treatments, a common technique is to use four equally spaced and 
weighted categories, where 1 = no relief, 2 = slight relief, 3 = moderate relief, 
and 4 = complete relief. As Tursky (1985) points out both extreme categories 
are highly unlikely to apply: “almost any treatment (real or imagined) will
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produce at least some indication of slight relief, and complete pain relief is 
almost never achieved by analgesics" (p232). This leaves just the two middle 
categories and these are not good discriminators of the degree of pain relief. 
It should not be considered surprising if a larger number of patients receiving 
the active treatment score 3. In addition, bearing in mind the nature of 
placebo, a notable number of patients receiving the placebo treatment will 
also score 3. The significance of these findings, however, may just be an 
artefact of the scoring procedure.
It must also be noted that average figures mask the fact that some patients 
report relatively great relief and some relatively little. There are, therefore, 
individual patient factors that must also be taken into consideration in 
interpreting such data. It is also interesting to note that there does not appear 
to be a ‘placebo-prone’ personality. Patients who are responsive to placebo 
on one occasion may not be on another. Furthermore, an individual who has 
been unresponsive initially may yet be responsive subsequently. In addition, 
few placebo studies include a no-treatment condition that would control for 
spontaneous remission and regression to the mean so that some of the 
apparent relief may have been due to non-placebo factors (Turner, et al,
1994; Ernst and Resch, 1995). This variability has led Shapiro and Shapiro 
(1997) to conclude that "... no reliable and valid estimate of placebo reactivity 
is currently available ...” (p80).
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However, Shapiro and Shapiro (op.cit) also comment that the difficulty in 
attaching a precise figure to the extent of the phenomenon should not detract 
from the fact that a potent effect exists. Despite the above reservations, it 
seems clear that not all instances of the placebo effect can be discounted as 
an artefact of deficient measuring procedures or statistical anomaly. If a 
powerful effect exists, the question is when, how and to whom does it occur? 
An understanding of the placebo effect is essential to the evaluation of 
medical treatments and is particularly relevant to the investigation of 
psychological approaches to treatment: both ‘pure’ psychological treatments 
and psychological aspects of medical treatments. It is important, therefore, to 
define the phenomenon as clearly as possible and identify the underlying 
mechanisms that are thought to be responsible for it.
Explanatory Models of the Placebo Effect
Brody (1985) identifies three possibilities in explaining the effects of any 
medical or psychological treatment:
1. “The patient got better due to the ‘vis medicatrix naturae' (the ‘natural history’) 
of the condition in an organism with intact healing and therapeutic powers .
2. “The patient got better due to the symbolic effect of the treatment - that is, its 
impact on his or her imagination, beliefs, and/or emotions.
3. “The patient got better due to some ‘specific’ or ‘characteristic’ feature of the 
treatment that can be studied, isolated, and predicted within the context of 
contemporary medical theory.” (p42)
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Each of these possibilities entails its own set of hypotheses.
The vis medicatrix naturae explanation attributes placebos to a naturally 
occurring propensity of the organism to heal itself. In more prosaic terms, this 
is the basis of ‘spontaneous remission’ and ‘regression to the mean’. The 
natural way of controlling for this in experimental studies is to have a no­
treatment group amongst whom ‘natural history’ factors will exert an influence 
in relation to which any additional effect of the treatment can be measured.
With respect to placebos, however, even if they can be explained as due to a 
process of natural history, the question remains whether this process is fully 
independent of any external influence, or whether it can be triggered by 
certain characteristics of treatment: i.e. can placebo factors expedite natural 
history processes? The placebo effect may be amenable to experimental 
control, but its mechanism is not fully explained by the vis medicatrix naturae 
hypothesis.
The ‘symbolic’ explanation is based upon the view that every medical 
treatment entails a symbolic effect, and some treatments may depend entirely 
upon this. That is to say that the patient upon whom any treatment is focused 
must inevitably have a perceptual, cognitive and affective response to the 
treatment. Thus, in addition to the ‘active’ ingredient, there is something within 
the patient that is stimulated by something outwith him or her (viz. the process 
of treatment). The something within is his or her imagination, beliefs and 
emotions. These may be the portrayed as the ‘incidental’ artefacts of the 
active treatment, or the symbolic effects of a sham treatment (e.g. a sugar
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pill). In both cases, it is appropriate to provide an ‘attention’ control which has 
the same characteristics as the active treatment in terms of time, attention and 
interaction with the clinician.
Finally, the ‘specific’ explanation is the feature of the treatment that is 
amenable to scientific scrutiny and interpretable within a valid theoretical 
framework. With regard to placebos there is some debate about whether or 
not placebos belong in this category of explanation. This is more than a 
semantic quibble and is fundamental to whether placebos are dismissed as 
marginal epiphenomena or central ingredients of theory. This question will be 
discussed more fully below.
The central question raised by the above hypotheses is whether the theory of 
placebo should be relegated to those circumstances where there is no known 
active ingredient in the treatment, so that the explanation of response to 
treatment is entirely symbolic. Or, should the placebo level of explanation also 
be taken into account even when a fully explicated active treatment is 
administered. In other words, does the symbolic element add anything to the 
theory of active treatment? For reasons that it is hoped will become apparent 
below, it will be argued that placebos do indeed form part of the complete 
theory of treatment. The neglect of a full understanding of placebo factors in, 
say, an active drug treatment, will lead to an incomplete theory of the action of 
the drug, and the same principle applies to psychological treatments. It will be 
argued below that the specific and the symbolic explanations are not 
exclusive alternatives; rather, they are different aspects of the same
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explanation. To oppose specific with symbolic explanations is to fall into the 
trap of ‘mind-body’ dualism.
Placebos and the Reduction of Anxiety
The anxiety reduction hypothesis posits that placebos exert their influence 
solely by changing the affective response to the condition being treated. This 
is best illustrated in relation to pain. Pain is defined as: “an unpleasant 
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue 
damage, or described in terms of such damage.” (Merskey, 1979). Pain can 
further be distinguished in terms of various dimensions, such as:
Sensation: what the pain feels like (e.g. “burning”, “stabbing”, “tearing”, etc.) 
intensity: how strong it is (e.g. VAS score)
Reactivity: how unpleasant it is (e.g. “miserable”, “depressing”, “unbearable”, 
etc.). (Melzak and Torgenson, 1971 ; Tursky, 1976).
The broad distinction between sensory pain (Sensation) and affective pain 
(Intensity and Reactivity) provides the basis for the anxiety reduction 
hypothesis of placebo. One of the earliest writers on the subject, Beecher 
(1959), proposed that placebos exert their effect on pain by reducing the 
emotional distress caused by the pain. Thus the patient who responds 
positively to a sugar pill for pain, gains apparent relief by virtue of a diminution 
of the affective component of the pain. The sensory component may remain 
the same, but the overall experience of the pain which comprises both 
sensory and affective dimensions, is reduced. It should be noted that if the 
same explanation is extended to placebo ‘cures’ for medical complaints, then
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a further mechanism must be entailed: viz. a means by which changes in 
affectivity (e.g. reduced stress) cause biological changes and thus affect 
health. The theory underpinning this possibility is reviewed in Evans et al 
(1997) and Glaser and Kiercolt-Glaser (1984).
What is true for pain is true for other conditions subjected to the placebo 
effect. For example, in a study of insomnia. Storms and Nisbett (1970) 
prescribed patients suffering from sleeplessness with one of two kinds of 
placebo pill. One was described as a ‘pep’ pill and the other as a ‘sedative’. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the patients taking the placebo pep pills 
experienced reduced insomnia and the patients taking placebo sedatives 
experienced increased insomnia. The authors explain this by virtue of the fact 
that insomniacs given ‘pep’ pills attributed their bedtime arousal to the effects 
of the pill rather than some internal emotional process. This had the effect of 
reducing their distress and worry about their own supposed psychological 
pathology, enabling them to become more calm more quickly and 
consequently sleep. In contrast, the patients given placebo sedatives 
interpreted their continued bedtime arousal as further evidence of their 
psychological pathology which endured despite the apparent ‘sedative’.
Conditioning and Expectancy
The classical conditioning view of placebo analgesia is described by 
Wickramasekera (1985), who suggests that the active ingredients of 
analgesics act as unconditioned stimuli (UCS) for pain reduction. In addition, 
the panoply of stimuli accompanying administration of analgesics (the hospital
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environment, smells, sounds; the sight of a stethoscope or white coat or 
syringe, and so forth) constitute the conditioned stimuli (CS). According to the 
rules of classical conditioning, the presence of the CS can elicit responses 
associated with the UCS.
As it stands, however, the classical conditioning approach is insufficient to 
explain the complexity of the human placebo response. Price and Fields 
(1997) develop the conditioning model and suggest that these principles can 
be extended to the human placebo response in which patients are 
conditioned to associate white coats, and other paraphernalia of medicine 
with pain reduction (and presumably, in some cases, such as nausea 
associated with chemotherapy, with pain increase). This conditioning, 
however, is also modulated by other psychological factors such as motivation 
to seek relief (desire for treatment) and expectation of successful treatment.
The expectation of successful treatment has become a major emphasis in 
psychological explanations of the placebo effect. Expectancy subsumes the 
patient's assumptive world and the perceived meaning of events within that 
context. It is usually portrayed as a characteristic of the patient, but it can also 
include characteristics of the clinician. The expectancy hypothesis of the 
placebo effect is that expectations generate beliefs and beliefs, it is argued, 
influence the course of healing. An illustration is provided by Ross and Olsen 
(1981). They explain the five trends in the placebo literature, described 
earlier, as being a consequence of the implicit communications of clinicians 
involved in the administration of the placebo. Thus, for example, a clinician
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who is blind to whether an administered drug is active or placebo is likely, 
nevertheless, to know the direction, strength, side-effects and so forth of the 
active drug and communicate this implicitly to the patient, whether that patient 
is receiving the active or placebo drug. This, induces a certain expectation in 
the patient and, they argue, accounts for the similarities described earlier 
between active and placebo treatments. It must also be noted that the 
expectations thus induced have been implanted by the behaviour of the 
clinician. The placebo effect, therefore, is a product of the interaction between 
the clinician’s and the patient’s attitude and beliefs.
Lundh (1987) takes this theme further in defining the placebo effect as 
consisting in the generation of placebo beliefs. The latter are: "... beliefs of the 
form “This treatment is going to cure me” (pp138-9). These beliefs have their 
effect by counteracting the negative affective impact of illness and disease. 
Thus a person who is seriously ill may be depressed or anxious because of 
the consequences of the illness on his or her life. If circumstances can be 
developed whereby a belief in the possibility of cure can be engendered, then 
improvement will follow (the “credebo” effect?). It can be seen, then, that the 
anxiety reduction hypothesis of placebo and the expectancy hypothesis are 
compatible. The expectation of cure is likely to engender confidence and thus 
counter negative affective states such as depression and anxiety.
155
Redefining the Placebo
It will be recalled that the much-cited definition with which this paper began 
referred to the placebo effect as “objectively without specific activity”. 
Unfortunately this terminology is ambiguous and the ambiguity is apparent in 
the literature. The phrase “without specific activity” has at least two senses in 
this context. On the one hand, “without specific activity” is often taken to mean 
inactive: and on the other hand, it is used to refer to general, but not inactive, 
ingredients of treatment. The “inactive” interpretation of placebo underlies the 
often expressed view that the placebo effect is an epiphenomenon and an 
inconvenient and illegitimate distraction from the ‘real’ effects of treatment: 
“Although the placebo response in medicine has been widely recognised ... it 
has generally been regarded as a nuisance variable” (Evans, 1985); and:
“They (placebos) were first ignored, then treated as contaminants to be 
controlled, and finally investigated as variables of interest in their own right” 
(Bootzin, 1985).
In contrast, the “general” interpretation of placebo describes active features a 
particular treatment shares with a range of other treatments. Frank (1974;
1983) has pointed out that the assumption that placebo is an inactive 
ingredient in therapy is mistaken: placebos are known to have substantial 
physiological, as well as psychological effects. Critelli & Newman (1984) 
define placebos as “... factors that are not specific to particular treatments, 
that is, factors that are common to most types of therapy”. These features may 
not yet be fully understood and articulated, but the possibility exists that at 
some point in the development of theory they will. This view is developed by
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Grünbaum (1986) who suggests that the placebo effect may, in fact, be 
specific, but the nature of the effect may simply be poorly understood at 
present. Many forms of innovative treatments contain elements that have not 
yet been fully articulated due to the undeveloped state of current theory. They 
may, nevertheless, have a specific remedial effect. To term these non­
specific, therefore, is to underestimate their potential importance. They may 
be unknown, but this does not justify calling them non-specific.
Thus there are two ostensibly conflicting views expressed in the literature. On 
the one hand placebos are portrayed as ‘incidental’, ‘inactive’, ‘artefactual’ 
and essentially peripheral to the main theory: a ‘nuisance’ that confounds the 
‘real’ treatment. On the other hand placebos are portrayed as an active, 
potent, general, but poorly understood phenomenon that, nevertheless, 
ultimately can be understood and incorporated within an expanded theory of 
the treatment in question.
Clearly these views are contradictory. The question, therefore, is what 
evidence is there to support one view over the other? The starting point is to 
acknowledge that even the most ‘powerful’ active ingredient of a 
pharmacological or a psychological treatment cannot have its full effect 
without the placebo elements. Placebo ingredients are a precondition of 
effective treatment insofar that they define the conditions upon which 
successful treatment is founded. The proof of this, of course, would be if a 
clearly effective active treatment were given without the placebo elements: in 
this case, one would predict diminished efficacy. Precisely this line of
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reasoning underlies the finding that some clinicians are more effective as 
individuals than others providing exactly the same active treatment.
This point is well illustrated by Freund et al (1971). They undertook a placebo 
evaluation of the effects of a weight-reducing drug. The finding of interest for 
present purposes was that even the effects of the active drug varied 
according to characteristics of the physician administering the treatment.
Freund et al's conclusions are worth quoting at length:
“The eight physicians participating in the study were randomly selected from a 
resident population. They were then ‘conditioned’ to relate to the patients in a 
predetermined manner. Nevertheless, even under these standardised 
conditions, the first week data demonstrated that the participating physicians 
were not uniformly capable of producing similar therapeutic results. This 
supports the long-held belief that physicians differ in the ‘art of medicine’ and 
in the quality of ‘bedside manner’. ... If either Doctor C or Doctor D had been 
the sole investigator,... entirely different conclusions might have been 
reached as to the effectiveness of the test drug. Apart from the action of the 
drug and the patient’s age, sex, education and social status, the effect of the 
physician’s personality and the manner in which he related to the patients had 
a significant effect on therapeutic outcome.” (pi 77).
Similar conclusions can be drawn from other medical procedures. In the realm 
of surgery, for instance, the attitude of the surgeon can have a profound effect 
on outcome. Benson and McCallie (1979) provide a dramatic example of this 
with a procedure known as internal mammary ligation. This procedure was
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originally used in cardiac surgery as an active treatment for angina and 
involves re-routing the blood flow by tying one of the arteries. Internal 
mammary ligation was enthusiastically promoted as the (active) treatment of 
choice for angina and a theoretical rationale was presented in terms of 
improvements in the blood flow which reduced ischemia. Numerous 
operations were performed with a high rate of apparent success; "... 38 per 
cent found complete relief, and 65 to 75 per cent showed considerable 
improvement” (p1426). Later, however, more sceptical investigators 
performed the operation with a placebo control in which anaesthetic was 
given and an incision in the chest wall was made but without the ligation. This, 
it transpired, produced the same outcome. The conclusion was that the 
efficacy of internal mammary ligation derives from the enthusiasm of the 
doctors rather than the objective consequences of the operation.
There appears, then, to be a demonstrable effect relating to the attitude and 
behaviour of the clinician, in conjunction with the expectation of the patient, 
which can influence the potency and efficacy both of active and placebo 
treatments; and this is an important addition to existing definitions of the 
placebo effect. The placebo effect is usually described as something that 
happens to patients. However, it appears that the effect in patients cannot be 
separated from the attitudes and behaviour of clinicians.
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Placebo and The Therapeutic Alliance
The importance of the attitude and behaviour of the clinician also has a long 
history in psychotherapy research. For example, Frank (1983) argues that the 
placebo effect "... contains the necessary, and possibly sufficient, ingredient 
for much of the beneficial effect of all forms of psychotherapy. This is a 
helping person who listens to the patient's complaints and offers a procedure 
to relieve them, thereby inspiring the patient's hopes and combating 
demoralisation.” (p291). Indeed, Frank suggests that a significant proportion 
of patients undergoing psychotherapy are suffering solely from what he terms 
“demoralisation” and it is this which responds to the factors identified above.
In the remaining subset of patients the nature of the problem is greater than 
can be encompassed by the notion of "demoralisation” and thus the same 
factors will not, in these cases, be effective as agents of treatment: more 
structured interventions are required.
Indeed it may help to recast the notion of placebo factors into alternative 
terminology which avoids some of the negative connotations noted above. 
One candidate term would be ‘therapeutic alliance’ (Luborsky, 1988). The 
term describes the relationship between therapist and client and the 
ingredients of this relationship. Horvath, et al (1993) list three aspects of the 
therapeutic alliance:
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1. “The client’s perception of the relevance and potency of the intervention 
offered.
2. The client’s agreement with the therapist on reasonable and important 
expectations of the therapy in the short and medium term.
3. A cognitive and affective component, influenced by the client’s ability to forge 
a personal bond with the therapist and the therapist’s ability to present himself 
or herself as a caring, sensitive and sympathetic, helping figure.”
Interestingly the effect size (26%) attributed by Horvath et al’s (op.cit.) meta- 
analytic study to these characteristics is close to that attributed to the placebo 
effect in a broad range of other contexts (see above). It is also important to 
note that the therapist’s belief in the efficacy of the intervention, is taken as 
read. Thus the attitudes both of therapist and client are positive and this is the 
basis for the effect.
While psychotherapeutic approaches frequently address the therapeutic 
alliance explicitly, more traditional medical treatments depend on the implicit 
presence of these characteristics. It seems reasonable to suppose, though, 
that the perceived authority of a medical doctor, the patient’s expectation of 
benign help and the power of the institution of medicine generate comparable 
conditions for a workable therapeutic alliance in medical treatments (Balint, 
1957; Parsons, 1951).
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Synthesis and Conclusions
Since the earliest reports, the placebo effect has been something of a 
mystery. The response to this has broadly been of two kinds: either to dismiss 
it as an artefact; or to view it as an important, but unknown, component in 
treatment. The thesis of this paper is that the latter view is supported by the 
weight of evidence. The alternative view that the placebo effect is a mere 
artefact is based on a common confusion in the placebo literature between 
definitions of placebo as inactive, on the one hand, and general but active, on 
the other. This ambiguity, in turn, has its origins in a further confusion 
between levels of the theory of what may be termed ‘healing’: a term that 
subsumes all endeavours in which a ‘healer’(doctor, psychologist, 
psychotherapist, shaman, etc.) attempts to alleviate symptoms of disease or 
distress in a designated recipient of healing. One may distinguish a broad or 
macro-theory of healing from a narrow or micro-theory of the components of 
healing. The micro-theory of placebos is different from the micro-theory of, 
say, a drug’s action; and both are different dimensions of the macro-theory of 
healing. There may also be some overlap between micro-theories (the 
overlapping areas in Figure 1 ). However, there is also a non-overlapping and 
specific micro-theory of the action of, say, analgesics as distinct from the 
specific theory of any other class of drugs such as anti-inflammatories or 
muscle-relaxants, and so forth. This is illustrated in Figure 1, below.
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Figure 1 : The macro-theory of healing (outer circle) and the overlapping 
micro-theories of each component of healing (inner circles).
BIO
PSYCHO
SOCIAL
The study of placebo is the study of this biopsychosocial interaction. Any 
theory of placebo, therefore, must take account of:
1. The central nervous system (the ‘bio’-).
2. The perceptual system and associated cognitions and emotions relating to 
the perceptions (the ‘psycho’-).
3. The cultural context, which encompasses the individual’s belief system and 
the social milieu (the ‘social’).
These dimensions are interconnected. An explanation of the mechanisms of 
placebo may involve any combination of these three components. Thus the 
placebo effect can be understood in relation to the social world of the patient; 
the meaning attached to events by the patient; and the effects of these on the 
central nervous system. Any or all of these may be the prime focus of the
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explanation in a particular case. However, there is no sole explanation that 
accounts for all cases.
The placebo effect, then, can be redefined. Placebos are non-specific in the 
sense of being general to a range of treatments, but are nonetheless active 
and potent elements in the macro-theory of healing. Central to the effect is the 
interaction of the patient’s and the clinician's belief in the efficacv of the 
process of healing. The patient must hold a belief in the potential of the 
treatment to help, in addition, however, the clinician must also share an 
equivalent belief and this must be expressed through his or her attitude and 
behaviour. The conjunction of these belief-states gives rise to what might be 
termed a joint ‘credebo’ effect. We have thus moved from placebo to credebo: 
from the passive treatment of gullible patients by clinicians to the mutuality of 
the therapeutic alliance.
In conclusion, it has been argued that the placebo effect, far from being a 
peripheral artefact, with only nuisance value, is a central component of the 
macro-theory of healing. There are a number of distinct components to the 
macro-theory, and there is also overlap between components. As the Gestalt 
psychologists used to say: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The 
whole, though, cannot exist without those parts and the theory of 
placebo/credebo is an integral part of the whole.
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Therapeutic Strategies and Outcomes:
Perspectives from Different Cultures.
J Mitchell Noon
"...any psychotherapy which is accepted by a society must 
embody...the values of that society." (Murase, 1982)
1. Introduction
The importance of cultural factors in the diagnosis and treatment of mental health 
and illness is well attested (eg. Marsel la & White, 1984; Leff, 1988; Rack, 1991). 
One of the principal issues, in understanding such influences, is the question of 
the relationship between universal and culturally relative features of human 
behaviour. The question is of the extent to which assumptions held by one 
culture about, for instance, the goals of psychological therapy, have applicability 
in others (Frank, 1973; Dow, 1986; Littlewood, 1990). The aim in what follows is 
to illustrate similarities and differences in the process and goals of one Western 
(Euro/American) and one non-Western (Japanese) approach to therapy for 
individual dysfunction. The therapies to be considered are client-centred 
(Rogerian) psychotherapy (CCT) and Naikan therapy. It will be argued that there 
are similarities and differences between the two approaches, and that these have 
implications for the practice of any specific form of therapy on a population 
whose cultural values are different from those within which the therapy has 
evolved.
169
whose cultural values are different from those within which the therapy has 
evolved.
The similarities and differences are apparent at three main levels. The first is the 
level at which the nature of the problem is defined: although the manifest 
disorder may be similar, the underlying problem is characterized in contrasting 
ways, reflecting important cultural differences. The second is the level of the 
intervention: the method by which change is brought about provides the most 
obvious contrasts. The third is outcome: it is argued that at this level the goals of 
each approach are fundamentally compatible.
The issues considered here also have implications for the conceptualization of 
'self in individualistic versus relational terms. It is hypothesized that the 
difference in self-conception, in the individualistic Euro/American versus the 
relational Japanese case, is a function of the relative immutability, in the latter, of 
the inner or private self, and the consequent focus on behaviour as a part of, 
rather than something peripheral to, personality. This contrasts with the view of 
behaviour and personality as separable phenomena which follows from a 
number of Western therapeutic perspectives, including CCT.
Although CCT is chosen as the vehicle for these comparisons, it will be argued 
that other Western psychotherapies show comparable contrasts in relation to the 
non-Western example discussed. CCT is considered an appropriate exemplar
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because its literature contains particularly clear evocations of a set of cultural 
assumptions that contrast markedly with those embodied in Naikan. The 
perceived similarity between CCT and other Western psychotherapies focuses, 
for present purposes, on the level at which a relationship is defined between the 
dysfunctional and the functioning self.
To begin with generalities, it is taken as axiomatic that all Western 
psychotherapies contain assumptions, often implicit, about the ideal relationship 
between the individual (self) and others (society, family, peer group, etc.). At a 
simple level, this relationship is one in which the individual is in some sense 
'strong' enough to withstand the vicissitudes of social interaction. Although the 
direction of any difficulties in this relationship is open to question, the result may 
be described as an imbalance, or lack of harmony, between the self and others.
The idea of dysfunction as an imbalance is evident in a number of theoretical 
approaches. A non-exhaustive list of examples includes the notion of'alienation' 
and of health as the move back to socialization (Rogers, 1961); the Freudian 
notion of 'enmity' between individual and social expectations, (eg. Freud,
1930/1949) and associated ego-psychology concepts whereby the individual 
remains dependent on others for self-definition; Social Learning Theory's 
concept of 'inefficacy', or the breakdown of perceived personal capacity to deal 
with specific situations (eg. Bandura, 1982); the idea of'learned helplessness' as
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the perceived lack of an individual's impact on the social environment (eg. 
Abramson, et al, 1978); and so on.
The definition of the 'ideal' (target) state may be disputed between these different 
psychological frameworks, as may the question of the direction of cause and 
effect. However, all share the view that there is a lack of harmony between the 
individual and her/his social world, and this is associated with personal 
dysfunction. The question, therefore, is how may this imbalance be restored?
The comparison of the two different approaches discussed below illustrates the 
ways in which cultural differences influence the characterization of the problem 
and the means of providing a solution.
2. Naikan and Client-centred Therapy.
(a) Naikan.
Naikan is a training, rather than healing, approach to personal dysfunction 
(Reynolds, 1987). Accordingly, the shidosha is viewed not as a therapist but as 
a guide. The Naikan client is not necessarily perceived as 'sick', although 
Yoshimoto (1974) lists a number of psychosomatic complaints as providing the 
impetus for undertaking Naikan. However, typical Naikan clients (see Tanaka- 
Matsumi, 1979) include alcoholics, delinquents and shinkeishitsusho (a "cycle of 
hypersensitive introspection" which becomes a state of pathological self­
obsession, Ohnuki-Tierney, 1984). Successful therapy is defined in terms of a
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relative enhancement of happiness and contentment, rather than 'cure' 
(Yoshimoto, 1974).
The approach was initially developed by Yoshimoto (1974) in the 1930's as a 
secularized version of a particular Buddhist discipline, although its values can be 
traced back to Shinto (Murase, 1982). At Yoshimoto's Naikan centre in Nara, 
more than 2,500 persons had undergone Naikan training by 1971. Their 
complaints ranged from family difficulties to psychosomatic and neurotic 
problems (Reynolds, 1977). Naikan has also been employed in industry: "in one 
Tokyo company by the firm's entire personnel of 4,000 from the president 
downwards" (Yoshimoto, 1974).
Detailed descriptions of the procedure of Naikan are provided by Murase (1982) 
and Reynolds (1977). Its aim is the discovery of 'authentic guilt' for the troubles 
one has caused others in the past, and 'positive gratitude' for the efforts of others 
on one's behalf. This is achieved through a period of concentrated introspection 
in which the guide/therapist offers direct supervision and instruction. The end 
result is a profound change in attitude toward others and a corresponding 
improvement in self-acceptance.
In particular, the emphasis is on fulfilment of one's duty towards, and harmony 
with, others rather than competition and assertiveness. The goal is a state 
termed sunao. Translation is difficult, but Murase offers "pure, undistorted"
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(etymologically derived from 'pure white silk cloth'). In Japan the concepts of 
purity and impurity are both hygenic practices and moral values (Ohnuki-Tierney, 
1984), and it is this moral, psychological purity that is sought through Naikan.
Clients having undergone Naikan therapy retrospectively describe their 
problematical past behaviours thus:
"Gohioh: literally meaning strong emotion - actually meaning stubborn or 
obstinate; Waaamama: selfish or capricious or wayward...Gashuu: 
egotistical attachment; Naimaiki and Unibore: self-conceit, impertinence, 
forwardness..." (Murase, 1982)
Murase subsumes these descriptions in terms of rigidity and egocentricity which 
have the effect of hampering smooth communication and harmony with others. 
The presenting Naikan client is fundamentally bad (dysfunctional) and it is the 
acceptance of one's own 'badness' in relation to the 'goodness' of significant 
others that is the starting point for Naikan.
"Naikan method is based on the commonly held Japanese philosophy that 
human beings are fundamentally selfish and at the same time are guiltv 
about their selfishness. These basic qualities are seen as being mitigated 
and balanced by the presence of an equally fundamental drive consisting 
of the expectation of unmeasured benevolence given by others to the 
individual" (Murase & Johnson, 1974, pi 23)
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The client in Naikan is required to consider three questions concerning their 
behaviour towards specific others within set periods of their life (eg., and initially, 
towards mother, between 0-5 years). These questions are:
1. What did my mother do for me? 2. What did I do for her? 3. What difficulties 
did I cause her? The client is encouraged to be as specific and detailed as 
possible in order to realize the extent to which their social environment has been 
unbalanced in their favour, and in so doing to reevaluate the interpersonal 
environment positively (Tanaka-Matsumi, 1979).
Naikan is openly directive and judgmental, emphasising social obligation rather 
than individual right. This sense of social obligation, however, is not synonymous 
with mere conformity, with the attendant negative values associated with that 
term in the Occident. For the Japanese, social obligation does not preclude self- 
actualization, but entails the notion of responsibilitv towards others (Murase & 
Johnson, 1974).
Thus concepts such as 'obligation' and 'guilt' have a specific cultural meaning 
which excludes some of the negative connotations implicit in at least some 
senses of the Occidental use of these terms. Referring to the latter, Tanaka- 
Matsumi (1979) stresses the interpersonal context of Japanese guilt as entailing 
debt to another. Similarly, Lebra (1983) writes:
"The Japanese sense of guilt ties in with the allocentric concern in that 
one's awareness of another as a victim of one's action or inaction is
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essential. Guilt is aroused or intensified through ego's vicarious sharing of 
altar's suffering (p203)... A person who is guilty and yet fails to apologise 
is extremely offensive to Japanese... Guilt sensitivity is considered 
always desirable" (p205)
(b) CCT.
The theory and practice of CCT is well documented (eg. Rogers, 1942,1961 ; 
Patterson, 1980) and is familiar to practitioners of Western therapies.
Accordingly, the following description will concentrate on what are considered to 
be the central issues for present purposes.
In CCT, as in Naikan, the client is not necessarily regarded as 'sick' (Rogers, 
1961) although the scope of application includes psychopathology. The 
ambiguity of CCT's status (as a psychotherapy for particular psychopathology, or 
a counselling approach for personal growth) resembles Naikan and justifies the 
following comparisons.
A central feature of CCT is the position of the individual. Although some notion of 
the individual underlies all Western psychotherapies (Dumont, 1985; Lukes, 
1973), it is particularly stressed by Rogers: "...this separateness of individuals, 
the right of each individual to utilize his experiences in his own way and to 
discover his own meaning in it...is one of the most priceless potentialities of life." 
(Rogers, 1961). The therapeutic relationship reflects the above desiderata in
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terms of a non-judgemental, non-directive, facilitation of inherently positive 
growth. It is readily apparent, though, that CCT's stress on the individual is itself 
intrinsically directive, and just one of a number of possibilities.
3. Contrasts.
One of the most striking contrasts between CCT and Naikan lies in their 
respective conception of the client's needs. For CCT, each individual needs the 
freedom to progress, develop, mature, or to use Rogers' term, 'self-actualize': 
"The good life, from the point of view of my experience, is the process of 
movement in a direction which the human organism selects when it is inwardly 
free to move in any direction." (Rogers, 1961). The CCT client is viewed as 
essentially 'good' and it is this 'goodness', defined as the client's intrinsic value 
as an individual, that requires fundamental acceptance by the client.
Naikan, by contrast, aims, as a result of the Japanese assumption of inherent 
selfishness, to reduce the individual's focus on his/her self. Consequently, the 
right to self-assertion is minimized as empathy with particular others is enhanced. 
The function of the organism is not actualization at an individual level, rather it is 
the maintenance of harmonious relationships through ready acceptance of 
obligation to others. In contrast to the feelings of self-worth and self-development 
encouraged in the CCT client, "the minimization of self and the maximization of 
others" (Murase, 1982) is the primary focus for the Naikan client.
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The client in Naikan is not free to choose the direction of development or the 
structure of therapy, as this is clearly prescribed, whereas in CCT the structure 
and course of therapy ostensibly follow the requirements of the individual client 
(Rogers, 1961). Accordingly, the authority of the shidosha is unquestionably 
acknowledged, whereas that of the CCT therapist/counsellor is de-emphasized.
The fundamental divergence between Naikan & CCT, which underlies the 
apparent differences in therapeutic direction, structure and attitude to the client, 
resides in the primary emphasis of each. These are culturally derived and can be 
described as individualistic in the Euro/American case and relational in the 
Japanese case (Kondo, 1987). CCT aims to instil the client with confidence to 
progress by the acquisition of a strengthened sense of individuality. Naikan aims 
towards harmony and reconciliation with the social world through accommodation 
and obligation to others. It is worth emphasizing, though, that these are 
generalizations, and as such should not be overextended. There is no absolute 
dichotomy between individual and relational values in either society (Ho, 1982). It 
is, rather, a question of emphasis which determines the prominence of either set 
of values in defining the goals and course of individual development.
4. Correspondences
In some respects the approaches discussed appear contradictory. Sunao is 
considered a simple (in the best sense), pure, quality, and Naikan aims to re­
establish this original state of grace. CCT defines personal improvement in terms
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of a kind of independence, where characteristics such as assertiveness are 
positively valued. Similarly, the methods of attainment are different. Naikan is 
overtly judgmental and directive, CCT is ostensibly the opposite.
In many ways, though. Western definitions of dysfunction have much in common 
with Japanese descriptions. Both include relationship dysharmony as a core. 
Murase (1984) talks of the hampering of smooth communication and harmony 
with others, while Western concepts such as learned helplessness, loss of self- 
efficacy, enmity, and alienation can also be seen as instrumental in a self- 
perpetuating cycle of social isolation. Goldberg (1982) writes: "The self of 
psychoanalysis is a construction seen developmental ly and arising out of 
relationships". And Guntrip (1968) writes: "The two problems of achievement of 
self-realization and achievement of good personal relationships cannot be 
separated, for they are two sides of the same process".
It is clear from the above that the Western self, although reflecting a Western 
emphasis on individualism, has a strong and undeniably relational component. 
CCT is based on the assumption that if the individual is 
whole/balanced/mature/actualized, then harmonious social relations will follow. 
Rogers (1961) describes progress in therapy thus: "As a client moves towards 
being able to accept his own experience, he also moves towards the acceptance 
of the experience of others".
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Further correspondences between CCT and Naikan become evident if non­
verbal communication on the part of the therapist is taken into account. Little of 
the literature available (at least in English) on Naikan examines non-verbal 
communication explicitly. However, some clues are provided.
"The Naikan therapist takes an unusually modest and polite manner 
toward the client, using honorific expressions and following ritualistic 
forms in his interaction with the client. He seldom interacts verbally with 
the client nor does he reinforce the client's emotional reaction to his 
recollected interpersonal events. If any emotional exchange is seen, it is 
the exchange of gratitude" (Reynolds, 1976). 
and:
"At the end of each brief interview, therapist and client solemnly say 'thank 
you' to each other and bow to one another" (Miki, 1976, quoted in 
Tanaka-Matsumi, 1979, pp386-7).
Tanaka-Matsumi describes how the non-verbal communication of the therapist 
conveys to the client 'prescribed role behaviours' and the task of self-observation 
within the residential Naikan centre. What Tanaka-Matsumi does not emphasize, 
and what is evident but not explicit in Reynold's (1976) account is that the 
therapist is exemplifying the caring and love which the client is expected to 
discover in the recollection of past encounters with significant others.
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'Throughout the treatment, the Naikan counsellor attempts to personify... a 
positive, empathie benignity toward his client. It is hoped that such an attitude on 
the part of the counsellor will reawaken the realization that others in the past 
have, in fact, similarly devoted themselves to the patient in an unusually attentive 
and accepting way." (Murase & Johnson, 1974, p i 24).
In the residential Naikan centre the shidosha or his/her family not only provide 
accommodation but also prepare and serve the client's meals. This is important 
insofar as caring, for the Japanese, is expressed through action, as opposed to 
words. Despite the increasing guilt and unworthiness felt by the client, s/he is 
shown (but this is never verbalized) the unconditional positive regard so strongly 
emphasized in CCT.
Although restricted, the examples of Naikan and CCT are intended to be 
representative, in at least one important way, of a wider range of Japanese and 
Euro/American therapeutic approaches. For instance, the aims of Naikan are 
comparable with other forms of Japanese therapy, such as Morita (Ohnuki- 
Tierney, 1984; Reynolds & Keifer, 1977) and Shinryo Naika (Ohnuki-Tierney, 
op.cit). They are also compatible with assumptions from other non-Western 
cultures about the definition of the fully functioning self (eg. Tuan, 1982; Westen, 
1985; Triandis, 1989). All are directed toward the assimilation of the individual 
within her/his social environment. While there may be differences in technique, 
the nature of the desired assimilation is shared.
181
Similarly, there is a sense in which the goals of CCT can be equated with the 
goals of other Western psychotherapies, despite differences in theory of 
underlying cause and in the means of achieving change. The goals, after all, are 
defined in terms of the underlying distress experienced by the individual which 
provides the impetus for seeking therapy. As noted earlier, at the simplest level, 
a common goal of Western psychotherapy is the restoration of what is perceived 
by the individual as an imbalance. This imbalance was related earlier to notions 
such as 'alienation', 'inefficacy', 'enmity', and so forth. More specifically, now, the 
imbalance can be defined in terms of the relationship between the self and 
others.
5. The Self and Others.
"...the self develops as we feel ourselves becoming separate and 
distinct from others" (Symonds, 1951)
"To define the self, we separate it from the other, whereas in Africa 
the opposite is the rule" (Zahan, 1979, quoted in Tuan, 1982)
The above quotes illustrate a common view of the differences between Western 
and non-Western concepts of the self. They suggest antithetical perspectives. It 
will be argued, however, that this is an oversimplified view which, if accepted too
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readily, can obfuscate as much as it is intended to illuminate. While the 
approaches clearly demonstrate differences, they are not antithetical.
It will be clear from the previous sections that the Japanese and Western self- 
concepts contain both relational and individualistic components. A number of 
writers have distinguished different facets of the 'self (cf. Lee, 1982; Schlenker, 
1985; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). For instance, Triandis (1989) differentiates 
between:
The Private Self, or assessment of Self by Self: 'I am ...honest, 
introverted, brave...etc.'
The Public Self, or assessment of Self by Generalized Other:
'People think I am...honest...etc.'
The Collective Self, or assessment of Self by Specific Reference 
Group: 'My family/work colleagues/etc. think I am...honest...etc.'
The notion of inner/private and outer/public facets to the self is well established 
in Western psychology (eg. James, 1890; Mead, 1934). The Japanese too 
acknowledge these inner and outer aspects of the self (Lebra, 1983; Lock, 1982). 
But these are not the only distinctions that should be employed in the 
comparison of Japanese and Euro/American conceptions of the self.
The different emphases in approach to the client apparent in our examples 
reflect the fact that the inner Japanese self is considered refractory to change 
(Lock, 1984). More amenable to change is behaviour and it is behaviour towards
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others that defines the relational aspect of the self. For the Japanese, how one 
behaves in relation to others defines what vou are not just what vou do and it is 
behaviour, therefore, that provides the more fruitful focus for re-socialization.
This observation permits a further contrast between relational and individualistic 
aspects of the self which can be expressed thus:
(1 ) The Individualistic self:
a. I am X (eg assertive, selfish, etc), therefore
b. I behave X (assertively, etc) toward Y
(2) The Relational self:
a. I behave X toward Y, therefore
b. I am X
The inclusion of behaviour in self-definition is a difference between relational and 
individualistic perspectives, and is reflected in the different emphases of 
Japanese and Euro/American therapies respectively.
It cannot, of course, be overlooked that much Western psychotherapy does focus 
on behaviour. The point, though, is that in these cases behaviour is not a central 
part of self-definition, and so such regimens are not considered to be personality 
orientated. The organism may be conditioned or desensitized, but the personality 
is not necessarily regarded as having been changed. In Naikan, by contrast.
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behavioural change touches the innermost level of the self, because the self and 
behaviour are inseparable.
6. Conclusions
An initial comparison of Naikan with CCT reveals differences of emphasis which 
make the two approaches appear almost diametrically opposed: judgmental vs. 
permissive; accepting vs. assertive, etc. These differences reflect the relational 
vs. individualistic foci. However, a closer inspection reveals that many of the 
elements apparently absent from each approach are present at a level where the 
emphasis is less marked; for instance the shidosha gives unconditional positive 
regard, while the CCT counsellor/therapist retains a degree of authority and 
directiveness.
It seems clear that Naikan and CCT are not antithetical. Individual assertion is 
not, of course, always given a negative value in Japan. The private/inner and 
public/outer aspects of the self are acknowledged in both cultural contexts but 
the extent to which they are considered amenable to change does vary.
In the Western case the focus on the private self does not deny the relational 
aspects of the self; in fact this aspect is ultimately enhanced. Western 
psychotherapies view the private self as an entity that may be conceptualized, 
articulated, and changed, leading to changes in personality. A common aim of 
Western psychotherapies is essentially to strengthen the private self, in terms of
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enhanced individuality and the perception of increased personal efficacy and 
agency. The ultimate goal, however, is to accept responsibility for oneself in 
relation to others. Thus the focus on the private self has implications in relational 
terms. Symonds (1951) and Zahan (1979), quoted earlier, are surely wrong to 
equate Western self-definition with separateness. The aim, rather, is 
differentiation. The former leads to isolation, the latter to relationship.
The aim of the Japanese therapies described is similarly to strengthen self- 
concept. However, this is achieved by a different route, which involves 
relinquishing the selfishness (for want of a better word) of the private self in 
favour of the acceptance of responsibility and accountability to others. The self 
that is strengthened is more directly the relational self. Personality, which is 
beyond the scope of rationalized verbal or cognitive interventions, is not 
changed, but restored from a state of distortion. This is achieved through a 
process of resolution of dysharmony between 'selfish' individuality and collective 
responsibility. The indicators of this imbalance lie in behaviour, which is the locus 
of the relational self, and thus the focus of Naikan.
In the present analysis it is assumed that neither the Japanese therapies nor the 
Western psychotherapies discussed aim to make individuals either merely 
compliant or more selfish. In Western psychotherapy the development of agency 
is not the development of egocentricity. It is a process of differentiation of self
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from the environment which provides a basis for authentic interaction with others, 
just as in the Japanese case.
The development of agency, then, is a basis on which interaction with others 
becomes possible and alienation ceases. The difference between the therapeutic 
approaches discussed is a difference in focus and emphasis, rather than ultimate 
goal. The goal is a similar state of independent maturitv/sunao/ 
actualization/aruoamama in which obligations as well as rights can be 
acknowledged. Both Naikan and CCT may be regarded as a means of re­
socialization and acceptance of a 'natural' state of harmony. In these terms, 
'authentic guilt' and 'positive gratitude' refer to a mature and even assertive 
reconciliation of oneself with others, rather than a superficial acceptance of the 
status quo.
The goals of the therapies discussed can be viewed as universal. However, the 
means by which these are achieved are culturally relative. The difference is one 
of focus and emphasis. The self, in this process, must be perceived as multi­
faceted, allowing for the enhancement of different aspects, according to 
individual and cultural needs.
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Health Psychology and the Primary Care Strategy: A Discussion
Document 
J Mitchell Noon
Introduction
The aim of the primary care strategy is to develop an appropriate 
balance between primary and secondary care. This will involve 
extending into the primary care setting a range of services previously 
provided at the secondary care level. The Health Authority and 
Primary Care Practitioners are concerned to ensure that such services 
are as good or better than those currently provided. While the details 
of these developments remain to be agreed, it is useful for each 
Healthcare discipline to examine ways in which it can contribute to the 
newly evolving services provided. The aim of this paper is to examine 
the implications of a primary care-led NHS for the provision of Health 
Psychology services. The following discussion will also have direct 
implications for the potential structure and function of Primary Health 
Care Teams.
Developments in Primary Care are also influenced by current 
proposals for the development of Mental Health services. In the Mental 
Health Strategy consultation paper, it is proposed that 5% of the 
mental health budget should be put aside to support primary care 
teams. These funds are a contribution to the service provided for what
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the Strategy Document terms “milder mental illness”, as opposed to 
“severe and enduring mental illness” which will be the main focus of 
the mental health strategy^
The figures provided in the Mental Health Strategy consultation paper 
indicate that about 50,000 people in Cornwall (males and females 
combined), visit their GP’s each year with mental health problems. 
About 12% of this group (6,000 people) will have a level of need 
requiring the Mental Illness service proposed in the Mental Health 
Strategy. This leaves 44,000 people each year who will consult their 
GP’s for mental health problems, but for whom the Mental Illness 
service will not be appropriate. The obvious question is how will these 
individuals' needs be met within the Primary Care resources available. 
The 5% Mental Health budget assigned to Primary Care will be a 
contribution, but it is very important that these funds should be 
directed to the appropriate services, so that the specific needs of this 
large population of people with “mild” mental health problems can be 
met. In an attempt to contribute to the task of identifying specific 
needs, the following proposals are intended to identify a sub-group of 
those who present in primary care with “mild” mental health problems^. 
The sub-group in question consists of those whose mental health 
needs are associated with physical ill health.
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Health Psychology and Primary Care
Health Psychology is allied to but distinct from Clinical Psychology. 
Health Psychology has as its prime focus psychological aspects of 
physical illness rather than mental illness, which is the province of 
clinical psychology, psychiatry and associated professions. There is 
some overlap between Health Psychology and Liaison Psychiatry, but 
the disciplines are mainly distinguished by their focus of clinical 
concern. Liaison Psychiatry is essentially an acute emergency service 
and is particulary relevant in A&E departments dealing with cases of 
deliberate self-harm (attempted suicide). This particular function 
accounts for the majority of liaison psychiatry time (Benjamin et al,
1994). In addition, liaison psychiatrists may also provide assessment 
for patients on general hospital wards and general hospital out-patient 
clinics, although the extent of these activities varies between districts 
(Benjamin et al, op.cit.).
The aim of Health Psychology is different. Health Psychology is 
defined as the application of scientifically established psychological 
knowledge and practice to the promotion and maintenance of health, 
and the prevention and treatment of illness (Matazarro, 1980). Health 
Psychology is more clearly associated with the kinds of psychological 
problems found at the primary care level. These may be termed 
psychosocial, rather than psychiatric, where the latter term refers to the 
“severe” mental illness category decribed in the Mental Health Strategy. 
One way of characterising the focus of Health Psychology is in terms of
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the World health Organization’s (1980) definition of Illness as comprising 
the following components:
Table 1: Showing W H O. definition of the components of 
illness
ILLNESS =
# impairment (the objective physical or psychological 
pathology)
# disability (effects on everyday activities)
# handicap (effects on social roles)
(W .H .0 .1980)
The focus of Health Psychology is on the psychosocial aspects of illness; 
both its precursors and consequences. Most often Health Psychology is 
practised within acute care and rehabilitation settings. However, there 
are good reasons to consider ways in which these approaches might 
be devolved to the primary care level. It will be suggested in this paper 
that the application of Health Psychology within the primary care 
setting has the potential to confer many benefits on patients and 
practitioners.
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As the earlier definition of Health Psychology indicated, Health 
Psychology serves both a preventative and a treatment function and 
examples of each will now be discussed.
HP and the Prevention of Psychological Disorder
An example of Health Psychology applied at the preventative level 
would be the psychological preparation of patients about to undergo 
medical procedures. There is considerable evidence that providing 
patients with information aimed at improving their understanding of 
their illness and associated medical procedures can increase 
compliance and satisfaction with medical services (Ley & Llewelyn,
1995). For instance, it is well known that preparing patients before 
surgery can reduce anxiety and distress, lead to a reduction in drug 
utilization and length of bed occupation while in hospital and, in 
addition, reduce the likelihood of subsequent illness behaviour. 
Occasionally, this kind of preparation is provided within the acute care 
setting, but by no means always. There would be benefits for patients 
as well as primary and secondary care staff in ensuring, wherever 
possible, that such preparation takes place at the primary care stage, 
before admission to hospital.
HP and the Treatment of Acute Illness
A recent report by the Centre for Health Economics (1995) indicated a 
prevalence rate for acute back pain of between 12% and 35% in the 
general population. In Cornwall, this amounts to approximately 60,000 
to 175,000 Cornish residents who, at any one point in time, will suffer
198
acute back pain. Within this number, 10% of sufferers fail to recover 
within a six week period. It is suggested that the prognosis for the 
latter group is poor and that if the pain problem becomes chronic, 
significant healthcare, social, economic and personal costs ensue.
In order to prevent these consequences, a set of management 
guidelines has been proposed based on a review of clinical evidence 
of good practice (The Clinical Standards Advisory Group on Acute 
Back Pain - CSAG -1995). The suggestion is that if these guidelines 
are implemented within the primary care setting for all patients, then 
the chances of developing chronic pain will be reduced overall.
Fundamental to the guidelines is the view that treatment must involve 
physical, psychological and social dimensions. The idea is that by 
attending to all potentially relevant dimensions of the problem, the 
chances of complication are reduced and speedy recovery is 
enhanced.
Health Psychology has a role in ensuring that the psychosocial care 
offered in these cases is well grounded by providing guidance on 
assessment and treatment, in conjunction with other services provided 
at the Primary Care level (eg. physical therapy). There would also be 
close links between Health Psychology and Secondary Care 
rehabilitation services such as the Pain Management Programme for 
Chronic Pain, and this would facilitate referral-on to specialist 
secondary services where necessary.
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HP and the Treatment of Chronic illness
Examples of psychosocial dysfunction can be found in a large 
proportion of people with a variety of chronic medical problems. For 
instance, following Myocardial Infarction a considerable number of 
people remain disabled by fear, anxiety and depression. 33% of 
patients who do not receive adequate psychosocial care following Ml 
continue to experience anxiety and depression a year later (Cay et al, 
1972; Lloyd and Crawley, 1982). In Cornwall, approximately 1000 
Cornish residents are diagnosed as having Ml each year (Health of the 
Population, 1995). In addition, angina, hypertension and post-CABG 
patients also experience similar psychological symptoms of distress 
and difficulty in adjustment. Even though depression following CHD is 
an independent risk factor for subsequent relapse (Frasure-Smith, 
1992), it would not conform to the criteria for “severe” mental illness 
identified in the Mental Health Strategy. Consequently, this group of 
individuals will depend on services mainly provided in Primary Care.
Anxiety and Depression are not the only psychosocial consequences 
of CHD. As Lewin (1995) points out, social and leisure activities have 
been found to decline in as many as 50% of post-MI patients four 
years after the M l. There is a high incidence of pessimism, avoidance 
behaviour and a heightened probability of physical deconditioning 
leading to greater susceptibility to illness. There is also an increase in 
“illness behaviour” with associated misuse of medical resources.
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especially at the primary care level; and there are frequent domestic 
problems including sexual dysfunction and other marital problems.
The example of CHD is typical of a range of other medical disorders. 
Similar psychosocial dysfunction is found in acute and chronic pain 
conditions, chronic fatigue, renal disease, dermatological disorder, 
disorders of the gut, cancer and so on. The symptomatic presentation 
of these conditions often takes the form of mental health problems 
such as anxiety and depression, which may also be accompanied by 
somatization disorder (anxious preoccupation with illness), 
hyperventilation and panic (Kaptein, et al, 1990; Broome & Llewelyn, 
1995).
The initial point of contact for these and similar problems is invariably 
at the primary care level and the primary care team is faced with the 
task of providing the first response to such difficulties. The aim of 
Health Psychology is to provide a service which enhances the ability of 
the primary care team to deal with these problems and provides 
backup where additional specialist help is required.
A Model of Service Provision
The preceding information is intended as a context for the suggestion 
that Health Psychology can offer an important contribution to the 
services provided at the Primary Care level for patients suffering “mild” 
mental health problems associated with physical illness or illness
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behaviour. Any such contribution, however, depends on the 
practicalities of providing the service. The essential question is: who 
will do the work and how? In the following sections, a plan will be 
provided in an attempt to answer this question.
The fu n c t io n s  o f  H e a lth  P s y c h o lo g y  a re : 
a s s e s s m e n t a n d  tre a tm e n t o f  p s y c h o lo g ic a l d is o rd e rs  
w h ic h  a re  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  p h y s ic a l I lln e s s  
a d v ic e  s u p p o r t  a n d  c o n s u lta t io n  fo r  h e a lth c a re  w o rk e rs , 
s o c ia l a n d  v o lu n ta ry  a g e n c ie s  a n d  c a re rs  o f  p e o p le  w h o  
a re  III
p ro m o tio n  o f  p s y c h o s o c ia l w e ll-b e in g  o f  p e o p le  w ith  
p h y s ic a l I lln e s s e s  o r  I lln e s s  b e h a v io u rs
The model of service delivery proposed for the Health Psychology 
Service is based on that suggested by the Health Advisory Service 
(HAS, 1995). In the HAS document, four distinct tiers of service 
delivery are suggested. The tiers reflect different levels of health care, 
ranging from primary care at tier one, uniprofessional specialisms at 
tier two, multi-disciplinary teams at tier three and specialist regional 
units at tier four. For present purposes, the first three tiers are the 
most relevant to Health Psychology provision. These are as follows:
202
Tier 1 Services
Tier 1 consists of primary care services:
GPs • voluntary agencies
health visitors • social services
practice nurses • Other primary care staff
The function of all primary care staff working at this level is to be able 
to identify potential psychological problems early in their development, 
offer general advice and preliminary non-specialist interventions, such 
as basic counselling or relaxation-therapy, and be involved in the 
promotion of psychological well-being amongst primary care patients.
Bearing in mind the definition of the function of Health Psychology 
provided above, there is a role, at tier 1, for the provision of training to 
Primary Care workers in methods of psychological assessment and in 
basic counselling skills and basic stress management. In addition, the 
Health Psychology Service would provide a source of advice, support, 
consultation and supervision in order to maximise and enhance the 
independent function of Primary Care workers at this level.
Case Example:
Mr A. is 55 years old. He has recently been discharged from hospital 
following a myocardial infarction. Since discharge he has experienced 
symptoms of anxiety and depression manifested as sleep disturbance, 
withdrawal and heightened concern over bodily ailments and fear of
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further illness. He visits his GP for help. A decision is made by the 
Primary Care Team about whether the case can be dealt with at the 
Primary Care level and, if so, who is the most suitable team member to 
work with this case. The team makes its decision on the basis of 
whatever criteria apply in any particular case. For example, there may 
be one member of the team who wishes to specialise in this role, in 
addition to other functions within the team (eg the practice nurse, or a 
GP with an interest in developing psychological therapy skills). Or all 
members of the team may wish to take on this role in particular cases. 
Alternatively the Primary Care Team may wish to employ a 
professional who has the specific remit for this type of work and a 
background in psychology or counselling (many GP practices currently 
employ individuals who provide psychosocial input within the practice). 
For the sake of clarity I will identify this individual as the ‘Health 
Counsellor’ for this particular case, although this may not be his or her 
only role within the team.
Assessment:
Basic history taking reveals that this man has no prior history of 
psychological disorder. Symptoms seem to be a reaction to the illness. 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Questionnaire is administered 
revealing a Depression score of 9 and Anxiety score of 11.
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Formulation:
Probable disorder in adjustment to illness. Symptoms consistent with 
natural response to loss of health compounded by anxieties over 
future physical and psychosocial wellbeing.
Psychological Options:
The Health Counsellor’s task is to provide information and advice 
about Ml and its effects on lifestyle, including effects on mood and 
behaviour (give information package). Normalise symptoms as a 
common pattern found after Ml, usually transitory. Explain clearly the 
patterns of somatization and how these can be avoided. Give written 
information about how to deal with sleep problems and a sleep diary. 
Offer a place in a regular ‘relaxation group’. Arrange a follow-up 
appointment in one week.
Outcome:
These reactions are often transitory and self-limiting. The duration of 
the problems can be reduced by providing support early on in the 
process. It might be expected that Mr A would find reassurance in the 
advice and information provided and in the knowledge that his is a 
natural, rather than an abnormal, reaction. The sleep diary should 
highlight any particular difficulties which can be addressed in the 
follow-up session and further appointments for these problems would 
probably be unnecessary. Psychotropic medication would probably not 
be required. Finally, it would be useful to send a follow-up appointment 
for three months time to monitor progress.
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Discussion:
It is envisaged that all the above intervention is provided by a Primary 
Care worker designated the Health Counsellor. The role of Health 
Psychology would be to ensure that the Health Counsellor has 
information advice and training in the basic skills required, such as 
administering the HAD, understanding the basis of somatization 
disorders, dealing with sleep problems, etc. Written information packs 
to supplement the intervention would be provided by the Health 
Psychology Service.
Some Primary Care services may consider sending automatic 
appointments to all patients following discharge from hospital for any 
type of illness. These would be seen by the Health Counsellor, who 
has access to a range of health information and advice and 
support/guidance from the Health Psychology Service and from other 
sources, such as Health Promotion. His/her function would be to 
identify any problems of the kind experienced by Mr A, provide 
relevant preventative advice and information and, where necessary, if 
the initial intervention is not successful, refer on for specialist Health 
Psychology Assessment and Treatment. This is likely to prove cost- 
effective in terms of avoiding subsequent GP appointments and 
medication or other costly health interventions.
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Tier 2 Services
Tier 2 is “A level of service provided by uni-professional groups which 
relate to others through a network (rather than within a team)” (HAS, 
1995). The function of Health Psychology at this level is to provide: 
training and consultancy to professionals working within tier 1. This 
includes providing advice and supervision in cases where the primary 
care worker retains clinical responsibility for the patient 
a specialist assessment service for more complex cases 
specialist interventions for more complex cases 
referral-on to tier three and four services such as CMHT’s or 
rehabilitation units such as the Pain Management Programme
Case Example
The Tier 2 Health Psychology service provides specialist input to 
cases which have proved unresponsive to Tier 1 interventions. A 
typical case would be as follows:
Mrs B. has received surgery and radiotherapy for a carcinoma. Despite 
being given the all clear by her surgeon, she remains anxious and 
fearful of recurrence. She makes multiple visits to her GP for 
suspected cancerous growths, but these are all insignificant. She fails 
to respond to reassurance and is not convinced by evidence from her 
medical notes that her condition has been successfully treated. She is 
referred to the Health Psychology Service for assessment with a view 
to treatment.
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Discussion
If the patient is suitable for Cognitive-Behavioural Treatment, the 
prognosis is good. Typically, such an individual would require between 
6 and 20 sessions of treatment. The Health Psychologist would see 
the patient either in the primary care setting, or in a locality-based out­
patient clinic. There would be full and open communication with the 
Primary Care team, including attending occasional team meetings as 
necessary.
Tier 3 Services
Tier 3 services are a “specialist service for the more severe, complex 
and persistent disorders. This is usually a multi-disciplinary team ...” 
(HAS, 1995).
Case Example
Mr C. has complained of severe back pain for the last 6 years since an 
accident at work when he slipped while carrying a heavy load. He has 
undergone numerous medical investigations but the physical signs are 
inconclusive and the surgeon has declined to operate. He has also 
been involved in acrimonious litigation with his former employer. The 
case has finally been settled, but not to Mr C.’s satisfaction. He is now 
perpetually angry, with his former employers and with the doctors who 
have failed to help him. He is on strong pain-killing medication, but 
continues to call out the GP for acute flare-ups of his pain. The GP 
refers Mr 0. to the Health Psychologist who, following a full 
psychological assessment, recommends referral on to the Pain 
Management Unit. The Pain Management Unit is staffed by a multi-
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disciplinary team, including anaesthetists, physiotherapists and 
specialist pain-management health psychologists.
Discussion
Mr C. is suffering Chronic Pain Syndrome. His pain has created 
additional cognitive, behavioural and physical complications that 
exacerbate and perpetuate his problems. His suitability for treatment 
will depend on his capacity to recognise the ways in which his 
behaviour compounds his other problems. If he is able to acknowledge 
this, he will probably benefit from an opportunity to enter the 
programme and learn alternative strategies for coping with his pain. 
Luscombe et al (1992) have published evidence for substantial cost 
benefits and improvements in quality of life after completing the 
Cornwall Pain Management Programme.
Staffing
Tier 1 : The 5% Mental Health funding released by the Health Authority 
for “mild” mental health problems at the Primary Care level could be 
used to fund specific Health Counsellor posts within each Primary 
Care team, although there are bound to be considerable demands 
from other quarters for these funds. Alternatively, it may be possible to 
re-designate funding from Band 3 Health Promotion. 1 believe this may 
have been attempted successfully in one local GP practice.
The Health Counsellor might be an existing member of the team 
(eg a nurse) who wishes to devote a number of specific sessions to
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Health Counselling as described earlier in this document, or it might be 
a basic grade psychologist (post-qualification), or a counsellor trained 
in the specific techniques of Cognitive Therapy. The Health Counsellor 
would liaise with the Health Psychology Service and undertake training 
and support / supervision within that service. The number of sessions 
devoted to Health Counselling would be determined by each Primary 
Care team and depend upon the perceived caseload for that team.
Tier 2: At present there are 0.9 WTE Health Psychologists working at 
the Tier 2 level mainly focused within Carrick. It is likely that more 
Health Psychologists would be required to cover the whole of Cornwall 
satisfactorily. One possibility is that some of the Clinical Psychologists 
who, at present, work in conjunction with Primary Care services may 
wish to preserve that role in a modified form as Health Psychologists. 
The transition would be relatively straightforward, although some initial 
training will be required. Funding should be possible from the budgets 
that already pay for Clinical Psychology in Primary Care. Certain GP 
practices have expressed an interest in funding their own psychology 
services and this could, in principle, be applied to Health Psychology.
Tier 3: There are 2.1 WTE Health Psychologists working at the Tier 3 
level at present. This is in Pain Management and Neuropsychology. 
Additional posts would be required for further developments, such as 
Cardiac Rehabilitation, Chronic Fatigue Rehabilitation, and so forth.
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Funding for further Health Psychology Rehabilitation services would 
require new bids from providers in the Acute and Community Trusts. 
Alternatively, consortia of General Practitioners may wish to sponsor 
their own Tier 3 Services in response to local needs. This would 
probably be via the appropriate Trust.
Conclusions
The psychosocial methods of Health psychology are one important 
element in comprehensive healthcare (Williams & Chesney, 1993). 
The implications for Primary Care are considerable. The treatment 
approaches of Health Psychology are well documented (eg Kaptein, et 
al, 1990; Broome & Llewelyn, 1995) and their efficacy has been 
demonstrated according to evidence-based criteria (eg Watts, 1990). 
The anticipated benefits of incorporating Health Psychology into the 
Primary Care armamentarium are:
A reduction in the inappropriate use of medical and mental health 
services and a reduced incidence of patients with medically 
unexplained physical symptoms
A holistic approach to illness in which impairment, disability and 
handicap are all addressed as part of the treatment plan 
Increased psychological well-being in patients 
Reduced disability and handicap
Greater staff satisfaction due to an increased perception of efficacy
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SUMMARY.
The study aims to examine evidence for or against Von 
Domarus ' ( 1944 ) proposal that the underlying factor in 
schizophrenic communication difficulties is a tendency 
to conclude identity between objects simply on the basi 
of the similarity of attributes.
Previous investigations of both schizophrenic and 
non-schizophrenic reasoning processes are described. It 
is concluded that reasoning involves an interaction 
between pragmatically based information on the one hand 
and an unspecified set of logical principles on the 
other. The critical variable in determining whether 
reasoning proceeds according to logical principles is 
the content of the propositions from which conclusions 
are drawn. This provides a basis on which differential 
predictions of the Von Domarus hypothesis can be made.
A syllogistic reasoning experiment is conducted, 
comparing the performance of schizophrenic, 
manic-depressive, and non-psychiatric controls. No 
differences in performance are detected between the 
groups. Despite limitations in the data, it/concluded 
that the evidence of this study does not support the Vo 
Domarus hypothesis as an explanation of schizophrenic 
communication difficulties.
Glossary of symbols used in the text
 > Implication (material), eg. F — > P,
read as F implies P.
H Equivalence, eg. F h  P, read as F
is equivalent to P.
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Chapter 1.
1.0 Introduction
The study of schizophrenic utterances has occupied the 
attention of investigators for some time now. Since 
Kraepelin's (1919) and Bleuler's (1911) pioneering 
attempts at circumscribing the phenomenon of 
schizophrenia, various hypotheses have been offered to 
account for the odd communications that are often 
observed amongst those so diagnosed. Because of the 
ubiquity of this observation, an immense amount of 
literature has been generated. Unfortunately, though, 
the effect has been to complicate rather than clarify 
the phenomenon. It is true to say that one of the few 
points of consensus amongst present investigators is 
that while most people - including non-clinicians - are 
able to recognise schizophrenic communications when they 
occur, the fact is that the problem of defining the 
nature of the perceived 'oddness' remains largely 
unresolved (e.g. Lorenz, 1961).
I Page 2
I A generalization which can be made, however, is that
Ï
I schizophrenic communication is not found in all
I individuals who are diagnosed as schizophrenic.
|: • '
I Furthermore, even for those individuals in whom it is
f
I observed, it may appear intermittently and with varying
I degrees of frequency (Rosenberg and Abbeduto, 1982).
4 .
I This variability is a major difficulty for investigators
I '  ■ ■
I of schizophrenic communication, and is a factor which
i
; almost certainly underlies many of the apparent
'
; contradictions which are to be found in the literature.
i
I
Î
An additional complicating factor is the question of 
i what is considered to be the underlying disorder in
I schizophrenic communication difficulty. There are
g essentially two views. The traditional assumption has
:
been that schizophrenic communication reflects an 
underlying thought-disorder. For example. Brown (1973) 
remarks that while he encountered no examples of 
schizophrenic speech, he nevertheless encountered plenty 
of examples of schizophrenic thought. More specifically, 
he proposed that the difficulty in schizophrenic 
communication was a result of problems at the semantic
I • Page 3I
j level of language production: what Katz an Fodor (1963
I have termed 'Knowledge of the World'.
I This, though, is just one of the possible alternatives
I Another is illustrated by Chaika (1974), who suggests
I that there are, in fact, identifiable features of
I
I schizophrenic speech which are other than semantically
I
I ' based, and which are distinguishable from other kinds '
I
I linguistic deviance such as that found in aphasia, orI
I experimental poetry, etc. The important difference
I between Brown s and Chaika's hypotheses is that the
Ï
I latter does not assume any necessary relationship
I ■ . ■
I •between speech and underlying thought-disorder. Maher
I (1972) provides a useful analogy which illustrates the
II alternative views:
"(The relationship between language and 
thought)...might be likened to a typist 
copying from a script before her. Her 
copy may appear to be distorted because 
the script is distorted although the 
communication channel of the typist's eye 
and hand are functioning correctly.
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Alternatively, the original script may be 
perfect, but the typist may be unskilled, 
making typing errors in the copy and thus 
distorting it. Finally, it is possible 
for an inefficient typist to add errors 
to an already incoherent script.
Unfortunately, the psychopathologist can 
observe only the copy (language 
utterances): he cannot examine the script 
(the thought)."(p.3)
To summarise, the relationship between schizophrenic 
communication difficulties and underlying cognitive 
processes is unclear: existing evidence is
equivocal. Nevertheless, in studies of the phenomenon of 
schizophrenic communication, it is as well to make 
assumptions about this relationship explicit. The aim of 
this present investigation, then, will be to clarify one 
of the earliest hypotheses concerning the relationship 
between schizophrenic communication and reasoning 
processes.' Chapter three will provide a review of
the literature on investigations of schizophrenic 
reasoning, and chapters four and five will review
Page 5
literature on normal reasoning processes. As a 
propaedeutic, however, chapter two is a brief summary of 
some relevant details concerning syllogistic reasoning.
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Chapter 2. Propaedeutic.
2.0 A Summary of the Logic of Categorical Syllogisms.
"A categorical syllogism is an argument 
consisting of three categorical 
propositions which contain exactly three 
terms, each of which occurs in exactly 
two of the constituent propositions."
(Copi, 1968, p.153)
The conclusion of a standard form categorical syllogism 
(henceforth referred to simply as a syllogism) is a 
standard form categorical proposition which contains two 
of the syllogism's three terms. The premise containing 
the predicate of the conclusion is the MAJOR term. The 
premise containing the subject of the conclusion is the 
MINOR term. This terminology is illustrated below:
I Page?
(i) No analysts are brainy 
Some behaviourists are brainy
Therefore, some behaviourists are not 
analysts
analysts'=the MAJOR term, and occurs in the major 
premise.
behaviourists is the MINOR term, and occurs in the 
minor premise.
The third term brainy , which occurs in both premises, 
but not in the conclusion, is the MIDDLE term.
The MOOD of a syllogism is dependent on the kind of 
categorical propositions it contains.
There are four forms of categorical proposition used in 
syllogisms. These are:
• Pages
Expression Symbol used to define mood
All F are P A
Some F are P I
No F are P E
Some F are not P 0
The mood of the complete syllogism can, therefore, be
defined by three letters, the first of which refers to 
the major premise, the second to the minor premise, and 
the third to the conclusion. The mood of the syllogism 
in example (i) is, therefore, E,I,0.
Finally, there are four different FIGURES (S=subject, 
M=middle term, P=predicate).
First Second Third Fourth
figure figure figure figure
M-P P-M M-P P-M
S-M S-M M-S M-S
S-P S-P S-P S-P
:
ï
I:
:
ï
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Given that there are 64 moods and four figures, there 
are a total of 256 possible syllogisms. However, as 
Johnson-Laird & Steedman (1978) point out, this number 
is derived from the arbitrary assumption, that has 
traditionally been made by logicians, that the subject 
of the conclusion should always occur in the second 
premise. However, there are no constraints to prevent 
the subject of the conclusion occurring in the first 
premise, and so the actual number of possible syllogisms 
is 512.
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CHAPTER 3. Logic and Schizophrenia.
3.0 Introduction.
The literature on schizophrenic communication is immense 
and exhausting. Consequently, the following chapter will 
be restricted to that subset of writing and experiment 
which addresses the specific question of whether or not 
there is some feature of schizophrenic / reasoning . .
which can be adequately characterised in terms of 
identifiable logical operations.
3.1 Theoretical background.
The seminal work in this area is Von Domarus' (1944) 
paper entitled "The Specific Laws of Logic in 
Schizophrenia".
In this. Von Domarus characterises schizophrenia as a
Page 11
regressive state in which the schizophrenic returns to 
an earlier stage of cognitive development. Von Domarus 
equates this with Vigotsky's stage of 'egocentric 
speech' (the prepenultimate stage in Vigotsky's system). 
Von Domarus writes :
"....the thought and language of 
schizophrenics may be in the nature of an 
atavism.... In egocentric speech inner and 
outer speech are not yet 
separated"(p.112).
Thus subject is not distinguished from predicate, and 
consequently similarity between adjectives is sufficient 
to conclude identity.
Von Domarus illustrates his proposal with the example of 
a schizophrenic who believed Jesus, cigar boxes, and sex 
were identical. The identity was based on the common 
predicates of being encircled.
"....the head of Jesus, as of a saint, is 
encircled by a halo, the package of 
cigars by the tax band, and the woman by 
the sex glance of the man" (pp. 108-9).
Page 12
Expressed in terms of the categorical syllogism, such 
reasoning may be characterised as in the following well 
known example:
Napoleon was misunderstood 
I am misunderstood
Therefore, I am Napoleon
Arieti (1955) developed this idea in terms of the notion 
of 'teleologic regression', such that what he relabelled 
'paleological' reasoning was a strategy adopted to 
diminish anxiety. Arieti writes:
"If, in a situation of severe anxiety, 
behaviour at a certain level of 
intellectual integration cannot take 
place or does not bring about the desired 
results, a strong tendency exists towards 
behaviour of lower levels of integration 
in order to effect those results".(p.191)
Page 13
Both of these hypotheses rely on clinically based 
anecdotes as evidence. Attempts to provide empirical 
tests are reported by a number of investigators.
Nims (1959) compared 25 schizophrenic subjects with 25 
non-psychiatric controls on a task of syllogistic 
reasoning. He found no difference between the two groups 
in the incidence of Von Domarus type errors. However, 
Nims made the unjustified assumption that the Von 
Domarus error was equivalent to the fallacy of the 
undistributed middle term. As Williams (1964) points 
out, while Von Domarus type errors are an instantiation 
of the said fallacy, the converse - that all 
instantiations of that fallacy are Von Domarus type 
errors - does not follow. Consequently, Nims conclusions 
are invalidated.i'
ii
Similarly unsubstantiated assumptions were made by 
Gottesman & Chapman (1960), who also failed to 
demonstrate any differences between schizophrenic and 
control subjects on Von Domarus errors. In addition, 
both Nims and Gottesman & Chapman used syllogisms in 
which the content of the argument was restricted to
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topics which were either neutral or of no obvious 
relevance to the subjects. Williams (1964) develops this 
point in his own experiment in which he included 
arguments designed to contain items which were 
potentially relevant to the schizophrenic subjects (in 
fact the extent to which he achieved this aim is 
arguable). Despite this manipulation, Williams found 
only one difference between the schizophrenic and 
control groups, and this was in the opposite direction
to that predicted by the Von Domarus hypothesis. In
consequence, Williams concludes that the hypothesis is 
not substantiated by the data.
Chapman & Chapman (19 73) present a review of the above ■
studies', as well as two others which similarly failed to 
support Von Domarus' hypothesis. They point out that 
that a possible confounding factor in three of the 
studies was the fact that the schizophrenic subjects 
exceeded the controls on certain measures of 
intellectual competence (e.g. length of schooling; 
verbal I.Q.). In addition, the remaining study used 
schizophrenic subjects described as being in "partial 
remission". Chapman & Chapman thus conclude that the
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expérimental evidence is equivocal, and in view oi t 
,act that there are a number of clinical examples whrch 
can easily be interpreted in terms of Von Domarus 
proposals, a rejection of the hypothesis would be
premature. They write:
"NO objective study has, as yet, 
supported von Domarus' and Arieti's 
contention that schizophrenics conclude
an identity of subjects from an identity 
of predicates any more readily than 
normal people. The Von Domarus principle 
could be justifiably discarded if it were
not for the clinical phenomena that
. appear to support it." (pl88)
The aim of this present study is, of course, t o  explore
r;rrr;:;:~=i _
 ^ t h «  n o ™ . l  p r o c  =
.o tp, »... "
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demonstrably false. The next two chapters provide a 
review of some salient facts concerning normal reasoning 
as a prerequisite to the further investigation of 
schizophrenic reasoning.
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Chapter 4. The logic of natural reasoning, part 1
4.0 INTRODUCTION
The relationship between formal logic & natural 
reasoning has been a persistent issue in both the 
psychological and the logical literature for some 
considerable time. Certain 19th century logicians (eg. 
Boole, 1854; Mill 1874) equated formal logic with the 
laws of reasoning. Later investigators (eg. Ayer, 1936; 
Cohen, 1944) have proposed the alternative view that 
formal logic is a system of valid deduction but is 
independent of natural reasoning. For instance, Cohen & 
Nagel (1934), in their classic introductory text, 
provide the specific caveat that "The traditional view 
of logic as the science of valid inference has been 
consistently maintained against all attempts to confuse 
logic with psychology.... Logic cannot be identified with 
the special science of psychology." (p.iv)
Nevertheless, both alternatives have been represented in 
recent literature. A number of studies have addressed 
the specific problem of the nature of the evident
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discrepancy between natural reasoning & formal logic 
The following is a review of some relevant proposals
4.1 THE 'ATMOSPHERE EFFECT' Woodworth & Sells, 1935.
There have been several attempts to account for the fact 
that subjects consistently manifest evidence of ' 
'illogicality' . One of the earliest of these is the 
'atmosphere' hypothesis (Woodworth & Sells, 1935, 
described in Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978).
"Whenever at least one premise is 
negative, the most frequently accepted 
conclusion will be negative; whenever at 
least one premise is particular, the most 
frequently accepted conclusion will 
likewise be particular; otherwise the 
bias is towards affirmative & universal 
conclusions"(Pp. 86-87).
Johnson-Laird & Steedman point out a number of 
difficulties with these proposals. For instance, there 
is, amongst other things, no basis on which the
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hypothesis, as it stands, is able to account for a 
response of 'No valid conclusion possible', since there 
will always be a possible conclusion which is congruent 
with the atmosphere of the premises. However, the above 
response is very often elicited from subjects in 
reasoning experiments. In addition, Bucci (1978) points 
out that it is sufficient as an explanation of the 
atmosphere effect to assume an error at the encoding 
stage of the representation of input in or^er to 
generate a 'global impression ' of the argument & a 
predisposition towards a consistent conclusion. Any 
logical errors which extend beyond this initial 
extralogical stage would be redundant.
4.2 THE 'ILLICIT CONVERSION HYPOTHESIS'.Chapman & 
Chapman, 19 59.
An alternative and influential approach is the 'illicit 
conversion' hypothesis (Chapman & Chapman, 1959). 
According to this view, there is a tendency for subjects 
to fallaciously assume that certain premises imply their 
converse, as in (3) below:
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(3) All A's are B's All B's are A's
It IS also proposed that because of a tendency towards 
probablistic assumptions in natural reasoning, premises 
which share the same predicate, as in (4 ) are likely to 
elicit a conclusion of similarity.
(4) Some A are B 
Some C are B 
Therefore, some C are A
Finally, it is suggested that where premises lack a
common predicate, there will be a tendency to conclude
dissimilarity as in (5 ):
(5) Some A are B
Some C are not B
Therefore, some C are not A
In proposing this hypothesis. Chapman & Chapman .(1973) 
comment:
"Reasoning in syllogisms by the 
traditional Aristotelian rules is a kind 
of game in which permissible inferences 
are arbitrarily limited to those that 
follow by absolute logical necessity. In 
most real-life situations the most 
adaptive form of reasoning is not this.
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but is instead an acceptance of at least 
tentative conclusions on the basis of 
probability of accuracy.... Such thinking 
is not unreasonable; rather, it is the 
reasoning process by which most science 
Progresses. Thus a chemist might reason 
tentatively as follows:
Sulphur is yellow powdery material.
Some of these test tubes contain yellow 
powdery material.
Therefore:
Some of these test tubes (probably) 
contain sulphur."
There have been various criticisms of this approach. For 
instance, Johnson-Laird & Steedman argue on the basis of 
a post-hoc analysis of their own data that the 'illicit 
conversion' hypothesis fails to occur where it is 
predicted that it should. A similar failure to account 
for extant data is described by Bucci, (1978). The 
point, then, is that at the very least, the illicit 
conversion hypothesis, as it stands, is insufficient to
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account for all types of errors in logical reasoning. 
Some hint of the nature of the limitations are provided 
by Wason & Johnson-Laird (1972) who conclude:
"While illicit conversion may be an 
important factor in the evaluation of 
abstract syllogisms, our results suggest 
that it is less prevalent in making 
inferences from concrete 
premises."(p.158)
This distinction between abstract and concrete premises 
is important and will be taken up again in a later 
section. Before that, though, there is one final 
hypothesis which merits discussion.
4.3 'FALSE QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE'.Piaget's 
work.
A line of research which cannot be ignored in the 
present context is that of Piaget (eg. Piaget, 1953). A 
hypothesis which he has proposed to account for apparent 
errors in children's reasoning is termed 'false
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quantification of the predicate'. According to this 
hypothesis, young children who have not mastered the 
cognitive skill of 'inclusion' are consequently unable 
to understand that one category can be part of another 
larger category. This is illustrated in (6 ). The correct 
line of reasoning which demonstrates the principle of 
inclusion is shown in (6a):
(6 ) All of the circles are blue —> All of 
the circles are all of the blue things
(6a) All of the circles are blue — > All 
of the circles are some of the blue 
things
It has been suggested by some writers (eg Braine,1978; 
Osherson, 1974, 1975) that errors of this kind described 
by Piaget are more plausibly attributed to extralogical 
factors, such as the development of 'operational 
schemata' (i.e. internalized cognitive representations 
of related phenomena. Flavell, 1963, writes: "...any 
representational act that is an integral part of an 
organisational network of related acts is an 
operation.".). And Bucci (1978) points out that a
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further objection to Piaget's proposal resides in the
fact that adults, who are supposed to have mastered the
principle of 'inclusion', nevertheless make similar
errors to that illustrated in (9 ). it would seem that
the consensus of opinion on the relevance of Piaget's
theory to a model of human reasoning, is that it is, for
a number of reasons, inadequate. Braine (1978) writes
the following:
"It is terribly frustrating to try to
become clear on precisely what
psychological claims are made by Piaget's 
logic because so much of it is left 
inexplicit.... the logic appears to imply 
the method of proof by truth tables for 
which there is little evidence in human 
reasoning.... In addition, it seems quite 
clear that the form of the logic is very 
seriously underdetermined by data.
"In summary, despite the richness of 
Piaget and Inhelder's work, it is 
necessary, I believe, to set Piaget's 
logic aside as a model for the logical 
component of reasoning."(p.5 )
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Chapter 5. The logic of natural reasoning, part 2
5.0 Introduction.
The hypotheses reviewed so far have all attempted to 
provide rules to account for observed instances of 
erroneous reasoning. However, a major limitation on all 
the accounts discussed has been their inability to 
distinguish between those occasions when errors are 
likely to occur and those when the reasoning proceeds 
according to the rules of formal logic. Objections to 
these hypotheses have been outlined and serious 
limitations have been revealed.
More recently, interest has centred upon the question of 
what exactly distinguishes the circumstances where 
errors are likely to occur from those where logical 
principles appear to be observed. The following sections 
describe some relevant proposals.
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5.1 Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972.
After presenting an extensive review of the reasoning
literature Wason & Johnson-Laird (1972) provide two
observations pertaining to syllogistic arguments.
l^i^stly, it is evident that syllogisms of different
types vary considerably in difficulty. Secondly, even
the easiest of syllogisms take a considerable time to
solve. The inference drawn from these observations is
that the process of deriving conclusions consists of a
series of operations, rather than a single act. On the
f^^sis of these observations the following hypothesis is 
proposed:
"It seems that the reasoner initially 
constructs his first approximation to the 
answer, working in an intuitive fashion, 
and then submits it to a series of 
logical checks.... the thoroughness with 
which the checks are carried out will 
vary from individual to individual, 
depending on both his logical acumen and 
his enthusiasm for the task. But it also
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seems to depend upon the syllogism 
itself. The processes of combination are 
naturally easier for some problems than 
others; and they are also facilitated 
when the content of the problem involves 
familiar everyday matters."(pp.152-153)
fbis hypothesis, of course, raises a number of 
questions. What, for instance, is it that accounts for 
the variation in ease with which different kinds of 
syllogisms permit conclusions to be drawn? And what is 
it about the content of premises that contributes to 
this variability? The following sections attempt to 
provide some answers to these questions
5.2 Harris & Monaco, 1978.
Harris & Monaco present numerous examples of strictly 
illogical conclusions which nevertheless appear to be 
implied by the premises from which they are derived. 
Amongst the class of implied information, Harris &
Monaco distinguish between what is logically and what is
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pragmatically implied(*). This is best illustrated by 
examples. Thus (7a) and (8a) are logical truth 
conditions on (7) and (8 ) respectively:
(7) John forced Bill to rob the bank 
(7a) Therefore, Bill robbed the bank
(8 ) Kathy is taller than Mary
(8a) Therefore, Mary is shorter than 
Kathy
However, (9a) and (10a) are pragmatically rather than 
logically implied by (9) and (10) respectively:
(9) The man dropped the delicate glass 
jug
(9a) Therefore, the man broke the 
delicate glass jug ■
(10) The truck driver stirred the coffee 
(10a) Therefore, the truck driver stirred 
the coffee with a spoon
(*) see footnote at end of chapter.
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Harris & Monaco suggest that the phenomenon of P I  can be
invoked to account for the types of errors often
observed in tests of reasoning. According to this view,
PI is a probablistic strategy based upon the
individual's 'knowledge of the world'. This is, of
course, consistant with the proposals of Chapman .
Chapman ,1959, with respect to the phenomenon of
'illicit conversion'. However, unlike Chapman .chapman,
Harris . Monaco provide a basis to distinguish those
cases where a probablistic strategy is likely to be
employed from those where it is not; viz. for that
subset of arguments whose conclusions are not truth 
conditions on the premises. '
The-relevance of these findings for the problem of 
syllogistic inference is that they provide a basis on 
which the questions posed earlier concerning the nature 
O f  the variability between syllogisms can begin to be 
clarified. This point will be developed in the next
section.
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5.3 Braine, 1978. '
Braine provides a similar line of argument to that
presented by Harris & Monaco in his distinction between 
formal' and 'practical' reasoning.
"Practical (i.e. 'everyday') reasoning 
uses all the information at a person's 
disposal, whereas formal reasoning is ■ 
concerned with whether conclusions follow 
from premises." (p.2 )
Formal reasoning imposes two constraints. Firstly, the 
reasoner must restrict the information used in 
formulating a conclusion to that contained in the 
premises. Secondly, the reasoner must assume a special 
attitude in processing the premises which is restricted 
to discovering their minimum commitments.
As a number of investigators have noted (e.g. Austin, 
1962; Grice, 1975; Johnson-Laird, 1975), the 
comprehension of natural language, by contrast, is rich 
in elaborative processes in which far more than just the 
n-inimum commitments of a sentence, or utterance, are 
considered. Indeed Grice, (1975) and Johnson-Laird
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(1975) have pointed out that, in practical reasoning, 
inferences extraneous to the information given 
explicitly in an utterance are always tacitly assumed
unless it is expressly stated that they do not obtain on
some given occasion.
A phenomenon which illustrates this tendency is the 
'invited inference' (Geis & Zwicky, 1971)..
(13)If you mow the lawn. I'll give you $5
> If you don t mow the lawn, I won't 
give you $5
In fact the inference in (13) commits the logical 
fallacy termed 'denying the antecedent'. Nevertheless, 
it arguably is consistent with 'common sense'. The point 
to note IS that the logical error in (13) is an 
Illustration of a failure to observe the constraint of 
the 'minimum commitment rule' which is necessary for 
formal reasoning.
With respect to syllogistic reasoning, the implication 
of these observations is that errors in formal reasoning 
result from the intrusion of strategies which are more 
appropriate to practical reasoning. And, on the basis of 
these assumptions, Braine proposes a model of the 
deductive process which comprises of two parts. Firstly,
Page 32
there is the performance component, which is concerned 
with two operations. One is the problem of identifying 
the scope of the information to be accepted on the basis 
of the premises provided, and the other is a set of 
strategies by means of which a line of reasoning may be 
constructed. The second component is a system consisting 
of formal rules for the combination of premises: in 
Other words, a logical system.
It can be seen that Braine's and Harris & Monaco's 
proposals share many features of the hypotheses 
described by Chapman & Chapman and Wason &
Johnson-Laird. All confirm the distinction between the 
logical and the probablistic components of the total 
reasoning process, and Braine's and Harris & Monaco's 
proposals provide evidence pertaining to the nature of 
the interaction between these components. The next 
section provides additional evidence on the nature of
this interaction and also describes the background to 
the present study.
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5.4 Bucci, 1978.
In the second of two experiments reported in her paper, 
Bucci investigated the hypothesis that variations in the 
content of the premises was the salient variable in 
determining the nature of the conclusion drawn in 
syllogistic arguments.
Subjects in a reasoning experiment were presented with 
universal affirmative syllogisms (i.e. the major premise 
was in the 'A' mood - see propaedeutic), and there were 
three classes of argument. The category designated 
'Broad Predicate' was characterised by the fact that the 
properties described by the predicate also applied to 
many other items. This is illustarted in (14), where the 
property strong can readily be seen to apply to many 
subjects other than 'wrestlers'.
The category designated Narrow Predicate, on the other 
hand, was characterised by the fact that the properties 
described by the predicate were far more restricted in 
their generality. Thus, in (15) there are no subjects 
other than oak trees ' to which the property of having 
'acorns' applies.
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Finally, as a control, there was a category of 
'Abstract Items ' for which there were no necessary or 
habitual relationships between the subject and predicate 
of the argument, as illustrated by (16):
(14) All wrestlers are strong
(15) All oak trees have acorns
(16) All large blocks are orange
The results obtained indicated that the content of the 
syllogism was a significant factor in influencing the 
conclusion drawn. Where the content consisted of 'Narrow 
Predicate' items, the information in the premises was 
intrinsically restricted by virtue of the fact that 
counter-examples to the properties predicated of the 
subject term were difficult or impossible to imagine 
(for example,in (15) it is difficult to imagine 
anything other than oak trees which have the property of 
possessing acorns). In consequence, where logic demanded 
a conclusion which was inconsistent with the 
pragmatically based information in the argument, it was 
logic that was abandoned in favour of the pragmatically 
plausible conclusion. However, where the content 
consisted of Broad Predicate items, the tension between 
logic and pragmatic factors was reduced by the fact that
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counter-examples were available that were consistent 
both with the logically correct and the pragmatically 
plausible conclusion (for example, in (14) where it easy 
to imagine people other than wrestlers to whom the
property of being strong applies) and so less logically 
erroneous conclusions were elicited.
(*) Footnote to page 28.
The basis for distinguishing logical from pragmatic 
implication is provided by the negation test (e.g. 
Kempson, 1977). Thus an inference follows logically from 
a premise only if the negation of the inference 
automatically negates the premise. If (7b) and (8b) are 
negated, therefore, (7) and (8) automatically become 
false statements. This is illustrated in (7c) and (8c): 
(7c) John forced Bill to rob the bank, 
but Bill didn't rob the bank 
(8c) Kathy is taller than Mary, but Mary 
is not shorter than Kathy
In the case of pragmatic implication, however, negation
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of the inference is permissible without necessarily 
altering the truth-value of the premise:
(11) The man dropped the delicate glass 
jug, but it didn't break
(12) The truck driver stirred the coffee, 
but not with a spoon
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Chapter 6.
6.0 Summary and Predictions
All the above hypotheses suggest either implicitly or 
explicitly a distinction between logical and pragmatic 
factors as two components of the complete reasoning 
process. The question of whether the logical component 
conforms to the principles of existing systems, such as 
Aristotelian logic, remains unclear: there are a number 
of alternatives available (e.g. Kenny, 1966). However, 
this latter question is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
For present purposes it is sufficient to identify those 
findings which remain salient irrespective of the finer 
details of the underlying logical system (*). We are 
thus left with the following conclusions:
(*) see footnote at end of chapter
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The conditions under which illogicality is most likely 
to occur are those where more than just the minimum 
commitments of the premises are observed. The evidence 
from Bucci s data suggests an inverse relationship 
between minimum commitments and the scope of the 
argument such that where the number of counter-examples 
to a logically incorrect conclusion is high (as in the 
Broad Predicate items), the opportunity to formulate a 
judgement in accordance with the logically correct 
conclusion is increased. In this way, the chance of 
deviating from the minimum commitments of the premises 
is decreased. These conditions also coincide with 
circumstances where the conclusion is not entailed by 
the premises.
With respect to schizophrenic reasoning, there is no 
evidence of a higher incidence of Von Domarus type 
errors amongst those diagnosed as schizophrenic than 
amongst the non-schizophrenic population. It appears 
that there are circumstances where both groups will 
formulate conclusions in which similarity of subjects 
appears to have been inferred on the basis of similarity 
of predicates. For non-schizophrenic subjects what is 
not clear, however, is whether this apparent 'error' of
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reasoning is in fact an error per se, or is, rather, a 
coincidental consequence of the interaction between 
logical and pragmatic processes (what may be termed the 
'interaction' hypothesis). In the latter case, there is 
nothing necessarily defective in the logical system. The 
evidence described in chapters 4 and 5 favours the 
interaction hypothesis.
Similar considerations apply to schizophrenic reasoning. 
The question is whether the apparent illogicality of Von 
Domarus type errors in schizophrenic subjects is 
indicative of illogicality per se, or of a similar 
process to that which appears to underlie 
non-schizophrenic instances of the same reasoning. The 
answer cannot be determined solely on the basis of the 
comparative incidence of such errors since the incidence 
is essentially identical. Rather, any differences there 
may be are more likely to be related to the specific 
circumstances where such reasoning occurs. These 
circumstances for non-schizophrenic subjects have been 
outlined above. The question, therefore, is: do the same 
circumstances obtain for schizophrenic subjects ?
The aim of the following study, then, is to investigate 
the specific proposal that the incidence of reasoning
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errors amongst schizophrenic subjects will vary as a 
lunctron of the content of the premises. Any potential
. ' schizophrenic and non-schizophrenic
-stances of such errors would, therefore, be related to 
e extent to which the information available in the 
premises permits logical errors to be avoided. The 
predictions of the Von Domarus hypothesis are that 
^nogical errors will occur irrespective of content. The
.pp..r ... ....... ...
predisposes them.
(*) footnote to page 37.
1 . 1 , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
• ™ . n o g i c a  - „  . .  . .  . . . .  .
Z  T  " ' ..s-p....,
«.= no. b, t.k.. i.p.y .Jb...... .. ... ....
at Aristotelian logic is an adequate characterisation 
human reasoning processes.
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Chapter 7. Method.
7.0 Subjects.
There is some, albeit equivocal, evidence that the 
aberrations of language associated with schizophrenia 
may also be found in mania (e.g. Harrow & Quinlan, 1977; 
Durbin & Marshall, 1977). Consequently, there were three 
subject groups in this experiment: schizophrenic, 
manic-depressive, and non-psychiatric.
Diagnostic category was determined on the basis of (a) 
case notes, and (b) a set of diagnostic criteria gleaned 
from the 'Present State Examination' (Wing, et. al.
1974) and the 'Feighner Criteria' (Feighner, et. al.
1972) - see appendix. The applicability of the 
diagnostic criteria in (b) was independently determined 
by a psychiatrist who was familiar with the patient's 
clinical history.
No effort was made to control for medication, since 
there is evidence that this is not a confounding 
variable in studies of schizophrenic language processes
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(e.g. Feldstein & Jaffe, 1963; Rochester & Martin,
1979).
Groups were matched for age, and years of education.
There were no significant differences between groups on 
these measures.
Because of the stringent diagnostic criteria, group 
sizes were relatively small, being: 9 diagnosed as 
schizophrenic; 8 diagnosed as manic-depressive; 9 
non-psychiatric controls.
Although it was not possible to control for number of
prior admissions, all schizophrenic and manic subjects 
were on acute psychiatric wards.
7.1 Materials.
The materials are derived, with minor modifications, 
from Bucci (1978). Three types of content were used in 
the syllogistic premises. These were 'Broad predicate', 
'Narrow predicate' and 'Abstract'. For each content type 
there were four exemplars. Each occurred as the major 
premise of the syllogism. The items used are illustrated 
rn table (1 ), and the complete list of arguments is 
given in the appendix.
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TABLE 1.
Broad predicate items:
i. All wrestlers are strong
ii. All cats have whiskers
iii. All bears are dangerous
iv. All' fathers are males
Narrow predicate items:
V. All oak trees have acorns
vi. All birds have feathers
vii. All dogs bark
viii.All birds hatch from eggs
Abstract items:
ix. All white blocks are small 
X. All pink blocks are square
xi. All long blocks are purple
xii. All large blocks are orange
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The broad predicate items are characterised by the fact 
that the features of the subject term described by the 
predicate also applied to a wide range of other 
entities. For narrow predicate items, the features 
described by the predicate are far less general, and 
apply to few, if any, other entities. The abstract items 
involved no necessary or habitual associations.
The twelve major premises in table (1) were presented 
within four syllogistic forms, to give a total of 48 
syllogisms. These forms are illustrated in table (2).
Table 2.
Modus Affirming Denying Modus
ponens the the toilens
Consequent Antecedent
All F are G All F are G All F are G All F are G 
% is F X is G X is not F X is not G
Is X G? Is X F? Is X G? Is X F?
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The logically correct replies are 'yes' for modus ponens 
(MP), 'no' for modus tollens (MT), and 'not necessarily' 
for the other two forms (AC) and (DA). However, Bucci 
(1978) has shown that the effect of content is to 
increase the probability of 'false positives' (i.e. 
yes instead of 'not necessarily') for certain 
syllogisms of the AC form. Specifically, there are more 
logical errors with Narrow predicate and Abstract items 
than there are with Broad predicate items. The 
predictions of the Von Domarus hypothesis are that there 
should be a similar increase for schizophrenic subjects, 
in the incidence of false positives to the AC 
syllogistic form, since this amounts to concluding 
identity on the basis of similarity. However, since 
according to Von Domarus 'paralogical ' reasoning is 
indiscriminate in schizophrenia, these errors should 
occur irrespective of content. On the other hand, if Von 
Domarus errors in schizophrenic subjects are based upon 
similar principles to those which apply in 
non-schizophrenic reasoning, and are nothing more than 
artefacts of the intrusion of pragmatic information into 
the reasoning process, then such errors will not be
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indiscriminate, but will vary according to content
7.2 Procedure.
All subjects were given an initial semi-structured 
interview on a neutral topic lasting about 20 minutes. 
The aim was to provide an opportunity for potential 
anxieties to be reduced, and to acquaint subjects with 
the experimental conditions. At the end of the 
interview, subjects were asked whether they would be 
prepared to take part in an investigation which had to 
do with the way in which sentences were understood. It 
was made clear that they were under no obligation to 
take part. If they agreed to continue, they were told 
that they would be read sentences by the investigator 
and that their task was to decide whether the answer to 
the question asked at the end of each sentence was 
"yes', "no", or "not necessarily". Each subject was 
given two trial sentences as examples.
In order to obviate potential memory difficulties, 
subjects were presented with a written form of the same
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sentences which they were able to see for themselves at 
the same time that the experimenter read them out.
Each subject was presented with the four syllogistic 
forms in each of the three content categories, giving a 
total of twelve items per subject. The total set of 48 
items was presented in pseudo-randomised and 
counter-balanced order.
All replies were recorded onto a Uher 4200 report stereo 
Ic tape-recorder. They were later transcribed and scored 
by the experimenter who was blind to reply accuracy.
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Chapter 8. Results and Discussion.
In view of the restricted sample size, the Log 
Likelihood Ratio Test (G-Test) was used in the following 
analysis. The assumptions are the same as for the
Chi-Squared Test, however the G-Test is more appropriate 
for small samples (Woolf, 1957).
Table (3) shows the percentage distribution of responses 
within groups and content types for all syllogistic
fo rm s.
Figure (1) shows the percentage of errors to the four 
syllogistic forms as a function of subject group and 
content type. There is no significant effect of subject 
group on response distribution for any content type or 
syllogistic form. All the following comments, therefore 
apply equally to all groups.
All subject groups show a significant tendency towards 
the logically correct response to MP forms (G=40.15, 
df=2, p<0.001.*) and MT forms (G=33.82, df=2, p<0.001). 
This is true irrespective of content type.
*n.b. All data reported are based on the figures for a 
one-tailed test.
TABLE 3. 
(n.b. N/n="Not necessarily').
DIAG- SYLLOGISM 
NOSIS FORM
CONTENT
TYPE
BROAD NARROW ABSTRACT
PREDICATE PREDICATE
N/n No Yes N/n No Yes N/n No
Schiz. MP 78 22 0 89 0 11 ~~78~~ïï"''ïï
AC 44 44 12 78 0 22 44 33 23
DA 34 33 33 11 22 67 11 22 67
^  0 11 89 22 0 78 0 22 78
Depr. MP 87 13 0 ' 100 0 0 3
AC 37 50 13 74 13 13 75 25 0
DA 13 25 62 25 25 50 13 50 27
_________ NT_______0__ 25 75 0 25 75 0 37 63
Non- MP 89 11 0 78 22~~0 78~"2r~o'
Psych. AC 34 33 33 45 22 33 67 22 11
DA 22 56 22 11 22 67 0 33 67
11 0 89 11 0 89 11 33 56
Table showing the distribution of responses within 
groups and content types for all syllogistic forms. 
The figures are expressed as percentages.
ru t. T«fC
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The fact that there is no significant variability 
between groups in response to these forms indicates a 
general ability to perform reasoning tasks accurately, 
and demonstrates that the schizophrenic as well as the 
non-schizophrenic subjects are able to combine 
propositions and draw inferences according to the 
criteria of syllogistic logic. This is confirmed by the 
fact that the effect is true for abstract items, as well 
as the other categories. Consequently, any logical 
errors on the two other syllogistic forms cannot be 
attributed to the lack of this ability and, therefore, 
these data contradict the claim of the Von Domarus 
hypothesis that schizophrenic subjects are unable to
reason according to the principles of Aristotelian 
logic.
However, the specific claim of the Von Domarus 
hypothesis is that the difference between schizophrenic 
and non-schizophrenic reasoning errors resides in the 
tendency of the former group to erroneously conclude 
identity on the basis of predicated similarity. The 
major and minor premises of the MP form do not share 
predicates, and the premises of the MT form do not 
express similarity. Consequently the proper test of this
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proposal is to be found in syllogisms where predicates 
are shared and where similarity is expressed: namely the 
AC form.
For the AC form there is a significant tendency for all 
groups to give 'false positives' (i.e. 'Yes' instead of 
'Not necessarily') to Narrow predicate items (G=6.21, 
df=2, p<0.025), and to Abstract items (G=5.34, df=2, 
p<0.05). However, there is no such tendency with Broad 
predicate items, and there is no statistically 
significant difference between groups for any of these 
effects. The fact that all groups are less likely to 
produce logical errors for Broad predicate items 
suggests that the pragmatic information in these items 
is exerting an influence on the conclusions drawn. The 
fact that there is a difference between Narrow and Broad 
predicate items for all subject groups suggests that 
there is an interaction between the pragmatic 
information and the constraints of logic, such that the 
availability of counter-examples for Broad predicate 
items more easily enables the minimum commitment rule' 
to be observed. This contradicts the predictions of the 
Von Domarus hypothesis that schizophrenic subjects 
should produce 'false positives' for all syllogisms of
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the AC form irrespective of content types.
Although the results of the DA syllogistic form are not 
directly relevant to the hypothesis under consideration, 
it is worth noting that the results here confirm the 
trends noted above in that there is no significant 
difference in the distribution of responses between 
subject groups.
Page 52
Chapter 9. Conclusions and recommendations
The aim of this thesis has been to explicate the claim 
originally made by Von Domarus (1944) that there is some 
feature in the logical component of the reasoning 
process which distinguishes schizophrenic from 
non-schizophrenic logical operations. The evidence 
accumulated appears to argue against this claim. There 
are, however, certain limitations on the data which need 
to be recognized.
First of all, it should be noted that the sample size 
used was relatively small. The results obtained, 
therefore, should be considered suggestive rather than 
definitive.
In addition, the logical operations investigated have 
been restricted to the sub-set of Universal Affirmative 
propositions. It is possible that other prepositional 
forms, such as the Particular Universal, etc., may 
elicit different patterns of results - although there is 
no a priori reason to assume that this would, in fact, 
be the case.
In the introductory chapter of this study it was noted
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that manifestations of "schizophrenic behaviour" may be 
episodic and unpredictable. It is difficult to know, 
therefore, to what extent the tasks in this study 
elicited, or coincided with such behaviour. In other 
words the sample of behaviour obtained may be 
unrepresentative. It could, perhaps, be argued that a 
more representative sample would be obtained from 
subjects whose behaviour was not controlled by 
medication. However, apart from any practical and 
ethical aspects of witholding medication, it is not 
clear that medication is a confounding variable 
(references on this point were given in chapter 7). 
Another variation on the question of representativeness 
resides in the fact that the subjects comprising the 
schizophrenic sample may be in some way atypical. 
Despite attempts to ensure that diagnosis was fairly 
clear, it was not possible to control for every 
potentially confounding factor. For example, there is 
evidence that a relevant variable affecting the 
manifestation of communication difficulty in 
schizophrenia may be "thought-disorder". Thus Rochester 
& Martin (1979) found that incoherence in schizophrenic 
utterances occurred only for those individuals who were
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diagnosed as thought-disordered. Within the present 
sample, four of the nine schizophrenic subjects were 
thus diagnosed. This number, however, is too small to 
permit even informal analysis. Any future investigations 
these lines, though, ought to consider 
thought-disorder as a potentially salient variable.
An important feature of Arieti s (1955) development of 
the Von Domarus hypothesis was the idea that 
"paleological reasoning" in schizophrenia was a 
regressive strategy adopted in order to diminish 
anxiety. It is possible, then, that the present 
experiment has failed to produce circumstances likely to 
promote such a regressive strategy. Of course, the 
unavoidable problem that arises is that any efforts to 
make the experiment more stressful would, as well as 
ethically questionable, be likely to reduce 
drastically the number of potential volunteers 1 
Where, then, does this leave the Von Domarus hypothesis? 
It will be recalled that Chapman & Chapman (1973) were 
of the opinion that despite the lack of experimental 
validation, the hypothesis retains a certain clinical 
relevance insofar as it does appear to capture the 
essence of certain examples of schizophrenic
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communication reported in the literature. It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that there are also 
many examples for which it is inadequate. Bearing in 
mind the above mentioned limitations, the evidence of 
this study suggests that the Von Domarus hypothesis as a 
pathognomic principle is untenable. At the most it 
provides an interesting description of certain examples. 
But it by no means follows that it has any explanatory 
power.
Having said this, the failure of this study to 
demonstrate any significant differences in the 
performance of schizophrenic and non-schizophrenic 
subjects must be treated with some circumspection. If 
any credibility is to be attached to diagnostic labels, 
then it would seem reasonable to assume that some 
differences do exist. The question, though, is not so 
much whether they exist. It is, rather, what is the most 
appropriate level at which to describe the differences ? 
It is concluded that, at least for the subset of logical 
operations that have been evaluated in this study, the 
Von Domarus hypothesis does not operate at the 
appropriate level to capture the essence of 
schizophrenic communication difficulties.
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APPENDIX. Showing
(a) Diagnostic criteria used.
(b) List of experimental sentences.
DL'lGNOSTlC SILSET FOR  ........................................................................................................................ ( P n t i r n l ' ,  nnr>e )
(MMi./rrHMF/ ) 
(■^ DELETE AS AMROmUTE)
1. AGE IN YEARS
2. MARRIED OR SINGLE?
5. ANY FAMILY HISTORY OF SCHIZOIHRENIA?
4. ANY E\TDENCE OF ALCOHOLISM?
5. ANY EVIDENCE OF DRUG ABUSE?
6. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF PREMOHBID 
SOCLAL ADJUSTMENT OR WORK HISTORY
7. NATURE OF PREVIOUS E>ffLOYMENT,
IF KNOWN
8. AGE ON LSAAULNG FULL TIME EDUCATION
9 . ANY ACADEMIC OR TECHNICAL 
QUALIFICATIONS?
10. im  PRE\U0U5 HOSPITALIZATION?
11. im  ECT?
12. IiNY EVIDENCE OF BRAIN D/JLIGE?
1 5. CURRENT MEDICATION? (details)
14. LENGTH OF ILINESS
1 5. ANY EVIDENCE OF DEPRESSIIT: OR M/iNIC 
SYMPTOMS WHICH MIGHT INDICATE 
AFFECTIVE DISORDER OR PROB/lBLE 
AFFECTIVE DISORDER?
16. IiNY EVIDENCE OF DELUSIONS?
17. DOSS THE PATIENT SHOW ANY EVIDENCE 
OF DIFFICULTY IN COMMUNICATING?
(for INSTANCE, A LACK OF LOGICAL OR 
UNDEJIST/JnDABLE OIKIANIZATION IN HIS/HER 
UTTERANCES)
IF THE ANSWER TO I? IS "NO" PLEASE
DISREGARD THE FOLUAvMNG QUESTIONS.
IF THE ANSA^ FR IS "YES" , PLEASE
YES/NO/NOT KNOWN"^  
YES/NO"*"
YES/NO*
GOOD/B^f^fbo#
(years)
yes/no/not KNOWN"^
YES/NO^; Date of last session.. 
POSITIVELY YES/POSSIBLY YES/NO"*"
YES/NO*
YES/NO*
YES/T40'
8. ARE THERE ANY NEOLOGISMS OR BIZARRE 
WORDS OR PHRASES EVIDENT IN THE 
PATIENT’S SPEECH?
9. DOES THE PATIENT’S SPEECH SEEM 
GENERALLY INCOHSREINT?
EG. DISTORTED OlAMMAR
IRRELEVANT ANSlfERS
OBSCURITY
' INAPPROPRIATE TOPIC SHIFT
0. IS THERE "FLIGHT OF IDEAS"?
EG. WORDS ASSOCIATED ON BASIS OF 
SIMILARITY OF SOUND
DISTRACTION BY EXTRANEOUS 
NOISE, OBJECTS, Etc.
PUNNING (vhether or not 
intentional)
1. IS THERE PO\FRTY OF THE CONTENT OF 
SPEECH?
EG. SPEECH WHICH SEEMS VAGUE AND 
CONVEYS LITTLE INFORM/iTION
REPETITION
SUDDEN "BLOCKING", ie., STOPPING 
IN MID SÜNTEÎ'ICE FOR NO APRARjNT 
REASON im  FAILURE TO RECAPTURE 
THEII3
YES/kO*
(t i c k if h i e s s n t)
I I
u
If all white bloca^i ai e small, ano thin llocr; if. not 
white, is it small?
If all birds hatch from eggs, and this nninnl did riOt 
hatch from an egg, is it a bird ?
If all fathers are male, and this person is n f  n t h o r , 
i s  h e m a l e  ?
If all long blocks are purple, and this blocit is purplo, 
i s it long ?
If* a.11 dogs bark, and. this animal is not a dog, 
does it bark ?
If all bears are dangerous, and this animal is not 
dangerous, is it a bear ?
If all large blocks are orange, and this blocic is large, 
is it orange ?
If all birds have feathers, and this animal has feathers,
is it a bird ?
If all cats have whiskers, and this animal is not a cat, 
does it have whiskers ?
If all pink blocks are squaxe, and this blocK is not 
square, is it pinK ?
If all oak trees have acorns, and this tree is an oa^, 
does it have acorns ?
If all wrestlers are strong, and this man is strong,
is he a wrestler ?
If all cats have whiskers, and this animal ha 
is it a cat ? s whiskers,
If all large blocks 
is it large ?
are orange, and this block is not orange,
ii all pink block 
is it square ?
s are square, and this block is pipink,
If all oak trees have acorns, and this tree does not 
have acorns, is it an oak ?
If all bears are dangerous, and this animal i 
is it dangerous ? s a bear.
If all dogs bark, and this animal barks, is it a dog ?
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•f all white bio 
s it white ?
oks are small, and this block is small.
If all wrestlers are strong, and this man is a wrestler, 
i s he strong ?
If all oak trees have acorns, and this tree has acorns, 
is it an oak ?
If all pink blocks are square, and this block .is not pink, 
is it square ?
If all cats have whiskers, and this animal does not 
have whiskers, is it a cat ?
If all birds have feathers, and this animal is a bird, 
does it have feathers ?
If all large blocks are orange, and this block is orange,
is it large ?
If all bears are dangerous, and this animal is not a bear, 
is it dangerous ?
If all dogs bark, and this animal does not bark, 
is it a dog ?
If all long blocks are purple, and this block is long,
is it purple ?
If all fathers are male, and this person is male,
is he a father ?
If all birds hatch from eggs, and this animal is not a bird,
did it hatch from an egg ?
nil white blocks are small, and this block is not small,
is it white ?
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If all long blocks 
is it long ?
are purple, and this block is not purple.
If all dogs bark, and this animal is a dog 
does it bark ?
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